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NOTE
WHAT BIG EYES AND EARS YOU HAVE!:
A NEW REGIME FOR COVERT
GOVERNMENTAL SURVEILLANCE
Mark G. Young"
Americans do not like the idea of being secretly watched; indeed, they
have grown up with the idea that one of the hallmarks of a free society
is that people do not have to take a walk in the woods to have private
conversations.!
INTRODUCTION
Several notable events in the past months have renewed with great
urgency and vigor a long-standing national debate about the proper
balance between the government's powers to maintain order and
security and citizens' liberties as provided in the Constitution. A few
days after the Super Bowl in January 2001, newspapers and television
programs revealed that the Tampa Police Department, in conjunction
with the National Football League and other law-enforcement
agencies, surreptitiously scanned the faces of all the people who
attended the game and, after converting certain measurements of
their faces into sophisticated algorithms, relayed this information to
computers which compared these algorithms to a database of known
or suspected terrorists.2 While there were those who voiced support
for this surreptitious surveillance of Super Bowl patrons,3 several
* J.D. Candidate, 2002 Fordham University School of Law. This Note is in honor of
my brother and with deep appreciation, admiration, and affection for my wife and
parents. I also owe a debt of gratitude to several colleagues on the Fordham Law
Review.
1. Super Bowl Snooping, Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 16.
2. Louis Sahagun & Josh Meyer, Secret Cameras at Super Bowl Scanned Crowd
for Criminals, L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al ("In a command post at Raymond
James Stadium in Tampa, Fla., the digitized images of fans and workers were cross-
checked against files of local police, the FBI and state agencies at the rate of a million
images a minute."). Although the faces entered into the database were apparently for
terrorist suspects, the 19 matches that resulted from this surveillance were mostly
pickpockets and con artists. See id.
3. See John D. Woodward Jr., And Now, the Good Side of Facial Profiling,
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prominent newspapers ran editorials sharply denouncing such a
practice.
On September 11, 2001, four commercial airplanes were hijacked-
two of which were crashed into the World Trade Center and one into
the Pentagon.' In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, the
attitude toward the propriety of widespread surveillance seems to
have markedly changed.' On the belief that vigorous surveillance is
necessary to prevent similar future calamities, Congress and President
George W. Bush launched proposals for expanding the powers of
federal agents in several important respects, including the authority to
conduct electronic surveillance.' Although muted, there were also
Wash. Post, Feb. 4, 2001, at B4 (advocating a pragmatic, middle-ground approach to
surveillance which recognizes the value of these techniques but which also attempts to
minimize their privacy-intruding aspects).
4. See, e.g., Super Bowl Snooping, supra note 1; Super Day for Big Brother,
Editorial, L.A. Times, Feb. 2,2001, at B8. The New York Times published two letters
to the editors that reflected this schism between views. See At the Game, Big Brother
is Watching You, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2001, at A18. One letter-
writer acquiesced in the need for the intrusion given the risk of terrorism, stating that
"Terrorism is a threat of major proportions, and distasteful as it seems, surveillance of
public places and tools of facial character recognition may be necessary." Id. The
other was distressed by the affront to the notion of privacy and the inability to
"observe the observers." This person stated: "When video and other high-tech
equipment are used by government agencies to randomly and surreptitiously monitor
citizens while they are out in public (and worse, capture their images), the expectation
of being able to 'observe the observers' is violated." Id.
5. See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked: Hijacked Jets Destroy Twin Towers and
Hit Pentagon in Day of Terror, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,2001, at Al.
6. Cf Neil Munro & Peter H. Stone, A Tougher Balancing Act, 33 Nat'l J. 2852
(2001) (noting how the attack will likely lead to pressure and calls for increased law-
enforcement capabilities, particularly in the area of surveillance, and stating that
"[privacy] advocates now face a potentially insurmountable political problem: a wave
of public disgust and fear that will likely help boost police budgets and surveillance
authority nationwide"); David Barstow, Envisioning an Expensive Future in the Brave
New World of Fortress New York, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2001, at 16 (discussing how
attitudes about security are likely to change); Marcia Coyle & Bob Van Voris, A New
Landscape as U.S. Seeks to Protect Itself, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 24, 2001, at A4 (discussing
likely changes in attitudes about security vis-A-vis privacy, and possible legislative
measures); Linda Greenhouse, The Clamor of a Free People, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16,
2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (noting that due to recent events the balance
between security and liberty "will now be recalibrated to reflect both new realities
and new perceptions").
7. See Lizette Alvarez, Spying on Terrorists and Thwarting Them Gains New
Urgency, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,2001, at A17 (reporting the Senate's late-night passage
two days after the attacks of an amendment with significant implications for the law
of surveillance that was attached to an appropriations bill for the Department of
Justice); Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties: Rights Groups
Unite To Seek Safeguards, Wash. Post, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 (reporting the
introduction by Attorney General John Ashcroft of a revised and expanded anti-
terrorism legislative proposal). See infra notes 271-83 and accompanying text for a
further discussion of these legislative proposals.
Shortly after passage of the USA Patriot Act, Attorney General John Ashcroft
authorized the Bureau of Prisons to eavesdrop on communications between
"inmates" and their attorneys upon a "specific determination that such actions are
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strong reactions against these legislative measures and calls for the
protection of civil liberties.8
These conflicting views illustrate the battle as old as the country
over the proper balance between granting the government authority
to maintain order in society and restraining the government from
reasonably necessary in order to deter future acts of violence or terrorism." National
Security; Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,062, 55,064
(Oct. 31, 2001) (amending 28 C.F.R. pts. 500, 501); see also Neil A. Lewis &
Christopher Marquis, Longer Visa Waits for Arabs; Stir over U.S. Eavesdropping,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2001, at Al. Characterizing the regulation as an interim rule
and invoking the good-cause and the foreign-affairs exceptions to the notice-and-
comment requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1),
(b)(B) (1994), Attorney General Ashcroft implemented the rule without public
comment. 66 Fed. Reg. at 55,064-65. Although enacted to deter terrorism, the new
rule potentially permits eavesdropping on attorney-client communications in other
situations. For one, the regulation defines "inmate" broadly to include "all persons in
the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons or Bureau contract facilities... ; D.C.
Code felony offenders; and persons held as witnesses, detainees, or otherwise." 66 Fed.
Reg. at 55,065 (amending 28 C.F.R. § 501.1(c)) (emphasis added). Second, the
standard articulated in the rule is broad and vague: "[AII communications between
inmate and attorneys may be monitored, to the extent determined to be reasonably
necessary for the purpose of deterring future acts of violence or terrorism." 66 Fed.
Reg. at 55,066 (amending 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)). Third, it is not clear that this
provision is subject to any time limitations, since section 501.3(d) does not explicitly
subject attorney-client eavesdropping to the time limitations for other "special
administrative measures" contained in section 501.3(a). See id. Nevertheless, the
regulations require that the inmate and attorney be notified of the surveillance prior
to its initiation, unless otherwise authorized by a court. Id.
8. See Krim, supra note 7 ("A coalition of public interest groups from across the
political spectrum has formed to try to stop Congress and the Bush administration
from rushing to enact counterterrorism measures before considering their effect on
Americans' privacy and civil rights."); see also Greenhouse, supra note 6 (querying
"at what point do security measures start to corrode the very society they are
designed to protect?" and noting that times of crisis, "deep insecurity, grief and
anger," which most test our commitment to the ideals of liberty, "'in fact have often
evoked the worst of our national instincts"); The Home Front Security and Liberty,
Editorial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 16 (stating that the
legislative measure proposed by the Bush administration after the attack contained
some useful steps, but warning that "many of the ideas being shopped by the Bush
administration would reduce constitutional protections with no obvious benefit to
national security"); The National Defense, Editorial, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2001, at
A26 (urging measures to counteract terrorism but cautioning about and advocating
for the preservation of constitutional rights and stating "[tihere must be an exacting
examination of how the country can face this threat without sacrificing its liberties");
Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Statement on Pro-Surveillance Criticism (Sept.
21, 2001), at http:llwwvv.eff.orglPrivacy/Surveillance/20010921_effstatement.html
(explaining EFF's opposition to some of the legislative measures to augment law
enforcement's surveillance capabilities-i) that the proposed changes are being
considered and passed in great haste and with minimal discourse, 2) that the proposed
changes, though putatively aimed at terrorism, are "broad ranging, permanent
reductions in civil liberties and privacy of all Americans," 3) that portions of the
proposals "appear to be part of a general law enforcement 'wish list' rather than a
specific response to terrorism," and 4) that there is no indication that the present legal
regime hampered law enforcement's ability to detect or investigate the acts) (on file
with the Fordham Law Review).
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intruding on personal liberties.9 Attempting to find and maintain a
proper balance is critical given the potential risks facing our society,
given increasingly sophisticated technologies, and given our
substantial and growing dependence on communications, transactions,
and other activities which leave some kind of data trail. Although
new anti-terrorism measures most likely will be desirable and
appropriate in light of the events of September 11, it is important to
bear in mind that the government already possesses very substantial
technological and legal capabilities, as this Note will discuss. While
there likely will be support for exploiting electronic surveillance
technologies in expanded or new ways to investigate and deter similar
events, this Note urges caution. The government's powers are already
broad and deep, and the current regime for regulating them is fraught
with profound problems; we risk throwing out the baby but keeping
the bathwater if we expand the government's surveillance capabilities
without addressing the problems of the current regime and without
ascertaining whether the failure to prevent this or future attacks is
actually a function of restrictions on the use of surveillance.
Although this balance between government's authority and citizens'
rights is the substance of the entire Constitution, the Fourth
Amendment is the part of that venerable document that comes most
into play when evaluating the boundaries, if any, of the government's
prerogatives of searching and seizing in the name of maintaining order
and safety. The Supreme Court's efforts to make the Fourth
Amendment's fundamental precepts meaningful in this era of highly
sophisticated technology has been widely criticized, and even the
Court appears to recognize weaknesses in its jurisprudence. 0 This
past term, the Supreme Court rendered its latest decision on the
constitutionality of a modern surveillance technology in Kyllo v.
United States." Although the Court's holding in Kyllo-that the use
of thermal imagers to detect unusual patterns of heat emanating from
a house is a search, requiring a warrant 2-might indicate the Court's
ability to keep abreast of technological advances, a closer analysis of
the entire system by which technologies are developed, used, and
regulated, casts doubt on this important supposition.
The surreptitious surveillance at the Super Bowl in Tampa and the
thermal imagers at issue in Kyllo illustrate several important aspects
of modern covert surveillance technology. First, the Tampa police's
face-scanner and the thermal imagers were each deployed or used by
a law-enforcement agency at its own discretion, with little or no
knowledge by the general public and little or no involvement by a
9. See infra notes 421-22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 365-67 and accompanying text; see also Kyllo v. United States,
121 S. Ct. 2038, 204546 (2001) (criticizing the "intimate details" test).
11. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2000).
12. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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judicial or legislative branch. Second, the face-scanning at the Super
Bowl shows how these technologies often involve the merging of
several technologies-here, the merging of biometrics, computer
databases and data-processing, and telecommunications- to create
powerful synergies.
Part I.A of this Note describes several important surveillance
technologies that the government is using or developing. This
discussion attempts to convey the technological sophistication of
modern surveillance and to identify the significant trends likely to
affect the government's surveillance capabilities in the future. Part
I.B explores the respective roles of the branches of the federal
government in utilizing and regulating these surveillance technologies.
These technologies and the entire system by which the government
deploys and regulates them constitute what will be referred to
throughout this Note as the surveillance regime.
Part H of the Note discusses several substantial problems with this
regime, such as the weakness of the sanctions against abuses and the
lack of any preemptive regulation. Further, this Part explores the
problems of having Fourth Amendment protections turn on
normative judgments by a panel of judges about "reasonableness" and
"expectations of privacy." Finally-but perhaps most
fundamentally-this Part then compares the regime with the
Founders' original understanding of the Constitution in general and
the Fourth Amendment in particular.
Based on the fundamental problems explored in Part II, Part III
argues for a fundamental rethinking of this regime. Accordingly, it
proposes an alternative regime, one which would permit
governmental agencies to use these powerful technologies toward the
paramount societal goal of maintaining domestic and international
peace and security, while at the same time appropriately regulating
their use and, in particular, minimizing their misuse.
At the heart of this proposal is the adoption by the Court of a rule
that the use of a surveillance technology is per se unreasonable unless
the executive agency or the Congress (or both) have clearly and
overtly disclosed its intended usage and established the rules and
regulations governing its use, especially measures to effectively
prevent abuse or misuse. The function and purpose of such a rule
would be to force the government, either the executive governmental
agencies seeking to use these technologies or the Congress, to be
accountable in its use of increasingly sophisticated and unobtrusive
technologies and to bear the burden in the first instance of defining
their reasonable use and of implementing measures to prevent misuse.
The principle behind such a rule is that the Fourth Amendment's
directive that the citizens' right against unreasonable searches and
seizures "shall not be violated" is meaningless when the government's
surveillance activities are virtually undetectable and unaccountable
2001] 1021
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and when the governmental agent's discretion has few realistic
bounds. Although maintaining important oversight on the substance
of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme
Court's primary role would be ensuring disclosure of the technology
and its intended usage, articulation of a legitimate purpose,
development of procedures and appropriate safeguards, and
compliance with these procedures and safeguards.
It bears mentioning that this Note explicitly seeks to avoid turning
this inquiry into an analysis of the right to privacy, as is often done
and indeed as the Supreme Court has done. 3 There is already
substantial literature on the meaning of privacy and on whether
privacy is a right that is constitutionally protected. 4 Focusing on
privacy places the burden on the citizen 5 rather than on the
government, which, this Note argues, is not only impractical but also
contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Fourth Amendment
specifically, and the Constitution generally. 6 Requiring the citizenry
to articulate and defend a "right to privacy" will, in the face of
inexorable technological progress, lead to an increasingly meaningless
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the focus of this Note is on the
government and its ability to articulate a legitimate purpose for its
surveillance, to tailor the means closely to the purpose, and to
construct sufficient safeguards against the misuse of these powerful
technologies.
13. See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text. The prevailing view currently
is against recognizing a broad constitutional right to privacy. Despite language in the
Ninth Amendment which on its face seems to allow-perhaps even encourage-the
recognition of rights that were not specifically created in the Bill of Rights, this view is
generally disfavored. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review 38 (1980) ("[Tjhe conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was
intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional rights beyond those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution is the only conclusion its language seems
comfortably able to support."); see id. at 33-34 (describing the Ninth Amendment as
the "old constitutional jester" and its disparagement in "sophisticated legal circles").
14. The seminal article on privacy, The Right to Privacy, was written by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Warren
and Brandeis were alarmed by the invasiveness of photography. See Samuel D.
Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 195 (1890).
The issue remains highly cogent and there are any number of books and law review
articles arguing for and against a constitutional right to privacy. See, e.g., Amitai
Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy (1999); The Right to Privacy (Ellen Frankel Paul et al.
eds., 2000); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme
Court. 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 173; William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960);
Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. Il. U. L. Rev. 479
(1990).
15. See infra note 414 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.
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I. THE REGIME IN THE UNITED STATES FOR COVERT
SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGIES
In the context of surveillance technologies, it is worth taking stock
of the familiar adage, "information is power." In the context of
criminal prosecutions, information gained from wiretaps, for example,
"can be powerful evidence of guilt,"'" and thus the allure of these
technologies for crime-fighting is predictably and justifiably very
strong. On the other hand, events such as Watergate serve as a
reminder that the appetite for power and for information can at times
be irresistible, and surveillance technologies can provide access to
important information for nefarious use, such as to undermine or
subvert political rivals or dissidents. In short and as this part of the
Note will attempt to show, there are various uses for surveillance
technologies, some of which are important, perhaps even vital, and
warrant the technologies' robust use; however, there are other uses
for the technology which pose grave risks. After describing the
sophistication of several important surveillance technologies, this part
of the Note will discuss the technologies' various governmental users
and uses, and the current judicial and legislative rules that exist to
constrain them.
A. The Technologies
Given the prominence in Americans' daily lives of highly
sophisticated technological devices-from personal computers to
cellular phones and from "smart homes" to global-positioning-satellite
devices for boats and cars' 8- few people will be surprised that there is
a wide array of highly sophisticated surveillance technologies.
Further, since many of these sophisticated devices generally benefit
users, it is easy to be lulled into a general perception that all
technological advancement should be embraced and eagerly fostered.
This part of the Note will describe several important surveillance
technologies-a comprehensive survey of all technologies with
potential surveillance applications is beyond this Note's scope. While
some of these technologies may be familiar, others, such as those used
at the Super Bowl in Tampa 9 which are designed to be unobtrusive,
may be less well known or not commonly considered as a surveillance
technology. The government's present capability for surveillance and
monitoring is already very broad, sophisticated, and widely used; the
17. Melissa J. Annis, Electronic Surveillance: Does it Bug You?, USABulletin,
Sept. 1997, at 33,38-39, excerpts reprinted in 9 The Department of Justice Manual § 9-
60.202A, at 9-1214.41 (1987) (giving primer on practical aspects and common issues of
surveillance).
18. See infra notes 36, 41-42 and accompanying text for statistics on the use of
personal computers and cellular telephones.
19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
2001] 1023
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uses and the capabilities will almost certainly continue to expand as
the technologies continue to develop. This Note classifies the array of
surveillance technologies into three categories: 1) technologies for
intercepting communications, such as wiretaps; 2) technologies for
enhancing perception, such as night-vision devices and thermal
imagers; and 3) technologies for identifying and tracking, a broad
category which includes location-tracking devices, biometric devices,
and computer systems and databases.
1. Technologies for Intercepting Communications
The importance of telephonic communications for business,
community, and culture is plainly evident. As one commentator
described this phenomenon: "We are moving the fabric of our society
into electronic channels as quickly as we can."20 Given the tremendous
and growing reliance by U.S. citizens on telecommunications, it is
important that the government's ability to protect the nation and to
ensure that internal peace and safety keep pace with these large
developments-i.e., that law enforcement be able to perform
reasonable searches into and seizures of these communications.
However, given this large reliance on telecommunications, it is equally
important that citizens' privacy rights be robustly safeguarded.
Presumably, the American public is generally familiar with wiretaps
and "bugs" which have existed for over a century and appear
frequently in the news and in television shows, movies, and spy novels.
Because these technologies are generally familiar, their continued
effectiveness against people who know to be discreet has required that
increasingly sophisticated and unobtrusive methods be created and
perfected.21 Furthermore, the communications industry has changed
20. Whitfield Diffie & Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of
Wiretapping and Encryption, at viii (1998).
21. See infra note 40; cf, e.g., Evans v. State, 314 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ga. 1984)
(noting that "the simplest method of installing a tap... would have presented a
serious risk of detection by criminal suspects, because it would have caused a drop in
voltage measurable by equipment available to commercial gamblers"); Edward V.
Long, The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry 21 (1966)
(noting how people in Nazi Germany tried to evade the Gestapo's surveillance by
conducting sensitive conversations in bathrooms or public parks).
Indeed, as part of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA") and at the request of the FBI, Congress required that communications
service-providers permit law-enforcement agencies to conduct completely
undetectable surveillance. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress,
Electronic Surveillance in a Digital Age 16 (1995), available at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/ [hereinafter OTA, Surveillance in a Digital Age].
The OTA report, which "relies heavily" on an FBI report entitled Law Enforcement's
Requirements for Electronic Surveillance, see id. at 15 n.17, notes:
Intercepts must be undetectable by the intercept subject or other callers, and
known only to the monitoring law enforcement agency and authorized
personnel of the service provider responsible for setting up the intercept. In
some cases, intercept subjects may use sophisticated equipment to detect
1024 [Vol. 70
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dramatically over the last few decades,'- pressuring law enforcement
to develop new technologies to enable its access to new means of
communications such as cellular telephones and e-mail.
Although there are occasional voices that question the value of
wiretapping,2 the prevailing view is aptly summarized by one
hornbook which states: "Wiretapping and eavesdropping are among
the most effective investigative techniques available to combat
crime."'24 The effectiveness of these means is quite self-apparent:
intercepts; nonetheless, service providers are obligated only to provide
transparency within the limits of their equipment based on industry
standards for transmission characteristics.
Id at 22.
22. See infra notes 36, 41-42 and accompanying text. Regarding changes in the
telecommunications industry, the congressional Office of Technology Assessment
observed in 1995:
Technology has raced ahead, the structure of the industry has changed, the
number of carriers and services has multiplied; dependence on
communications for business and personal life has increased, computers and
data are becoming more important than voice traffic for business, and the
nation has become enthralled with mobile communication.
OTA, Surveillance in a Digital Age, supra note 21, at 1-2.
23. Forcefully articulating the view that the costs of wiretapping outweigh its
benefits, then-Attorney General Ramsey Clark stated in 1967 that:
Public safety will not be found in wiretapping. Security is to be found in
excellence in law enforcement, in courts and in corrections. That excellence
has not been demonstrated to include wiretapping.
Nothing so mocks privacy as the wiretap and electronic surveillance.
They are incompatible with a free society and justified only when that
society must protect itself from those who seek to destroy it.
1 Staff of Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, Comm. of the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., Federal Data Bases and Constitutional Rights: A Study of Data Systems on
Individuals Maintained by Agencies of the United States Government, at XXX
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter Federal Data Banks and Constitutional Rights].
Senator Long stated in his 1966 book The Intnders, "Wiretapping and bugging are
undoubtedly helpful to the police in some instances. But experience indicates that
their value is limited." Long, supra note 21, at 43. A substantial minority of members
on a commission to study and review Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 in the mid-1970s concluded that
court-authorized surveillance had been used successfully in a limited number
of major cases, and has resulted in the conviction of only a few upper-
echelon crime figures; more frequently, however, court-authorized
surveillance has proved to be costly and generally unproductive, has served
to discourage the use of other investigative techniques, and, even under the
authorization and supervision of a court, has resulted in substantial invasions
of individual privacy.
Electronic Surveillance: Report of the National Commission for the Review of
Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, at xiii
(1976) [hereinafter Report of the National Wiretapping Commission].
24. 1 Clifford S. Fishman & Anne T. McKenna, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping §
1:1, at 1-3 (2d ed. 1995). In enacting Title III, the third of four findings that Congress
made was: "Organized criminals make extensive use of wire and oral
communications in their criminal activities. The interception of such communications
to obtain evidence of the commission of crimes or to prevent their commission is an
indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice." Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211
2001] 1025
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"The jury hears from the horse's mouth that the defendant
participated in the criminal activity as charged."' 5 As a result, the
number of requests and authorizations for wiretaps (which includes
telephonic, oral, or electronic intercepts) by state and federal law-
enforcement agencies has steadily increased from 763 in 1989 to 1350
in 1999.26 Wiretaps were sought predominantly for narcotics-related
offenses.27 Fifty-three percent of the 1350 wiretaps authorized in 1999
were for electronic intercepts (such as cell phones, e-mail, and
pagers), thirty-one percent were for telephonic intercepts, five percent
were for microphones, and eleven percent were for a combination of
devices.28
(1968).
25. Annis, supra note 17, at 39 (giving primer on practical aspects and common
issues of surveillance). Although the hearing-from-the-horse's-mouth analogy seems
to raise the question of the defendant's right against self-incrimination, the Supreme
Court held in Olmstead v. United States that a wiretap does not violate the Fifth
Amendment. 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928) (stating "[tihere is no room in the present case
for applying the Fifth Amendment unless the Fourth Amendment was first violated"
and subsequently finding no Fourth Amendment violation). The Supreme Court in
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), held that a statement by a defendant
recorded by an undercover agent was given freely and voluntarily rather than by
compulsion and thus did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. See 1
James G. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 2.5(d)(3)(A), at 2-41 to 2-43 (2d
ed. 2001). As one hornbook author explained, "The decision in Hoffa has been
applied to reject claims of Fifth Amendment violation in cases involving bugging and
wiretapping. Recordings lawfully obtained by electronic surveillance can be played at
trial without violating the defendant's right to stand mute." See id. at 2-42 (citations
omitted).
26. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Wiretap Report 1999: Applications
for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, and Electronic
Communications 7, 32 (2000) [hereinafter Wiretap Report 1999]. These figures do
not include wiretaps where the surveillance is conducted with the consent of one
party. Id. at 6.
27. See Id. at 9 (noting that "72 percent of all applications for intercepts (978
cases) authorized in 1999 cited drug offenses as the most serious offense under
investigation"), 17-20 (listing wiretaps by type and by jurisdiction). According to a
federal law-enforcement agent:
DEA has recently taken a more aggressive stance on the use of wiretaps in
its drug investigations. One of the reasons for this is that wiretaps have
proven to be an effective tool in dismantling entire drug organizations. A
wiretap can expose the entire conspiracy-across city limits, state lines, and
even the country. Also, DEA has recently relaxed its funding restrictions so
that case agents are more likely to commit to a wiretap in an investigation
that merits [one].... [T]raditional law enforcement techniques are usually
not sufficient to [identify and prosecute drug organizations] and a wiretap
becomes an automatic consideration.
Wiretaps: A DEA Agent's Perspective Interview with Special Agent Mark Styron,
USABulletin, Sept. 1997, at 29-30, excerpts reprinted in 9 The Department of Justice
Manual §9-60.202A, at 9-1214.31 to .32 (1987) [hereinafter Interview with Special
Agent Styron].
28. See Wiretap Report 1999, supra note 26, at 10. In 1998, telephonic wiretaps
were for the first time not the most common method of intercept. See id.
1026 [Vol. 70
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Since telephones are ubiquitous in homes and offices in the United
States a9 are typically located "close to the center of activity and
discussion,"' and are highly vulnerable to interception," they are
highly suitable to easy and effective surveillance. However, in recent
years, there have been several substantial changes in the technology of
the nation's telecommunications network, and these changes have
affected surveillance in a variety of ways, both facilitating and
impeding certain techniques.32 According to the FBI, the proliferation
of fiber-optics in many long-haul or high-bandwidth cables and the
installation of highly sophisticated computerized "switches"33 have
impaired their ability to execute lawful surveillance orders.-' On the
other hand, the sophistication of these computerized switches also
substantially benefits lawful surveillance orders.-5
As cellular telephones have become widely used,- law enforcement
has developed technologies to ensure access to these communications
29. According to statistics compiled by the Federal Communications Commission
for 2000, 94.5% of U.S. households had a telephone. See Alexander Belinfante, FCC,
Telephone Penetration by Income by State 23 tbl.4 (July 2001).
30. Bob Berkel & Lowell Rapaport, Covert Audio Interception 445 (CCS
SecuritySource Library, Vol. 1, 1994).
31. In general the entire stretch of the telephone system from the user's handset
to the telephone company's central office ("the facility housing the switching system
and related equipment that provides telephone services for customers in the
immediate geographical area," see OTA, Surveillance in a Digital Age, supra note 21,
at 72) is vulnerable to interception. Berkel & Rapaport, supra note 30, at 447-48. The
telephone handset converts sound into an electrical signal, which is then transmitted
to the central office along a single continuous strand of wire and which can easily be
detected from outside the wire. Id. at 464-65. Once the electrical signals reach the
central office, however, they are co-mingled with other conversations and sent along
"trunk lines" that consist of large-bandwidth media; at this point it is much more
difficult if not impossible to pick out one conversation from another. Id. at 446.
32- See OTA, Surveillance in a Digital Age, supra note 21, at 2.
33. "Switches" are the machines that route telephone calls throughout the entire
telephone network. See Id at 38; American National Standard, Telecom Glossary
2000 at http://wvw.its.bldrdoc.gov/projects/telecomglossary2000.
34. New communications services, such as caller ID and call forwarding, made
possible by these modem switches apparently could be used to thwart a surveillance
operation, for example by redirecting calls away from a line suspected of being
tapped. See OTA, Surveillance in a Digital Age, supra note 21, at 2. Similarly, high-
speed fiber-optics lines and packet-switching make it far more difficult to intercept
telephone calls in the long-haul transmission lines. As will be discussed below, see
infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text, the FBI has succeeded in getting Congress
to enact changes in the law of wiretapping to overcome some of these changes. More
than merely maintaining the status quo, it appears that the FBI has successfully used
these alleged foils to effective surveillance to actually expand their capabilities.
35. See OTA, Surveillance in a Digital Age, supra note 21, at 2. For example,
these computerized switches enable law-enforcement agents to be electronically
patched into a telephone call, making it nearly impossible for the target to detect the
surveillance. Additionally, by leasing another telephone line from the phone
company, a law-enforcement agency can conduct its surveillance from virtually any
location, including its own offices. See id. at 19-20, 40-41; see, e.g., Evans v. State, 314
S.E.2d 421,424 (Ga. 1984) (describing the process of setting up a wiretap).
36. The explosive growth of cellular telephones is a recent and very significant
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as well. Calls over cellular telephones, like calls over land-line
telephones, are susceptible to interception at the telephone company's
central office.37 In addition, a technology has been developed that
allows a law-enforcement agent to eavesdrop on a specific person who
is talking on cellular telephones in the vicinity of the agent s.3  This
technology, called "triggerfish,"3 9 overcomes a reputedly common
problem in tracking organized-crime or drug traffickers-namely their
frequent changes in phones.4
Alongside the remarkable growth of cellular telephony is the
similarly explosive growth of the Internet and electronic mail.4 ' More
development in the United States. According to the Department of Commerce, "[i]n
less than 20 years, the U.S. wireless industry has blossomed from virtually nothing to
one with 100 million subscribers, and it continues to grow at a rate of 25 to 30 percent
annually." Nat'l Telecomms. and Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Annual
Report 2000, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/annualrpt/2001/
2000annrpt.htm.
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Since cellular telephone calls are
carried over airwaves, they can be detected by anyone in the vicinity with a scanner
that covers the particular frequency on which the call is being carried. See generally
FCC, Fact Sheet: Interception and Divulgence of Radio Communications (June
1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Factsheets/
investigation.html (on file with the Fordham Law Review). However, unlike a
telephone call over a land-line which is carried from the premises to the central office
by a specific and identifiable wire, the precise frequency assigned to a particular
person will vary each time the user makes or receives a call, and will change to a
different frequency if the caller moves from one cell site to another cell site during the
conversation. See Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass'n, For the Consumer:
Howitworks, at http://www.wow-com.com/consumer/howitworks/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2001) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Furthermore, digital cellular
telephone calls are encoded and encrypted and therefore more difficult to intercept
between the handset and the cell-site than analog cellular phones or cordless
telephones. See Market Sense: Cell Phones Facts Fiction Frequency, at
http://www.fcc.gov/marketsense/cellphone.html ("If you are concerned about whether
your conversation will be overheard, digital signals are considered more secure
because the sophistication and complexity of a digital system makes interception of
calls virtually impossible."). However, the encryption scheme commonly used for
digital cellular telephony can be readily cracked by a standard desktop computer. See
Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 26-27.
38. See Interview with Special Agent Styron, supra note 27.
39. "Triggerfish" is the product name of a technology that will "pluck cell calls out
of the air." Richard Willing, Government Wiretapping Sets Record: Fax Machines,
Cell Phones, Pagers and E-mail Targeted, USA Today, May 3, 2000, at 3A; Richard
Willing, Technology Boosts Government Wiretaps (June 7, 2000), at
www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cth831.htm (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
40. See Michael Goldsmith, Eavesdropping Reform: The Legality of Roving
Surveillance, 1987 U. Ill. L. Rev. 401, 410 ("The success of electronic surveillance
prompted experienced targets to shift telephones continuously, carefully guard
conspiratorial meeting sites, and frequently change the locations of meetings.").
41. The Department of Commerce found that "[als of August 2000, 116,5 million
Americans were online-31.9 million more than only 20 months earlier. Internet
users accounted for 44.4% of the U.S. population ... ." Nat'l Telecomms. and Info.
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion
33 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/digitaldivide.
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than half of all U.S. households have computers, more than forty
percent have access to the Internet, and there has been substantial
growth in both of these measures in the last few years. 2
Consequently, law-enforcement agencies are developing and using
sophisticated technologies to intercept these electronic
communications. As indicated above, the interception of electronic
communications represents the most common use of authorized
surveillance. Although several off-the-shelf software packages for
monitoring or "sniffing" e-mail and Internet traffic exist, 3 the
technology most important in this context is Carnivore, which has
been developed and deployed by the FBI to intercept electronic
communications. Along with two other software programs that
together comprise a suite of software known as DragonWare,4
Carnivore is a computer program that enables the FBI to "select and
record a defined subset of the traffic on the network to which it is
attached."'  While Carnivore has sparked a strong reaction to
secretive governmental surveillance of electronic communication 7 it
42. See id at 1 ("In just 20 months, the share of households with Internet access
soared by 58%, from 26.2% to 41.5%, while the share of households with computers
rose from 42.1% to 51.0%. More than 80% of households with computers also have
Internet access today, up from little more than 60% in 1998." (footnote omitted)).
43. See Stephen P. Smith et al., IIT Research Institute. Independent Technical
Review of the Carnivore System, at 4-2 (Final Report Dec. 8. 2000) ("Carnivore
represents technology that protects privacy and enables lawful surveillance better
than alternatives such as commercially available sniffer software.") [hereinafter
Independent Review of Carnivore].
44. Carnivore was originally called "Omnivore." When the newspapers first
reported about Carnivore in July 2000, several commented on the unfortunate name.
The FBI recently gave Carnivore a new name: DCS1000. See Janet Kornblum,
Citizens' Concerns About Privacy Grow, USA Today, Apr. 3, 2001, at 3D. This Note
will refer throughout to this technology as Carnivore.
45. Independent Review of Carnivore, supra note 43, at viii. -Packeteer is a tool
used to process the collected packets; the main purpose of this process is to put
together all of the packets that belong to one session.... CoolMiner is a web browser
tool that is used to analyze the packet data that Packeteer put together." Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 1-1.
47. The existence of Carnivore became known to the general public when an
Internet service-provider "told a House Judiciary Committee in April [20001 that the
FBI was requiring the company to install the system on its network to fulfill court-
ordered surveillance of criminal suspects." See Ann Harrison, Privacy Group Critical
of Release of Carnivore Data, ComputerWorld, Oct. 9, 2000, at 24. Earthlink, the
Internet service-provider, "resisted the installation of the secretive system because
[Carnivore] caused performance problems on its network... [and because Earthlink]
couldn't examine the technology to determine if its capturing of e-mail. IP addresses
and other traffic violated the privacy of other customers." Id. This discovery aroused
considerable controversy and criticism. Subsequently, Congress held hearings, and
the Justice Department commissioned a study of Carnivore by the lIT Research
Institute and the Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law, which
published an unclassified report in December 2000. See Independent Review of
Carnivore, supra note 43, at vii. The Department of Justice specifically asked the
contractor to evaluate four issues. See id. The contractors, however, also integrated
concerns and questions raised by privacy groups, such as '[a]ll potential capabilities of
the system, independent of intended use [and clontrols on, and auditability of, the
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is apparently not the only way in which the U.S. government monitors
communication traffic over the Internet. There are reports that the
National Security Agency ("NSA") has devised a system, called
"Echelon," to monitor Internet traffic around the world. 48 A second
capability for the government to eavesdrop on citizens' computers has
come to light recently: "key logger" systems, which record all
keystrokes made on a target computer.49
Although there were only fifty-eight reported authorizations for
microphone-based interceptions, it seems safe to assume that the
true usage of "bugging" devices is substantially higher." The
technologies for intercepting oral communications, like the
technologies for intercepting telephone conversations, have been
around for many years52 and are highly developed. 3  For example,
body-worn microphones, which are useful for detecting and
intercepting conversations where one participant consents to the
surveillance (as in an informant or undercover agent)54 are becoming
entire process by the FBI, the DoJ, and the courts." Id. The contractors did not
address the constitutionality of Carnivore nor the trustworthiness of the agents
operating it. See id. at 1-2.
48. On behalf of the U.S. government and in conjunction with U.S. allies, the
NSA reportedly "maintain[s] a massive worldwide spying apparatus capable of
capturing all forms of electronic communications." A. Michael Froomkin, The Death
of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461, 1482 (2000); see also Coyle & Van Voris, supra
note 6, at A4. According to a report for the European Parliament, as of 1995 NSA
had "installed 'sniffer' software to collect [foreign Internet traffic of communications
intelligence interest] at nine major Internet exchange points." See Duncan Campbell,
Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic
Information: An Appraisal of Technology for Political Control, at 60 (1999),
available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/default-en.htm [hereinafter
Campbell, Surveillance Technology for Political Control].
49. John Schwartz, F.B.L Use of New Technology to Gather Evidence Challenged,
N.Y. Times, July 30, 2001, at C7. After seizing, pursuant to an ordinary search
warrant, the computer of an individual suspected of gambling and loan-sharking, the
government was unable to gain access to the content of the computer because it had
been carefully encoded. Id. The government then installed the key-logger system on
the target's computer which uncovered the password on his encryption system. Id.
Precise details of the technology and its use are presently not public and the
government has resisted a judge's order to provide details of it. John Schwartz, U.S.
Declines to Release Data in Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,2001, at B1.
50. See 1999 Wiretap Report, supra note 26, at 10.
51. Cf id. at 6 (noting that consensual searches, including the use of body mikes,
do not have to be reported).
52. For example, Senator Long in 1966 described an array of bugging devices
shown to a Senate Subcommittee holding hearings on governmental surveillance
activities, including small microphones and transmitters hidden inside an olive. See
Long, supra note 21, at 5-6.
53. Indeed, a telephone can be turned into a "bug" through a very small
modification-so that a target's conversations can be intercepted even when the
target is not talking on the telephone. See Berkel & Rapaport, supra note 30, at 476-
85; Long, supra note 21, at 8.
54. Cf. Wiretap Report 1999, supra note 26, at 6 (noting that situations where "the
interception of a communication to which a police officer or police informant is a
party" are not covered by the reporting requirements of Title III).
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more powerful and more discreet."5 "Excellent microphones as small
as 5 mm in diameter by 3 mm long are available with sensitivities such
that they can pick up a whisper at approximately 7.5 meters (25
feet). '56 Lasers make it possible to detect the minute vibrations in a
pane of glass that are caused by the sound waves of the human voice.
There are pneumatic microphones which, when placed against an
adjacent wall or window, "[a]llow[] sound to be overheard through
solid surfaces up to 50 cm thick [20 inches]." Finally, although of
limited use in covert surveillance given their bulkiness,59 parabolic and
shotgun microphones have a potential range, under ideal conditions
(no wind, clear line of sight), of three-quarters of a mile.'
A close cousin to wiretaps and bugs is a technological device
commonly known as a "pen register," which collects information
(such as the telephone numbers dialed, the duration, and the time)
about telephone calls placed to and from a target telephone for use in
investigations and prosecutions of crimes.61 While less probative of
guilt than a tape-recorded wiretap, these devices are helpful in
showing associations between individuals which can be incriminating
in prosecutions of conspiracy and organized crime.' Further, the
evidence gained from pen-registers can and is used to show probable
cause necessary to obtain a surveillance order authorizing a wiretap.63
55. According to one authority, one significant advance in covert audio
surveillance has been the development of the "electret" microphone. Berkel &
Rapaport, supra note 30, at 365. Electret microphones "are much more resistant to
shock and solid-borne vibration than other kinds of mikes,... [minimize] the problem
of clothing rustle.... [and] perform well under temperature extremes." Id.
56. Id. at 358.
57. Id. at 435. The laser beam reflecting off the glass pane is picked up by a special
receiver; thus, this technique will not be available if the receiver and laser cannot be
properly aligned. Id. Furthermore, the efficacy of this surveillance technique is subject
to certain environmental disturbances that cause the glass to vibrate such as air
conditioners, traffic, and wind. Id.
58. Id. at 613.
59. Id. at 379.
60. Id. at 376-79, 612.
61. Strictly speaking, a pen register captures information about calls from the
target telephone, while a so-called trap-and-trace device captures information about
telephone calls to the target telephone. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4) (1994). See generally
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("Pen registers record
telephone numbers of outgoing calls... ; trap and trace devices record telephone
numbers from which incoming calls originate, much like common caller-ID systems."
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3127)).
62. Cf. Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 192 (noting that in 1987 federal law-
enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the INS requested the installation of only
91 trap-and-trace devices while in 1993, they requested over 2000).
63. See Annis, supra note 17, at 35 ("Probable cause can be developed in part
through pen registers [and] traps and traces .... A pen register and/or trap and trace
section is an important part of the affidavit that develops probable cause. Once
subscriber information provides names for the numbers being called by-or calling
into-the target phone.... it is an easy way to 'freshen' the probable cause."); see,
e.g., People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1998) ("Based on the information
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In theory, these dialed-number devices do not pick up the content of
the communication, although, as will be discussed below," changes in
technology and the forms of communication are blurring the line
between "address information" and content.65
2. Technologies for Enhancing Perception and Detection
During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the American public learned
of the effective use by the U.S. military of an image-intensification
technology known as night-vision goggles.66 Night-vision goggles
illustrate how modern technologies, often initially developed by and
for the U.S. military but later adapted for civilian uses,67 are not only
improving how well we see-beyond the rudimentary perception-
enhancing technologies such as binoculars or flashlights-but are also
creating new ways of "seeing. "I
obtained through the pen register and trap and trace devices, [the Organized Crime
Task Force] advanced its efforts to an application for a more invasive eavesdropping
warrant encompassing Kramer's telephone lines."); People v. Bialostok, 610 N.E.2d
374, 376 (N.Y. 1993) ("Numbers recorded by the devices over the next several days
were then used to support an application for an eavesdropping warrant to monitor
conversations on the two lines."); cf. Merrick D. Bernstein, Note, "Intimate Details":
A Troubling New Fourth Amendment Standard for Government Surveillance
Techniques, 46 Duke L. J. 575, 590 (1996) (noting how the thermal image scans were
used to support search warrants in United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057
(8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 1994)).
64. See infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the New
York Court of Appeals eased its rules governing the use of pen registers that can
easily be modified to become a wiretap and pick up the content of communications.
65. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 462 (noting that not all numbers dialed on
a telephone are addressing information-some numbers dialed, such as an
individual's calling card numbers, credit card numbers, or PIN (personal identification
number), are actually content). In implementing CALEA, the FBI petitioned the
FCC to require telecommunications carriers, pursuant to a pen-register authorization,
to give law enforcement information about "post-cut-through dialed digits"-in other
words, information in addition to the telephone number dialed. Id. at 456. While
these "post-cut-through dialed digits" would provide law enforcement with
information about conference-calling and call-forwarding, they would also enable pen
registers to detect information that is more properly categorized as call content. Id. at
462. The D.C. Circuit found that the FCC failed to show reasoned decisionmaking,
per the Chevron doctrine, in granting FBI's request for post-cut-through dialed digits.
Id. at 460-63.
66. See Gene Adcock, Electro-Optical Surveillance 1-67 (CCS SecuritySource
Library, Vol. 3, 1999) ("Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm provided the US
Military with its first major test of night vision capability and the public the first
opportunity to see its unique capability. Media coverage of successful missions
conducted during these operations introduced night vision capabilities into the living
room of the world.").
67. See id. at 1-75 to 1-77; Electronic Surveillance Standards (Third):
Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance, Standards 2-9.1(a) cmt. (1999)
[hereinafter ABA Standards for Electronic Surveillance].
68. See Adcock, supra note 66, at 4-1 ("[A]n image intensified night vision device
detects both minute levels of light energy and wavelengths that are outside the
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A person's normal vision can be greatly enhanced by the use of
technologies that improve how far we can see or that improve our
ability to see in the dark. By amplifying small amounts of light, these
devices permit viewing in nearly perfect darkness as if in day-time
conditions.69 State police departments have used night-vision goggles
while patrolling areas of high crime. 0 In addition, these devices have
proved particularly effective in assisting the surveillance of drug
smuggling at night along coastlines. 1
In contrast to image intensification, thermal imaging (also known as
forward-looking infra-red) operates completely independently of
light.72 Instead, thermal imagers take advantage of the fact that all
objects emit energy in wavelengths besides the ones that humans
detect with our senses of sight, hearing, and touch.' Thermal imagers
detect the differences in the heat emitted by objects relative to other
objects and convert these results into visual displays.' Prior to the
Supreme Court's Kyllo decision, a majority of courts to address the
issue had held that the use of thermal imagers was not a search;" these
decisions often emphasized that thermal imagers are "passive"
detection devices-i.e., they do not radiate anything into the subject,
but rather merely detect what the object radiates, much like a
camera.76 As Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo, some versions of the
technology are relatively crude, while others are capable of "seeing"
detection range of the human eye." (emphasis added)).
69. See id. at 5-1.
70. See id. at 8-36 to 8-37.
71. See id. at 8-37 to 8-47.
72. See id. at 6-3, 6-13 to 6-15.
73. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (2001); Adcock, supra note
66, at 6-3, 6-13 to 6-15.
74. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041; Adcock, supra note 66, at 6-17.
75. The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits had all previously held that
the use of thermal imaging to detect heat emanating from houses was not a search
under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.
1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael,
48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
Although panels of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had ruled that such use of thermal
imaging did constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, see United States v.
Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510
(10th Cir. 1995), both of these decisions were later withdrawn. See United States v.
Kyllo, 184 F3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250
(10th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit subsequently aligned with the four circuits that
held this was not a search. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (1999).
However, a federal district court and a California appellate court ruled that
warrantless thermal imaging violated the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Wis. 1994); People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied 1996 Cal. LEXIS 4001 (July 24, 1996). See
generally Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1048 (Noonan, J., dissenting). In addition, the highest
courts of the states of Washington and Montana had ruled that thermal imaging
violates their respective state constitutions. See State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont.
1997); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
76. See, e.g., Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044-45, rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
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through walls.77 In its cruder form, it is commonly used by law
enforcement for detecting abnormal emissions of heat from houses
that is often a tell-tale sign of the cultivation of marijuana.78 More
sophisticated versions permit the police to conduct "remote frisks 79
and to detect various contraband.8 These thermal imagers, which
have other important civilian uses besides law enforcement,8' are
unaffected by lighting conditions and by the amount of clothing worn
by the person," and are increasingly able to detect intimate details
about the subject.83
77. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044 n.3 ("The ability to 'see' through walls and other
opaque barriers is a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law enforcement research
and development."); see also Steven Salvador Flores, Note, Gun Detector Technology
and the Special Needs Exception, 25 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 135, 139-40
(1999); Peter Eggleston, Video Meets Vision: A System That "Sees" Through Wallsl,
Advanced Imaging, Mar. 1, 2000, at 10.
78. See Adcock, supra note 66, at 7-9 ("[Tjhe US military is starting to surplus
many of these older systems, transferring them to US law enforcement agencies for
use in the war against drugs." (emphasis omitted)); see, e.g., Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2041
(describing the process of using of a thermal imager to detect heat emissions from a
house).
79. One commentator described a thermal-imaging product as follows:
Millivision is intended to be used primarily by law enforcement officers,
usually to conduct "remote frisks" of individuals to detect the presence of
concealed weapons. A patrolman could operate the device from his car to
examine an individual on the street from a substantial distance without
having to leave the vehicle or physically "search" the individual-and
without the individual's knowledge.
Bernstein, supra note 63, at 600-01 (footnotes omitted).
80. As of 1994, one thermal imager known as Millivision offered "the opportunity
for rapid and remote detection of metallic and non-metallic weapons, plastic
explosives, drugs, and other contraband concealed under multiple layers of clothing
without the necessity of a direct physical search." Reducing Gun Violence: Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong.
(1994) (statement of Dr. G. Richard Huguenin of Millitech Corp.), available at 1994
WL 14190555 [hereinafter Huguenin Statement]. They were able to detect non-
metallic items as small as a centimeter as of 1994. Id. The thermal imager detects
these contraband items by detecting variations, even slight ones, between the heat
radiated by different objects relative to other objects, such as the human body. See id.;
see also Flores, supra note 77, at 138-39.
81. See Adcock, supra note 66, at 8-1 to 8-59 (discussing the various civilian
applications of image intensification and thermal imaging); see also Kyllo, 190 F.3d at
1044 n.4 (noting other uses besides surveillance of thermal imagers), rev'd, 121 S. Ct.
2038 (2001).
82. See Huguenin Statement, supra note 80; Flores, supra note 77, at 138-39.
83. See T. Wade McKnight, Note, Passive Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting
the Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Burden, 59 La. L. Rev. 1243, 1265 (1999)
("[A] new device known as a radar skin scanner is capable of producing images so
precise that the operator is able to tell whether or not a male subject has been
circumcised." (citing a 1997 report in the American Bar Association Journal)).
However, law enforcement can configure the devices to afford some measure of
protection for the privacy of people scanned by the device; for example, it can be
programmed to only show on the screen items that satisfy certain criteria. See Flores,
supra note 77, at 139.
Millivision's manufacturer argues that privacy safeguards, such as an image
understanding algorithm ('IUA'), will protect subjects from unnecessary
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3. Technologies for Identifying and Tracking
a. Beepers
Beepers are devices that can be implanted in an object such as a car
or a container that transmits a signal and that can be tracked using
ground-based or satellite receivers.' Beepers permit law enforcement
to keep tabs on a suspect or contraband without the need for
maintaining direct visual contact that might alert the suspect that he is
being trailed or that might jeopardize the safety of a law.enforcement
officer.s With the greater use of satellites and the evolution of global-
positioning systems, the capabilities for monitoring increase.' Further,
advances in electronics have and will continue to reduce the size of
these transmitters while increasing their range and effectiveness. The
market for location-identifying services is expected to grow rapidly,
from an estimated $600 million to $5 billion in three years, spurred in
part by the use of this technology in cellular telephones.' In addition,
the Federal Communications Commission has proposed that cellular-
service providers be able to more accurately locate callers, reputedly
in order to locate callers making 911 calls.'s Further, it may not be
long before tracking devices could be implanted under a person's skin
to track his movements or location.' While such a device could have
many invaluable uses-e.g., to track individuals suffering from
Alzheimer's disease-it is also possible to envision nefarious uses, for
invasions. The IUA is a computer-filtering system designed to send only
those shapes that are programmed as suspicious to the human operator for
further inspection. The shapes of many known weapons could be
programmed into the IUA. Only if a scanned image matches the shape of a
weapon, will the body's image be sent to the operator.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
84. See 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 3.2(e)(2)(D), at 3-47 to 3-48 ("As an aid to
physical surveillance, particularly of objects or suspects in moving vehicles, law
enforcement officers often use small transmitting devices, statutorily defined as
,mobile tracking devices' and usually referred to as beepers." (footnote omitted)). A
"tracking device" is statutorily defined as "an electronic or mechanical device which
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object." 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b)
(1994).
85. See 2 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 28:2, at 28-5 to 28-6.
86. See Simon Romero, Location Devices' Use Rises, Prompting Privacy
Concerns, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,2001, at 1.
87. See id
88. See id ("[Tihe Federal Communications Commission has determined that by
the end of this year carriers will need to begin equipping either cell phones or their
communications networks with technology that would allow authorities to determine
the location of most callers to within 300 feet, compared with current systems that can
locate them within about 600 feet.").
89. See id (discussing "a chip called Digital Angel that could be implanted
beneath human skin, enabling his company to track the location of a person almost
anywhere using a combination of satellites and radio technology").
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example to monitor the minute movements of a political dissident or
rival.
b. Biometrics
Technologies that permit the identification of people through
unique characteristics have evolved tremendously from the now-
familiar fingerprint." The U.S. government and private-sector
organizations such as banks are using these technologies which
distinguish between people based on their irises or from the pattern of
heat in their faces.91 Recently, DNA "fingerprinting" has received
considerable attention from the highly publicized murder trial of O.J.
Simpson and from a series of cases where reanalysis of DNA has
exonerated approximately seventy wrongly-convicted people.' In
addition to freeing the innocent, however, DNA is proving to be a
valuable tool for identifying and securing convictions of the guilty.93
90. See Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1494.
91. See id.
92. The Innocence Project is an organization with chapters throughout the
country that uses DNA science to challenge convictions of innocent people. See
generally Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, Actual Innocence (2000) (analyzing cases
where DNA evidence proved numerous wrongful convictions); Robert W.
Schumacher II, Expanding New York's DNA Database: The Future of Law
Enforcement, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1635, 1636-49 (1999) (discussing the science and
the technology of DNA).
93. A pamphlet distributed by the National Commission for the Future of DNA
Evidence stated: "Recent advancements in DNA technology are enabling law
enforcement officers to solve cases previously thought to be unsolvable." Nat'l
Comm'n on Future of DNA Evidence, U.S. Dep't of Justice, What Every Law
Enforcement Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence (on file with the Fordham
Law Review). The pamphlet further explains:
The saliva on the stamp of a stalker's threatening letter or the skin cells shed
on a ligature of a strangled victim can be compared with a suspect's blood or
saliva sample. Similarly, DNA collected from the perspiration on a baseball
cap discarded by a rapist at one crime scene can be compared with DNA in
the saliva swabbed from the bite mark on a different rape victim.
Id.; cf Richard Willing, Criminals Try to Outwit DNA, USA Today, Aug. 28, 2000, at
IA (describing criminals' tactics for undermining effectiveness of genetic evidence).
The article recounts how one prisoner smuggled a sample of his semen out of the
prison and paid a woman to stage a fake rape to create the impression that he was
accused of a crime actually committed by another person with exactly the same
DNA-a "3 trillion to 1" chance. Id. The article later notes that advances in DNA-
testing technology "make it difficult to ruin a crime scene by spreading strangers'
DNA. Enough DNA to form a near-certain match is now routinely lifted from
fingernail clippings, hair particles, tiny sweat stains and even dried saliva from old
postage stamps." Id. A lawyer quoted in the article noted that "police can 'trap'
[suspects] by lifting DNA from cigarette butts, beverage containers and even spittle
left on interrogation room floors, even if the cops don't have enough evidence to get a
search warrant." Id.
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c. Computer systems and databases
Although the government maintains numerous databases and
operates numerous computer systems, several are most germane
here. 4  Since 1967 the FBI has maintained the National Crime
Information Center ("NCIC"), a centralized "computerized
information system" that federal, state, and local law enforcement can
quickly access via a "nationwide telecommunications network" to
more efficiently exchange criminal-justice information. 5 NCIC has
grown considerably in scope from its origins as a resource to allow
police to ascertain whether or not a suspect had a criminal record."
According to the Department of Justice, NCIC not only contains
"criminal history records on persons arrested and fingerprinted for
serious or significant offenses," but also "records on wanted persons,
stolen property,.., and [certain] missing persons." NCIC was
enhanced in 1999 by the inclusion of features, such as improved
image-processing and the ability to perform instant background-
checks.8
The Treasury Department maintains the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), which was created with little
fanfare by an Executive Order in 1990.99 Although the main inputs to
this system are the reports of financial transactions above $10,0 0 0,1"J
FinCEN also draws on a variety of other commercial and
governmental databases. 10 "At the heart of FinCEN is a powerful
'expert system'-a form of artificial intelligence that uses a set of rules
94. Cf. Charlotte Twight, Watching You: Systematic Federal Surveillance of
Ordinary Americans (Cato Inst. Briefing Papers No. 69, Oct. 2001). Professor Twight
states:
[Tihe federal government has instituted a variety of data collection
programs that compel the production, retention, and dissemination of
personal information about every American citizen. Linked through an
individual's Social Security number, these labor, medical, education and
financial databases now empower the federal government to obtain a
detailed portrait of any person: the checks he writes, the types of causes he
supports, and what he says 'privately' to his doctor.
Id. atl.
95. See 1 The Department of Justice Manual, General Resource Manual No. 11, at
1-101 (2d ed. 2000); Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, A Preliminary
Assessment of the National Crime Information Center and the Computerized
Criminal History System (1978) [hereinafter OTA, NCIC Report].
96. See Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age
Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34 Jurimetrics J. 383,
388-89 (1994).
97. 1 The Department of Justice Manual, supra note 95, at 1-101.
98. FBI, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release. July 15. 1999, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel99/ncic2000.htm (describing the new services
provided by the enhancement) (on file with the Fordlan Law Review).
99. See Bercu, supra note 96, at 389.
100. See id. at 394-95.
101. See id. at 396-97.
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to emulate the thought processes of human experts who are skilled at
solving a given sort of problem."'" Although FinCEN is justified
largely on the basis of its ability to battle narcotics-trafficking by
detecting money-laundering, its directors have sought broader
application. 1°3
More recently, there has been a proliferation of databases
containing genetic materials (DNA) of criminals. These databases are
used to identify the perpetrators of later crimes by comparing
characteristics of genetic evidence collected from a crime-scene with
the database. °4 The allure of DNA testing for criminal prosecutions
is twofold. First, DNA tests are highly reliable in identifying a person:
except for identical twins, the genetic "markers" in a person's genes
are unique.05 Second, the information is easily converted to data for
storage in a computer for very quick and efficient cross-reference with
other samples."°6
B. The Role of the Government
Each of the three branches of the federal government plays an
important role in the current legal regime of covert surveillance
technologies in the United States. The various law-enforcement
agencies within the executive branch are the prime developers and
users of these technologies. The judiciary exercises direct oversight
over the executive agencies and interprets how these technologies
comport with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution when their
use is challenged in court. The Congress controls the various
agencies' budgets and from time to time enacts legislation adding
requirements beyond what, according to the Supreme Court, the
102. Id. at 394.
103. See id. at 390-91.
104. See Schumacher, supra note 92, at 1644 ("A DNA database is a computerized
collection of DNA profiles capable of being used for criminal identification
purposes.... Essentially, a DNA test result derived from a crime scene sample can
be checked against the digital profiles stored in the database.").
105. Gregg Easterbrook, DNA and the End of Innocence: The Myth of
Fingerprints, The New Republic, July 31, 2000, at 20.
106. See id. The author claims:
In the fairly near future, a standard item in the trunks of American police
cruisers-perhaps even on each officer's belt-may be a DNA analyzer. As
a suspect is arrested, police will quickly swipe the inside of his cheek with a
cotton swab and pop the results into the scanner. Within minutes the
machine will produce a stream of data describing the suspect's unique
genetic structure. The data will be uploaded to state or national DNA
databases to determine whether the suspect's DNA matches that of blood,
sweat, semen, or similar bodily fluids found at the scene of unsolved crimes
around the nation.
Id.; see also Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Future of Forensic DNA
Testing: Predictions of the Research and Development Working Group 3 (2000)
("Portable, hand-held systems are now working in laboratory experiments; how soon
these will be available for routine use is not clear.").
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Constitution requires. This part of the Note describes in closer detail
the roles that the three branches of government play in the use and
the regulation of covert surveillance technologies.
1. Executive-Branch Agencies: The Users and the Uses
Accurately gauging the extent to which surveillance technology is
used and may be used in the future is important in order to fashion an
appropriate and considered scheme for regulating these
technologies-indeed it is important for understanding the need for
regulation. Further, since these agencies are the ones who would be
bound by any regulation, it is important to consider the ends for which
they use technology, and differentiate the relative societal interests of
each of these ends. The risks of misuse inherent in the various
applications of surveillance technologies by these agencies also
deserve consideration.
Several important observations flow from the self-evident fact that
executive-branch agencies are the governmental actors who develop
and use new surveillance technologies: As the developers and users,
these executive agencies are for all practical effect the first
interpreters of the constitutionality of these technologies; as Kyllo and
the surveillance at the Super Bowl in Tampa illustrate, these agencies
and their agents decide in the first instance-and often in the only
instance or an instance that lasts a long time-when and how the
technology will be used." 7 Already cabined off from direct political
pressure, their accountability is further diminished by the fact that
their activities-carried out in the name of law enforcement and
national security-are statutorily shielded from disclosure."
Furthermore, certain agencies are heavily involved in behind-the-
scenes policymaking,109 and have exhibited an unwillingness to accede
when the apparently prevailing view differs from their own. ' "
107. See infra Part II.A.1.
108. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520, 2707, 2712 (1994); see also Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L No. 107-56, sec. 223, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520,2707,2712).
109. One commentator explained that "the principal telecommunications
regulatory body in the United States is the FBI. The FBI is taking on a major
regulatory and policymaking role in determining the direction of technology." Stewart
Baker, Regulating Technology for Law Enforcement, 4 Tex. Rev. L & Pol. 53, 55-56
(1999). As Representative Bob Barr explained:
This significant expansion of federal wiretap authority, sought for years by
the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies, %as accomplished not
through hearings, legislative mark-up, floor vote, and public input. Rather,
it was itself born of a covert operation wvith nary a hearing. The provision
appeared as a surreptitious and non-germane addition to legislation
authorizing foreign intelligence activities.
Bob Barr, A Tyrant's Toolbox" Technology and Privacy in America, 26 J. Legis. 71, 75
(2000) (noting the expansion of the capability to conduct "roving wiretaps"
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There are numerous governmental agencies currently using
surveillance technologies. This cast includes the intelligence agencies
(such as the Secret Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
National Security Agency), various law-enforcement offices within the
Department of Justice (such as the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms; and the Drug Enforcement Agency), and
numerous other agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, the
Immigration and Naturalization Services, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land Management, the
Department of the Interior and the Forest Service, the Bureau of
Prisons, and the U.S. Postal Service."' A 1984 study by the
authorized in Intelligence Authorization Act for 1999 § 604, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112
Stat. 2397, 2413 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(b))). According to a 1999 report
published by the European Parliament,
[b]etween 1993 to 1998, the United States conducted sustained diplomatic
activity seeking to persuade EU nations and the [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] to adopt their "key recovery" system.
Throughout this period, the US government insisted that the purpose of the
initiative was to assist law enforcement agencies. Documents obtained for
this study suggest that these claims willfully misrepresented the true
intention of US policy. Documents obtained under the US Freedom of
Information Act indicate that policymaking was led exclusively by NSA
officials, sometimes to the complete exclusion of police or judicial
officials....
Since 1993, unknown to European parliamentary bodies and their
electors, law enforcement officials from many EU countries and most of the
UKUSA nations have been meeting annually in a separate forum to discuss
their requirements for intercepting communications. These officials met
under the auspices of a hitherto unknown organisation, ILETS
(International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar). ILETS
was initiated and founded by the FBI.
Campbell, Surveillance Technology for Political Control, supra note 48, at 1 84, 85.
110. In recent years, the FBI has lent particular influence to two other important
initiatives: the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and the so-
called "Clipper chip," an encryption technology for which law enforcement had a key,
ensuring that law enforcement would be able to decode any communication. See
Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at vii. When the FBI submitted its "Clipper chip"
technology for notice-and-comment rulemaking, the public input was overwhelmingly
against it-with two favorable responses and 300 negative ones. See id. Nevertheless,
the FBI continued to aggressively pursue and promote its technology. See Bruce
Schneier & David Banisar, The Electronic Privacy Papers: Documents in the Battle
for Privacy in the Age of Surveillance 320 (1997); see also Diffie & Landau, supra
note 20, at 76.
After lobbying for passage of CALEA, the FBI has continued to play a major
role in its implementation. Pursuant to CALEA, the FBI and the
Telecommunications Industry Association ("TIA"), the body that was setting the
standards for the industry, conducted "extensive negotiations" before the TIA arrived
at these standards, known as the J-Standard. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d
450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The FBI then requested that the Federal Communications
Commission grant law enforcement nine additional capabilities beyond those
included in the J-Standard. See id. at 456. The FCC granted four of nine proposed
additional capabilities requested by the FBI, denied three, and granted two in part. Id.
111. One indication of how many components of the federal government are
involved in law enforcement in some respect is that the newly created Office of
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congressional Office of Technology Assessment discovered that
fifteen agencies used at least six types of surveillance technologies.' 2
In addition to these numerous agencies, two other large sectors play
significant roles in the user portion of the surveillance regime. First,
since surveillance technologies are highly valuable tools in battle-for
example, detecting enemy troops and armaments at night or in
difficult terrain-the U.S. military is a major consumer and developer
of surveillance technologies.'1 3  As mentioned elsewhere, several
technologies initially developed by the military have been adapted for
civilian purposes, including law enforcement."' Second, law
enforcement often relies on private-sector actors in significant ways." 5
For example, private-sector actors such as banks, telephone
companies, employers, and utilities collect and preside over much
personal information, including information that law enforcement can
use in gathering evidence of criminality." 6 In fact, the assistance of
telecommunications companies with law enforcement for wiretaps is
now mandated by statute."7  Also, since the Court has ruled that
surveillance of a person does not require a warrant if another person
speaking with the target consents to or implements the wiretap
himself,118 private citizens can and frequently are used for surveillance
by law enforcement." 9
The license for, and prevalence of, surveillance is not the only
important factor in understanding the extent of the problem and in
Homeland Security will coordinate forty-six agencies and departments. See Elizabeth
Becker & Tim Weiner, New Office to Become a White House Agency, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28,2001, at B5.
112. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Electronic Surveillance
and Civil Liberties 14 (1985) [hereinafter OTA, Civil Liberties].
113. See Adcock, supra note 66, passin; see also Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1500-
01 (discussing development by military of "smart dust," which is "ubiquitous
miniature sensors floating around in the air").
114. See, e.g., supra notes 66-67, 81 and accompanying text.
115. Although the Constitution as a general rule does not reach the conduct of
private persons, see 1 David S. Rudstein et al., Criminal Constitutional Law 1 2.02, at
2-7 (2000), the role of these private-sector actors may take on a constitutional
dimension through the state-actors doctrine, which states that when "a private party
'act[s] as an instrument or agent of the state' in effecting a search or seizure, he is
subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment." Id. 2.02[3], at 2-14.
116. See, eg., Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041 (2001) (noting that
records of energy consumption were used to build the case against Kyllo); cf. Twight,
supra note 94 (describing the substantial information collected by the government
related to individuals' employment, finances, health, and education).
117. See infra notes 245, 247, and 270 and accompanying text for the discussion of
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
11& See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (holding in a plurality
decision that a conversation transmitted from a wired informant to federal agents did
not violate the Fourth Amendment and did not require a warrant). See generally 1
Carr, supra note 25, § 3.5, at 3-86 to 3-151.
119. See 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 3.5, at 3-88 ("Without question, consent




attempting to craft appropriate regulation; a second significant
consideration is the various governmental purposes which surveillance
technologies are deployed to serve-i.e., the agencies' motivations for
exploiting the capabilities of these technologies. According to
standards recently promulgated by the American Bar Association
("ABA"), "[t]echnologically-assisted physical surveillance[ 120 ] can be
an important law enforcement tool... [to] facilitate the detection,
investigation, prevention and deterrence of crime, the safety of
citizens and officers, the apprehension and prosecution of criminals,
and the protection of the innocent. 1 21 For example, less-than-covert
surveillance technologies, such as metal detectors in government
buildings, schools, and airports, are used to detect and deter crime.
Similarly, several municipalities in the United States are
experimenting with the use of closed-circuit televisions in high-crime
areas. 2 After using the face-recognition system at the Super Bowl,
Tampa deployed the system in other areas of the city,"2 and following
the attacks on the World Trade Center, there were calls for instituting
face-recognition at important landmarks in New York City." 4
120. The technologies of physical surveillance-as contrasted to "communications
surveillance" and "transactional surveillance"-for which these standards were
specifically developed are "video surveillance; tracking devices; illumination devices;
telescopic devices; and detection devices." ABA Standards for Electronic
Surveillance, supra note 67, at 2-3 (quotation marks in original omitted).
121. Id. Standard 2-9.1, at 21. The face-scanning technology used in Tampa
illustrates technologies for detecting and preventing crime, while the thermal imager
in the Kyllo case illustrates a technology for detecting, investigating, and prosecution;
more advanced thermal imagers capable of seeing through walls and clothes illustrate
a technology for detection and investigation of crime and for safety of officers; the X-
ray machines in airports illustrate technologies for deterrence and the protection of
the innocent.
122. See Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1476-77. For a description of the widespread
use of closed-circuit televisions in the United Kingdom, see Jeffrey Rosen, A
Watchful State, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 38. Professor Rosen
describes how the rapid proliferation of cameras-to perhaps 2.5 million cameras
throughout the country in approximately 440 city centers-has been propelled by the
fear of terrorism. See id. at 41. Although the cameras are not primarily being used to
detect terrorists (because "few terrorists are suspected in advance of their crimes," see
id. at 42) and are not clearly leading to reduced crime rates ("[llast year, Britain's
violent crime rates actually increased by 4.3 percent," see id. at 92), these cameras are
nevertheless very popular. See id. at 41-42. Professor Rosen argues that the United
States should "resist going down the same path," because these systems have "subtle
but far-reaching social costs" (such as intensified racial profiling and video voyeurism
of women), while their benefits remain unproven. See id. at 92, 93.
123. See Dana Canedy, Tampa Scans the Faces in Its Crowds for Criminals, N.Y.
Times, July 4, 2001, at Al.
124. See Barstow, supra note 6 (discussing measures that professionals
recommended for deterring terrorist attacks against Times Square, Grand Central
Terminal, the Statue of Liberty, and St. Patrick's Cathedral). According to this
article, the former police commissioner of New York City, Howard Safir,
recommended "the installation of 100 or so surveillance cameras in Times Square[,
which would] ... be integrated with biometric facial imaging software, allowing the
images of all pedestrians to be compared with photographs of known terrorists." Id.
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Unquestionably, there are manifestly valuable governmental and
societal interests in exploiting these technologies.
In addition, surveillance technologies serve other useful private-
sector1' and non-law-enforcement governmental purposes.
Surveillance technologies are increasingly important for the efficient
operation of governmental agencies and delivery of governmental
services." Sophisticated and reliable ways to verify people's
identities aid the government in rooting out fraud and waste, and
generally make the delivery of governmental services more efficient.'
However, the ABA's standards also point out that there are
important differences in the values served by particular technologies
and purposes and that these values should correlate to the "burden
law enforcement must bear to justify a particular procedure.-'-!" As
the ABA notes in its commentary,
[c]ertain techniques may be reasonable only with respect to a
particular law enforcement interest. For example, certain
techniques (e.g., at airport checkpoints) may be easier to justify for
security purposes than for investigatory purposes. Similarly, certain
measures (e.g., an electronic "frisk" of a person on the street based
on reasonable suspicion) may be permissible for protective purposes
but not for detection or deterrence reasons.1 -9
Another professional recommended that visitors or commuters traveling through
Grand Central Station be channeled through passive metal detectors. Id.
125. See, e.g., supra note 81.
126. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Court observed:
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces,
and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation
of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character
and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.
Id. at 605. However, the Court's next comment-"The right to collect and use such
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures," id. -does not entirely square with
a contemporaneous congressional report which found "a disturbing absence of laws to
control the new information capabilities of government, [and] an equally disturbing
absence of knowledge of what data banks the government had, what they contained,
and what they were used for." 1 Federal Data Banks and Constitutional Rights, supra
note 23, at III.
127. See 1 Federal Data Banks and Constitutional Rights, supra note 23, at XVI
("As the planning, programming, and budgeting functions of federal agencies became
more complex, the use of and demand for statistical data in machine-readable form
also grew."); Barr, supra note 109, at 79 ("Domestic policy goals such as preventing
the employment of illegal aliens, tracking the spread of diseases, and enforcing the
payment of child support, have led to a government push for larger, more closely
linked databases.").
128. ABA Standards for Electronic Surveillance. supra note 67, Standard 2-9.1(c)
cmt., at 26-27.
129. Id. at 26.
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Presumably, following the ABA's reasoning, technologies that are
particularly invasive, unaccountable, or susceptible to misuse can be
used in only the most limited circumstances, if at all.
Several of the more important distinctions bear further
consideration. For instance, it is important to draw distinctions
between evidence-gathering, general intelligence-gathering30  and
intelligence-gathering for national security.' 31 For example, evidence-
gathering is typically place- and person-specific and, though the
invasion visited on the target is often high, this invasion will often be
brought to light in the prosecution.3 2  By contrast, general
intelligence-gathering is typically very unspecific; though the invasion
on an individual may be small, it also may be very broad and the
people surveilled may, for better or worse, be none the wiser. 3
Because it is cloaked in the greatest secrecy, intelligence-gathering for
national security can be simultaneously highly and broadly invasive; it
is also highly unlikely that such surveillance will come to light.134
Finally-but perhaps most importantly-is the risk that these
technologies will be used improperly or illegally, whether for
gathering evidence or intelligence. History is full of examples of the
misuse of these technologies; 35 since by their very nature their
130. See 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 1.2(b), at 1-6 to 1-7 (describing the common use of
surveillance to gain information about criminal activities beyond use in
prosecutions-to "determine the scope of a criminal organization, the extent and
nature of its activities, and the identities of its participants"); cf Diffie & Landau,
supra note 20, at 114 ("In general, wiretaps appear to be of greater value in gathering
intelligence than in developing evidence.").
131. See Louis A. Chiarella & Michael A. Newton, "So Judge, How Do I Get That
FISA Warrant?": The Policy and Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance,
Army Law., Oct. 1997, at 25, 27-29 (discussing distinctions between surveillance for
counterintelligence, for law enforcement, and for domestic security); cf Physical
Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of
the House Permanent Select Comm. On Intelligence, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) (comments
of Chairman McHugh) ("[Wiarrantless physical searches conducted in the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes... occur with some regularity and have for
several years.") [hereinafter Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence]; id. at 5
(statement of Mary Lawton, Department of Justice) ("It is important to understand
that the current provision for issuing judicial search warrants, Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, is ill-suited to the field of intelligence gathering.").
132. Cf 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 1.2, at 1-7 (describing surveillance for the gathering
of specific evidence as being at the "other extreme from open-ended and unrestricted
strategic intelligence surveillance"); Chiarella & Newton, supra note 131, at 27 ("The
subject of a law enforcement investigation eventually learns of or knows about any
searches and surveillance, even if the collection of the evidence does not result in
prosecution.").
133. Cf. supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (discussing Carnivore and
Echelon).
134. See Chiarella & Newton, supra note 131, at 27 ("The 'subject' of
counterintelligence collection techniques will not learn of searches and surveillance
conducted, except in those exceptional instances where the Attorney General later
approves the use of the collected information as criminal evidence.").
135. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 137-48 (discussing incidents of illegal
surveillance of prominent political figures from the 1940s through the 1980s); Richard
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effectiveness is a function of their surreptitiousness. this risk of abuse
or misuse logically increases as the technologies become more
discreet. 136 As one commentator described:
[B]ecause of the surreptitious nature of many new surveillance
techniques, individuals will be unaware when the techniques are in
use, and thus will be unable to detect or prevent government abuse.
E. Morgan, Domestic Intelligence: Monitoring Dissent in America 3-10, 61-62 (1980)(discussing incidents of questionable or illegal activities, including surveillance, by the
FBI, CIA, and U.S. military from World War II to Watergate): Report of the
National Wiretapping Commission, supra note 23. at 163-64 (discussing illegal
surveillance by the New York City Special Investigations Unit and by the Houston
Police Department). In the early 1970s, several instances of illegal surveillance by
federal agencies came to light. For instance, it was learned that under the direction of
President Nixon, a group of federal agents called the "Plumbers" broke into the
psychiatrist's office of Daniel Ellsberg, who was responsible for leaking the
documents relating to the U.S. government's handling of the war in Vietnam, the so-
called Pentagon Papers, to the New York Times and Washington Post. See Morgan,
supra, at 5. William Ruckelshaus, appointed in 1973 by President Nixon to head the
foundering FBI, "revealed that between mid-1969 and early 1970 the FBI had, at the
direction of White House officials, installed without warrants seventeen wiretaps on
government officials and newsmen in an effort to determine the source of leaks of
foreign policy information." Id. at 6. As evidence of potential or actual improprieties
grew, special committees within the U.S. Senate (chaired by Frank Church) and the
U.S. House (chaired by Otis Pike) were created to further investigate the extent of
improper activities by federal agencies. See id. at 7-8. The Church Committee (the
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities) eventually uncovered evidence that:
For the next thirty years [after World War II], the FBI engaged in extensive
monitoring of radical politics, largely in response to three separate waves of
domestic unrest: the perceived danger of domestic communism in the 1940s
and early 1950s, the civil rights movement of the mid-1960s, and the anti-
Vietnam war movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Id at 37. Other federal agencies, such as the CIA, NSA, IRS, Army, and Secret
Service, were also employing a variety of "questionable and sometimes illegal
practices" to monitor and manipulate "political dissent in this country." Id. at 3; see
also iL at 37-83. With regard to the activities of the U.S. Army, Morgan states:
The army began the Continental United States (CONUS) Intelligence
Program in the summer of 1965 to provide early warning of civil
disturbances that it might be called on to quiet. Two years later, the
program was expanded to include collecting materials concerning the
political beliefs and actions of groups and individuals active in the civil rights
movement, the white supremacy movement, the black power movement,
and the movement against the war in Vietnam....
;ITe Church Committee Report in 1976 identified four general areas of
army involvement in illegal or at least problematic domestic intelligence
activity: the collection of information concerning the political activities of
individuals and groups; the monitoring of domestic radio transmissions
despite a Federal Communications Commission opinion that such
monitoring was illegal; investigations of groups that the military considered
threats to their own personnel and installations; and assistance rendered to
other agencies-ranging from the Justice Department to local police
forces-engaged in keeping track of militant dissent.
Id. at 61-62.
136. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
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The checks on government surveillance that previously had limited
government intrusion into our private lives will be severely reduced,
and much that individuals have long considered private will be open
to arbitrary and capricious police inspection. 37
2. Judicial Regulation
The second major part of the regime for surveillance technologies is
the judiciary's role in interpreting the constitutionality of these
technologies. Although covert surveillance can implicate other liberty
interests, such as the First Amendment right of association" 8 and the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, 39 this Note focuses
on the Fourth Amendment, whose prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure is by far the most significant constitutional
provision in this context. 40 This evaluation by the courts occurs
primarily on two levels: first, determining whether the use of a
particular technology or police practice constitutes a search or seizure
and thus comes under the Fourth Amendment; and second, enforcing
constitutional requirements on a day-to-day basis, by issuing search
warrants and ruling on the admissibility of evidence gained from
surveillance in court. This part of the Note will review how the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment, first with
respect to general principles relevant to surveillance technologies and
second with respect to surveillance technologies specifically.
137. Bernstein, supra note 63, at 579.
138. See ABA Standards for Electronic Surveillance, supra note 67, Standard 2-
9.1(b) cmt., at 24 ("[T]echnologically-assisted physical surveillance can implicate
other values as well, including 'freedom of association, speech, and travel,' and, more
generally, the 'openness of society."'); Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1506 (noting that
"the First Amendment right to freedom of association imposes some limits on the
extent to which the government may observe and profile citizens, if only by creating a
right to anonymity in some cases").
139. See OTA, Civil Liberties, supra note 112, at 9; cf Telford Taylor, Two Studies
in Constitutional Interpretation 64-67 (1969) (discussing the implication on the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination of the seizure and use of personal
papers); Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1506-23 (analyzing the First Amendment aspects
of electronic surveillance).
In Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that a wiretap did not violate the
defendant's right against self-incrimination. 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928). This was the
same decision where the Supreme Court ruled that a non-trespass wiretap did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 466. Despite significant advances in the means
for intercepting and recording a suspect's words and actions, the Olmstead ruling with
respect to the implications of electronic surveillance for the Fifth Amendment
remains valid. See 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 1.3(a), at 1-8 to 1-9; Taylor, supra, at 72-73.
However, a full exploration of this interplay is beyond the scope of this Note.
140. See ABA Standards for Electronic Surveillance, supra note 67, at 6 ("The
constitutional provision most relevant to regulation of physical surveillance is, of
course, the Fourth Amendment .... ).
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a. Important Principles of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' 4 '
Although a complex area of constitutional law with many intricate
contours, there are certain principles of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence which are most relevant and important for an analysis
of surveillance technologies.
i. Warrant Required for a Search or Seizure
The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses, the
Unreasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause. "2 The Supreme
Court's modern interpretation of the Fourth Amendment reads these
two clauses together.'43 Thus, the proper measure of reasonableness
required by the Amendment for a search or seizure of a person or his
or her personal effects by a government official'" is secured by a
warrant, which is issued by a judge or magistrate.4 Furthermore, as
the text of the Amendment clearly provides, the government official
seeking the warrant must show, through sworn statements, probable
cause and must specify in the application the person or items sought
by the search or seizure."
The modem interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, therefore,
places great emphasis on the intercession of a judge or magistrate,
who is in theory impartial and dispassionate, to assure that a
governmental agent does not conduct an unreasonable search or
seizure.47 The probable-cause prerequisite to a warrant serves to
141. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
142. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 23,42-43; Kevin J. Allen, Overview of the Fourth
Amendment, 88 Geo. L.J. 883, 883 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 762 (1994); Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note,
"Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment. An Exception Poised to Swallow the
Warrant Preference Rule, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L Rev. 529, 529 (1997) ("A small forest
has been pulped by legal scholars debating whether the two clauses of the Fourth
Amendment stand alone, or whether the second Warrant Clause modifies the first
Reasonableness Clause by defining a reasonable search.").
143. See Amar, supra note 142, at 762.
144. Cf supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text (discussing involvement in
surveillance of non-governmental agents).
145. See 1 Rudstein et al., supra note 115, 1 2.08[1], at 2-307.
146. 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:5, at 1-10; see also Taylor, supra
note 139, at 79-85 (noting the substantial differences between a search warrant and a
surveillance order, and describing how Congress sought the constitutional acceptance
of a surveillance order by favorable comparison to a search warrant).
147. See Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Constitution of the
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assure that the power of law enforcement is not brought down upon a
person unless there is a threshold showing of legitimate suspicion. 4 8
Although the Court has upheld generalized or broad searches in
certain extenuating circumstances, the Court looks with disfavor on
these generalized searches.
ii. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Even where the governmental action constitutes a search or seizure,
the Court has carved out several exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Although there are others, the exceptions to the
requirement that a government obtain a warrant prior to a search or
seizure most relevant in the context of electronic surveillance are (1)
in instances of emergencies, (2) where a person consents to the search
or seizure, (3) when the person or object is in plain view, and (4)
"administrative" or "special" searches.150  Thus, just as a law-
enforcement officer does not need to obtain a warrant to search a
person's house if that person agrees to the search, a law-enforcement
officer does not need to obtain a warrant to eavesdrop on a telephone
conversation if one party consents. 151 Similarly, the requirement is
United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation, S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 1215-17
(Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello, eds., 1996) [hereinafter CRS, Constitution
of the United States]; Taylor, supra note 139, at 80.
148. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1217-20
149. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that a
law permitting local police to randomly stop drivers to check for illegal drugs was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment). In Edmond, the Court noted that it has upheld
a limited number of programs where there was no individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing-"where the program was designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement."' Id. at 37.
150. 1 Rudstein et al., supra note 115, $1 3.01, 3.02, 3.04, 3.05, 3.10, 3.11; cf Amar,
supra note 142, at 764-68 (describing several instances where warrants are not
required for a search or seizure, including searches and seizures (1) incident to arrest,
(2) in exigent circumstances, (3) made with consent, and (4) of objects in plain view).
But see Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence, supra note 131, at 19 (statement of
Samuel Dash) (suggesting that consensual and administrative searches are "not truly
exceptions").
151. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1994) ("It shall not be unlawful ... for a person acting
under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such
person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication
has given prior consent to such interception."); id. § 2511(2)(d) ("It shall not be
unlawful ... for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or of any State."). See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 6:1, at
6-4. As the National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws Relating
to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance explained in its 1976 report, consensual
surveillance is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because
consensual surveillance is meant to corroborate conversations rather than intercept
them. See Report of the National Wiretapping Commission, supra note 23, at 10. A
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relaxed where the delay in obtaining a warrant could jeopardize a
person's life1 12 or could result in the imminent destruction of
evidence.153  Searches for contraband at airports, schools, and
government buildings and courthouses are considered
"administrative" searches and "are generally treated differently under
the Fourth Amendment than searches aimed at capturing criminals
and finding evidence of criminal activity."' ' Although the Supreme
Court has not decided the constitutionality of x-ray screenings at
airports, those lower courts that have addressed the question
generally have upheld such searches as reasonable given the minor
intrusion compared to the high threat to people and property posed
by a potential hijacking.155 Finally, it is not considered a search if a
law-enforcement officer can plainly see the object or person from a
vantage point where the officer is legally allowed to be."
iii. Enforcement
Although the Fourth Amendment does not specify a remedy for its
violation, compliance under current precedent is achieved through the
exclusionary rule.157 Initially articulated in Boyd v. United States'5
and later adopted in Weeks v. United States,"s9 the exclusionary rule
provides that any evidence that the state secured by means violative of
the Fourth Amendment-i.e., without a court-authorized search
warrant-must be excluded from the trial against the suspect.16u
However, as will be discussed below,"' the exclusionary rule remains
controversial and courts and law enforcement in general bristle under
it.162
Initially the Fourth Amendment was enforced by civil damage suits
against offending government officers, 16' and this remedy still applies,
at least in theory.1" As one prominent academic noted in an
minority of commissioners expressed alarm that consensual surveillance had
increased while court-authorized surveillance had decreased. Id.
152. See 1 Rudstein et al., supra note 115, T 3.02[2][a], at 3-27.
153. See id. I 3.02[2][b], at 3-33 to 3-38.
154. ME 3.05[1], at 3-68.6(7) to 3-68.7.
155. Id. 3.1011][a], at 3-143 to 3-148.
156. See idL 3.04[1], at 3-68.2.
157. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1257.
158. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
159. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
160. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1259.
161. See infra note 330-333 and accompanying text.
162. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1257 ("ITihe
Supreme Court has settled, not without dissent, on [the exclusionary rule] as [the]
effective means to make real the right.").
163. See id.; Amar, supra note 142, at 759, 775-76.
164. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1257
("Theoretically, there are several alternatives to the exclusionary rule. An illegal
search and seizure may be criminally actionable .... ").
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influential critique of modem Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the
common-law tort remedy for trespass was an effective way at the time
of the passage of the Constitution to discourage government officials
from exceeding their authority when searching and seizing. 65 Indeed,
in fashioning a wiretap statute to comport with the Fourth
Amendment, Congress specifically provided in Title III that a citizen
aggrieved by illegal surveillance by either a private citizen or law
enforcement officer has criminal and civil causes of action.166
Nevertheless, criminal prosecutions against police officers conducting
illegal searches, either physical or electronic, are "extremely rare" - as
are internal disciplinary actions.67
iv. "Mere evidence" Rule
The government's use of surveillance technologies has been
significantly affected by developments or shifts in constitutional
precedents in other, related areas. One of the most significant shifts
in this context is the repudiation of the so-called "mere evidence
rule," according to which governmental agents can only search for or
seize contraband or criminal instrumentalities, but not for "mere
evidence." Since the results of surveillance rarely is contraband or a
criminal instrument, the use of surveillance technologies is inherently
inconsistent with this rule.1"
Building on a famous quotation from one of the more celebrated
cases at the time of the country's founding, the Supreme Court held in
1886 in Boyd v. United States169 that a statute authorizing agents to
obtain by subpoena a person's private papers was unconstitutional.""T
The Court held that this law violated not only the person's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures as afforded by the Fourth
Amendment but also the person's Fifth Amendment freedom from
self-incrimination.' Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley explained
165. See Amar, supra note 142, at 759, 774 ("[W]e must remember the historic role
played by civil juries and civil damage actions in which government officials were held
liable for unreasonable intrusions against person, property, and privacy."). Professor
Amar also notes that "any official who searched or seized could be sued by the citizen
target in an ordinary trespass suit .... If the jury deemed the search or seizure
unreasonable... the official would be obliged to pay (often heavy) damages." Id. at
774 (citation omitted).
166. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (1994).
167. See infra notes 349-353 and accompanying text.
168. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 52.
169. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Writing for the majority in Boyd,
Justice Bradley quoted extensively from Lord Camden's decision in Entick v.
Carrington, see id. at 627-29, about which he said: "every American statesmen, during
our revolutionary and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with
this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate
expression of constitutional law.. .. " Id. at 626-27.




that "compelling the production of [a person's] private books and
papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary
to the principals of a free government... [and] the instincts.., of an
American."'" Despite the Court "categorically and unanimously"
reaffirming the "mere evidence rule"'73 in 1921 in Gotded v. United
States," courts found ways around this rule.'" Given the inherent
tension between the "mere evidence rule" and surveillance, the Court
reevaluated the proposition that there is a difference for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment between "mere evidence" and the
instrumentalities and fruits of a crime. In Warden v. HaydenY,17 a case
decided in 1967, the Court reversed the lower court's determination
that clothing seized and used as evidence in the prosecution only had
evidentiary value and so was not lawfully subject to seizure." The
Court reasserted its repudiation of the "mere evidence" rule in a 1978
ruling that the police, armed with a warrant, could search for evidence
even from people not suspected of a crime.'
These rulings doing away with the "mere evidence rule" have
smoothed over potential constitutional impediments to the use of
these technologies. While scholars have noted that the "mere
evidence rule" articulated in Boyd and Gouled did not rest securely
on an accurate reading of history,7 9 the current view similarly fails to
appreciate important historical nuances.
b. The Fourth Amendment and Surveillance Technology: The
Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Test
i. History
In 1928, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Olmstead v. United
States,18' its first ruling on the constitutionality of a modern
surveillance technology, namely wiretapping. At that time,
wiretapping was not new; soon after the development of the telegraph
in the mid-nineteenth century, government officials and private
172. Id. at 631-32.
173. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 51.
174. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
175. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 51 (quoting Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309). Professor
Taylor noted that the existence of a rule prohibiting the use of "mere evidence" was
often a surprise even to lawyers. Id.
176. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
177. Id. at 296-97.
178. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 547-48 (1978); see also Jeffrey
Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze 65 & 243 n.21 (First Vintage Book ed. 2001) (noting that
Congress statutorily narrowed Zurcher by enacting the Privacy Protection Act of
1980).
179. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 59; Amar, supra note 142, at 765-76 & n.26.
180. Cf. Amar, supra note 142, at 765,803.
181. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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citizens figured how to intercept communications to their advantage,
such as for bookmaking, stock manipulation, and newspapers
scooping each other.182 Several states, including Washington where
Mr. Olmstead and his co-conspirators were conducting an illegal
liquor enterprise, had enacted laws to curb wiretapping.'13  Still,
federal agents installed wiretaps on eight of the suspects' phones and
amassed extensive evidence of a large conspiracy to violate the
National Prohibition Act." Noting the Fourth Amendment's
reference to "material things"'" and the significance of physical
invasions in prior Fourth Amendment cases, 186 the Court held that
wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as there
was no physical invasion of the target's premises. 87 Thus, Olmstead
affirmed that the dispositive factor in the Court's analysis of the
Fourth Amendment, even relating to electronic surveillance, was the
presence or lack of trespass by the agents on a person's premises' 8
A few years after Olmstead, Congress passed the Communications
Act of 1934 which made any interception of any telephonic
communication a crime. 8 9 Significantly, Congress did not add a law-
enforcement exception to this prohibition, 190 and the Supreme Court
subsequently held that federal and state law-enforcement agents were
therefore barred from using wiretaps.' 91  Nevertheless, in clear
contravention of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
182. See Samual Dash et al., The Eavesdroppers 23-25 (1959) (noting that
newspapers stealing stories, gamblers stealing the results of horse-races, and
stockbrokers stealing financial news were examples of early telegraphic wiretappers);
OTA, Civil Liberties, supra note 112, at 31; Berkel & Rapaport, supra note 30, at 121-
22; Long, supra note 21, at 36-37.
183. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479-80 & n.13 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (listing state
wiretap statutes).
184. See id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the wiretaps spanned
nearly five months during which time the federal agents amassed 775 pages of notes
on conversations).
185. Id. at 464 ("The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects.").
186. Id. at 464-65.
187. Id. at 466. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:3, at 1-4 to
1-6.
188. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:3, at 1-4 to 1-6. Thus,
overhearing a conversation by pressing a listening device against a wall was
permissible, see Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); while nailing or
tacking a listening device into a wall crossed the threshold into the Fourth
Amendment and thus required a warrant, see Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
189. See 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 1.3(b), at 1-8 to 1-9.
190. See OTA, Civil Liberties, supra note 112, at 32.
191. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:3, at 1-4 to 1-5. In
1937 the Supreme Court ruled in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), that
this prohibition applied to federal law enforcement agents, thus making it illegal for
them to use wiretaps under the Act. See id. at 383. The Court later extended this




Communications Act, federal and state agents continued to wiretap
phones." Given evidence and growing public awareness that illegal
wiretapping by the police was a rampant practice, 3 the Supreme
Court revisited the constitutionality of wiretapping in the mid-1960s,
this time reaching a different result.
In 1967 in Berger v. New York,"" the Court held unconstitutional a
New York statute that authorized surveillance in certain
circumstances.195  This decision's analysis of the constitutional
implications of a wiretap was substantially the basis for Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, subsequent legislation
establishing parameters for the lawful use of wiretapping by law
enforcement. 196 Later that year, the Court decided the watershed case
Katz v. United States"9 which repudiated trespass as the dispositive
factor in surveillance jurisprudence and which held that wiretapping
was a search under the Fourth Amendment.' The Court exclaimed
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," t ' and
reasoned that a warrant was required before law-enforcement officers
could eavesdrop on telephone calls that Katz was making from a
public pay phone.2'
192. See OTA, Civil Liberties, supra note 112, at 32 (describing how wiretapping
continued even after the Nardone decision); see also Long, supra note 21, at 79-101
(discussing the policies and practices of wiretapping by federal agencies of the 1920s
through 1950s).
193. See OTA, Civil Liberties, supra note 112, at 32-33. Samuel Dash's 1959 book,
The Eavesdroppers, brought to the public's attention the extent of wiretapping within
the New York Police Department. See Physical Searches for Foreign Intelligence,
supra note 131, at 15 (comments of Samuel Dash) ("I conducted the first nation-wide
investigation of wiretapping and bugging, electronic surveillance in 1959 and wrote
the book, "The Eveasdropper." [sic] That book, I believe, played a significant role in
changing the Supreme Court's decisions overturning Olmstead [sic] and ultimately
leading to the Katz decision and the Congress' decision to enact Title III of the Safe
Streets Act of 1968.").
194. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
195. 388 U.S. at 58-60.
196. See 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, §§ 1:4, 1:6, at 1-6 to 1-7, 1-10 to 1-
11.
197. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
198. The Court explained:
We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
199. Id. at 351.




ii. Constitutionality of Other Surveillance Technologies
In addition to marking a substantial departure from its prior
precedents, Katz was significant in a second respect. In subsequent
cases involving the issue of whether a certain surveillance technology
constitutes a search or seizure, the Court has adopted the analytical
framework articulated by Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz.201
Justice Harlan opined that the Fourth Amendment's reach turned on
two factors: "first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. ' ' '12  The Court has
used this two-part reasonable-expectation-of-privacy rubric for
determining whether other technologies are searches or seizures. In
Smith v. Maryland,°3 the Court held that the use of pen registers-
devices that tell law enforcement details about the telephone numbers
dialed to or from a target telephone214-did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because a person does not have a "legitimate"
expectation of privacy in numbers that he dials.20 5
In a series of cases regarding the constitutionality of aerial
surveillance, the Court has attempted to add more nuance to this
analysis, by exploring the significance of whether the search was of an
area akin to an "open field" or to the "curtilage" of a house and
whether the surveillance revealed intimate details.20 6  In Dow
Chemical Company v. United States,2"7 the Court found that despite
extremely rigorous efforts by Dow to protect its large facility from
observation,208 aerial photographs taken by the Environmental
Protection Agency with sophisticated cameras and without a warrant
did not violate the Fourth Amendment.0 9 Significant to the result the
Court reached was that the area targeted by the surveillance was more
akin to an "open field" than the "curtilage" of a private house.211
More recently, the Court has backed off the curtilage/open fields
distinction as the dispositive factor21 ' for evaluating the
201. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042-43 (2001) (noting that Court
has employed Justice Harlan's formulation from his concurrence in Katz for
determining the constitutionality of pen registers and aerial surveillance).
202. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
203. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
204. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
205. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
206. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,235-37 (1986).
207. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
208. See id. at 241-42 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. at 239.
210. Id. ("We conclude that the open areas of an industrial plant complex with
numerous plant structures spread over an area of 2,000 acres are not analogous to the
"curtilage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance; such an industrial
complex is more comparable to an open field .... ).
211. Cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (implying that anything
within a home's curtilage was within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment).
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constitutionality of a search. In Florida v. Rile) -12 and California v.
Ciraolo,2 13 the Court held that surveillance of an area manifestly
within the curtilage did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because
they were naked-eye searches that any member of the public could
have made just as easily as the law-enforcement officers did and thus
did not require a warrant.24
Another important factor in the Court's result in the aerial-
surveillance line of cases is that the observations occurred in places
where the officers or any other person (at least in theory) had a legal
right to be."l' This reasoning has also generally been central in other
cases involving surveillance with familiar or relatively simple
technologies, such as binoculars26 and flashlights. 27 Similarly, the
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Karo2 18 and United States
v. Knotts219 book-end the constitutional aspects of location-identifying
technology.' Together, these decisions indicate that law
enforcement can track a person's movements with the use of a beeper
212. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
213. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
214. In Ciraolo, the police, acting on a tip that a suspect was growing marijuana,
were able to observe marijuana plants while flying over the target's home in a fixed-
wing aircraft at an altitude of 1000 feet. 476 U.S. at 209.
In Riley, a police officer, flying in a helicopter from 400 feet, was able to look
in through openings in the roof and sides of a greenhouse and observe "what he
thought was marijuana growing in the structure." 488 U.S. at 448. Riley's greenhouse
was located on a five-acre plot of land in rural Florida and was "obscured from view
from surrounding property by trees, shrubs, and [a] mobile home." Id.
215. The Court in Ciralo explained:
The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to
require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home
on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an individual has
taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude an officer's
observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and
which renders the activities clearly visible.... The observations by Officers
Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place within public navigable
airspace ....
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14); see also Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239; Riley, 488 U.S. at
449 ("As a general proposition, the police may see what may be seen 'from a public
vantage point where [they have] a right to be."' (quoting Ciraolo)).
216. See I Rudstein, supra note 115, 1 2.03[2][f], at 2-82 ("The use of binoculars, a
telescope, or other optical aid that merely enlarges does not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the police use the device to
observe individuals, objects, or activities exposed to public view.").
217. See id. I 2.03[2][e], at 2-79 to 2-80 ("It is well-settled that where an officer's
observations do not otherwise constitute a 'search,' his use of a flashlight or other
artificial means to illuminate a darkened area does not transform those observations
into a 'search' for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.").
218. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
219. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
220. See generally 2 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, at §§ 28:1, 28:6-28:17, at
28-3, 28-8 to 28-25.
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without resort to a warrant unless and until it monitors activity inside
a house.221
As discussed elsewhere, the Supreme Court recently ruled in Kyllo
v. United States that the use of thermal imagers to detect unusual
patterns of heat emission from homes-which is often indicative of
indoor marijuana cultivation-was a search.22 Several things about
this decision bear noting. First, in stark contrast to Dow Chemical,
where the Court went out of its way to downplay the sophistication of
the camera used to make the aerial surveillance,223 Justice Scalia in
Kyllo partially premised his ruling on the recognition that there are
substantially more sophisticated versions of the device at issue.224
Second, he heavily emphasized the importance of a house in
determining whether an activity is a search, explaining that "[i]n the
home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes. ' '21 In addition,
citing favorably a case from the pre-Katz era,226 this decision may
portend that trespass is being reestablished as the dispositive factor in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, thus marking a full departure from
the notion stated in Katz that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." 27 Third, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
rubric and the curtilage/open fields dichotomy were markedly muted,
and the opinion sharply criticized the intimate-details analysis for
failing to provide sufficient practical guidance to citizens and to police
officers about where the threshold between reasonable and
unreasonable lies.2m These features suggest that the Court may be
221. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (holding that the Fourth Amendment is implicated
when beeper tracks an object into a private dwelling); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (holding
that the Fourth Amendment is not violated when beeper tracks an object on a public
highway). See generally 2 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, §§ 28:1,28:2, at 28-2 to
28-6; Jennifer Gruda, Electronic Surveillance, 88 Geo. L.J. 990, 1011-12 (2000).
222. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001) ("Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
223. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240-43 (1986) (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing in fuller detail Dow's efforts
to maintain secrecy of its compound and the highly sophisticated camera used by
EPA to photograph the compound).
224. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2044 ("While the technology used in the present case
was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.").
225. Id. at 2045; see also id. at 2041-42 ("'At the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' With few exceptions, the question
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must
be answered no." (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
226. See id. at 2041, 2043 (citing Silverman).
227. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
228. See Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. at 2045 ("Limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to
'intimate details' would not only be wrong in principle; it would be impractical in
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repudiating the doctrine and progeny of Katz and returning to a
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that is rooted in trespass.
3. Legislative Oversight and Regulation
The third major participant in this regime for surveillance
technology is Congress. Although under the long-standing principle
of judicial review, Congress cannot take away protections that the
Supreme Court deems the Constitution requires,'- it can and does
give shape to these requirements, including from time to time
augmenting the protections. This part of the Note reviews principal
laws related to surveillance that Congress has enacted, in particular
the laws regulating wiretapping and privacy-related laws.
A few years after the Supreme Court ruled that a non-trespassory
wiretapping did not violate the Fourth Amendment,2-1 Congress
enacted the Communications Act of 1934, which created a blanket
prohibition against the interception of communications, with no
exception for law enforcement." Similarly, when the Court in Berger
v. New York noted certain deficiencies in New York's wiretap statute,
the U.S. Congress shortly thereafter codified these parameters in Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. -
Title III-as the federal wiretap statute is commonly known "- -
remains the core legislation governing the use of wiretapping.
a. Title III, EPCA, FISA: Wiretapping and Interception of Electronic
Communications
Title III prohibits wiretapping generally, but creates an exception
under which law enforcement can legally intercept oral, electronic,
and wire communications in certain limited situations and under strict
constraints.' In enacting Title Ill, Congress expressly sought to
application, failing to provide 'a workable accommodation between the needs of law
enforcement and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."' (quoting Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)).
229. Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that law enacted
by Congress to overrule result in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was not
valid); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (holding that Congress
exceeded its constitutional bounds in enacting a law to overturn a Supreme Court
ruling construing the right to freedom of religion).
230. See supra notes 181-188 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
232. Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
233. Cf. 1 Carr, supra note 25, passin; 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24,
passim.
234. 18 U.S.C. § 2517. See generally 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 2.2, at 2-4 to 2-5; 1
Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:6, at 1-10. Although Title III also applies to
private citizens, the focus here is on the regulations created by this legislation on
government agents.
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accommodate both the need for effective law enforcement and the
need to protect citizens' right to privacy. 35 Title III was enacted amid
strong evidence of widespread surveillance by police. 6
A surveillance order, the authorization that Congress created for
law enforcement to legally conduct a wiretap, bears many similarities
to a search warrant, which it is essentially modeled after. 37
Nevertheless, a wiretap differs in key respects from an ordinary
search-it is broader in time and place and it is harder to describe
with much specificity the item that is sought.?38  Describing a
surveillance order as a "super search warrant," 9 one assistant
attorney general explained:
It is not an ordinary search warrant because it allows the search to
be conducted over a particular instrument, no matter where that
instrument may be in the United States (and even outside the
jurisdiction of the court), and the search is allowed to span a 30-day
period with the approval of the court.240
Thus, Title III places analogous but more rigorous requirements on
law enforcement. For example, a wiretap authorized under Title III
235. See § 801, 82 Stat. at 211. In enacting Title III, Congress made four findings,
the fourth of which was that:
To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or
oral communications where none of the parties to the communication has
consented to the interception should be allowed only when authorized by a
court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the control and
supervision of the authorizing court. Interception of wire and oral
communications should further be limited to certain major types of offenses
and specific categories of crime with assurances that the interception is
justified and that the information obtained thereby will not be misused.
Id. at 211-12. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, at § 1:6, at 1-10 to
1-11.
236. See supra note 193 and accompanying text; cf supra note 135.
237. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 79-80; see also 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 2.5(a), at
2-20 to 2-21 (comparing conventional and electronic searches); Annis supra note 17,
at 34 (same).
238. See 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:5, at 1-8 to 1-10; Taylor, supra
note 139, at 83.
239. Annis, supra note 17, at 33.
240. Id. at 33-34. Although a surveillance order can be granted only for thirty days,
see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1994), it can-and very often is-extended for additional
thirty day periods. See Wiretap Report 1999, supra note 26, at 8. According to the
Wiretap Report 1999:
A total of 1,367 extensions were requested and authorized in 1999 (an
increase of 17 percent). The average length of an extension was 29 days, up
from 27 days in 1998. The longest federal intercept occurred in the Western
District of Texas, where the original 30-day order was extended nine times
to complete a 289-day wire-tap used in a narcotics investigation. Among
state wiretaps terminating during 1999, the longest was used in a
racketeering investigation in New York County, New York; this wiretap
required a 30-day order to be extended 16 times to keep the intercept in
operation 510 days. In contrast, 19 federal intercepts and 77 state intercepts
each were in operation for less than a week.
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requires that a high-ranking official within the U.S. Attorney
General's office submit an application to a federal judge or magistrate
specifying, inter alia, 1) the facts showing probable cause that a crime
is, was, or would be committed, that the particular communications
will be used for the commission of the crime, and that the particular
facility will be used in the commission of the crime; 2) the type of
communication to be intercepted; and 3) a statement that other
procedures have failed, will likely fail, or are too dangerous.-1 Thus,
Congress intended that law-enforcement agents seeking a warrant for
this "super search" would have to meet an onerous burden. -4 -
To keep the wiretap statute current in the rapidly and profoundly
changing telecommunications environment, Congress subsequently
has amended Title III several times,"43 the most significant of which
are the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986-" ("ECPA")
and the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994245 ("CALEA"). Congress passed the ECPA in response to the
proliferation of new "electronic communications," such as e-mail and
stored voice-mail and e-mail messages.- With CALEA, Congress
241. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1); see also Annis, supra note 17, at 35.
242. The process of obtaining judicial authorization for a wiretap, from the
perspective of the law-enforcement officers who draft these applications, can be
onerous. For an instructive discussion of the process and pitfalls of applying for an
electronic wiretap, see Annis, supra note 17, at 35-39, and Monica Bachner, So
You've Always Wanted to do a Wiretap: Practical Tips If You Never Have,
USABulletin, Sept. 1997, at 40, excerpts reprinted in 9 Department of Justice Manual
§ 9-60.202A, at 9-1214.42 (1987). These articles explain that defense attorneys will
generally pounce on mistakes or omissions in an application and seek to exclude the
evidence. See Annis, supra note 17, at 35 ("ITihe necessity requirement seems to be
one of the areas of concentrated effort in the defense bar's attempts to suppress the
results of super search warrants.").
243. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:6, at 1-10 to 1-12.
Since 1968, Congress has expanded the crimes for which a wiretap is authorized from
26 to nearly 100. See Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze, supra note 178, at 37. For a
general discussion of the federalization of crimes, see John S. Baker, Jr., State Police
Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 673 (1999), which
describes the expanding federal criminalization of local crimes, the reasons for the
trend, and its consequences for the courts.
244. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C.).
245. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
2522,47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1021 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
246. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:9, at 1-19 (noting that
"the overall result [of the ECPA] was a significant improvement in the law").
Congress also codified the rules generally in practice by law enforcement for pen
registers and trap-and-trace devices. Congress created for law enforcement the ability
to conduct "roving wiretaps," which allow the government to listen in on any phone
line a targeted person is likely to use, rather than allowing for a tap only on a
particular phone known to be used by the person and which is the specific subject of
the court-ordered tap. See generally 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:9 at 1-
19 to 1-20. (The phrase "roving wiretap" does not appear in the statute. See
Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 411.)
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made it illegal to intercept communications over cordless
telephones.247
Alongside Title III is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978248 ("FISA"), which Congress enacted in response to lingering
questions about whether surveillance by executive agencies in
carrying out their national-defense function were covered by Title
111.249 In United States v. United States District Court250 (commonly
known as Keith), the Supreme Court held that the interposition of a
judge was necessary for surveillance by executive-branch intelligence
agencies for domestic national security.2 1  The decision did not
mandate the application of Title III procedures for such surveillance
for national security, 2 and invited Congress to craft other protective
procedures.2 3 Although the president's powers are at their greatest
when acting for national security, nevertheless in light of Watergate
and revelations by the Church Committee on abuses by federal
intelligence agencies,2 Congress has mandated the president to get a
surveillance order to conduct a wiretap for national security
purposes." FISA created a seven-member special court to review
applications for wiretapping for national-defense purposes.256  With
FISA, Congress required the Attorney General to apply for a warrant
to conduct electronic surveillance and show probable cause for
domestic intelligence purposes.2 7 Thus, although the standard for
247. Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 202, 108 Stat. 4279, 4290 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510,
2511 to include cordless telephones within Title III coverage). See generally 1 Fishman
& McKenna, supra note 24, § 3:19, at 3-25.
248. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1863 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
249. Despite the urging of a sizeable minority on a commission to review the
wiretap laws, see Report of the National Wiretapping Commission, supra note 23, at
177 (Minority Report, James Abourezk et al.) (criticizing the majority opinion for
"failfing] to address the subject of electronic surveillance for national security
purposes"), the majority believed that national security surveillance was not covered
by Title III and chose not to include national-security surveillance in its investigation.
See id. at 27 ("The Commission did not undertake a study of... electronic
surveillance for national security purposes because Title III specifically excludes
electronic surveillance for national security purposes from its scope."). In response,
the Minority notes that Title III is actually neutral on the president's authority to
order surveillance for national security and that Congress empowered the
Commission to investigate such sensitive matters. See id. at 177-78 (Minority Report,
James Abourezk et al.).
250. United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
251. Id. at 323-24.
252. Id. at 322 ("[W]e do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures
prescribed by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case.").
253. Id. ("Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which
differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III.").
254. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
255. See 2 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 27:4, at 27-6 to 27-9; Chiarella &
Newton, supra note 131, at 29-32.




getting a surveillance order to wiretap for intelligence purposes is
lower than a surveillance order for law-enforcement purposes,
nevertheless, Congress has sought to require some level of
accountability and to not cede totally unfettered discretion to
intelligence agents.
b. Privacy statutes
An additional contribution by Congress to this surveillance regime
takes the form of privacy-protection statutes, such as the Video
Protection Privacy Act, 8 the federal Privacy Act of 1974," the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, and the Privacy Protection Act of 1980,2"' in
response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily.261  The Freedom of Information Act 62 ("FOIA") is also an
important measure which requires federal agencies to make certain
information available to the general public and which empowers
citizens to request additional specific information from these
agencies." While this statute assures some measure of governmental
accountability to the public, it also contains several exemptions that
permit law-enforcement agencies to not disclose information.2'
258. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710
(1994)). The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, also known as the -Bork Bill,-
restricts the disclosure of information about what videos an individual rents. The act
entitles law enforcement access only to identifiable customer information and
requires that the targets of investigations into video rental patterns be notified about
law enforcement subpoenas. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710. See generally Robert Gellman,
Privacy, in Federal Information Policies in the 1990s: Views and Perspectives 143
tbl.7.3 (Peter Hernon et al. eds., 1995).
259. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896, tit. 5, § 552 (1974) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1994)). This statute "places limits on the types of information federal
agencies may collect on individuals." Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 136.
Congress later enacted the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988.
Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988), to amend and modernize the Privacy Act
because it was increasingly out of date with modern computing and record-keeping.
See Gellman, supra note 258, at 146. However, according to Gellman. the Act's core
purposes have not been effectively carried out for a number of reasons: "[llack of
administrative oversight, changing technology and record-keeping practices, and
limited congressional attention." Id. at 147. In particular, the Office of Management
and Budget ("OMB"), which is charged with oversight of the Privacy Act, has been
criticized for not keeping up its responsibilities under the Privacy Act. fi. at 146.
260. Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2t00jaa(a)
(1994)).
261. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See supra note 178 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Zurcher.
262. Pub. L. No. 89-487,80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
263. See Gellman, supra note 258, at 147 (describing how FOIA "permits any
person to request records in the possession of a Federal agency" and noting how
FOIA has an important privacy component because the courts have interpreted it to
exclude the disclosure of personal information).
264. See id. (noting that there are nine exemptions to the requirement that a
federal government agency disclose requested information, including "national
security information" and "law enforcement investigatory records"), see, e.g., Master
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Although these and other enactments265 have created some
additional protections for the privacy of communications, the overall
trend seems to be the legislative erosion of privacy interests.266 For
example, when Congress brought "electronic communications" within
the scope of Title III, it did not impose the exclusionary rule on
evidence procured in violation of its provision. Second, the ECPA
created the power for law-enforcement to conduct "roving wiretaps,"
where the government is relieved of specifying "the nature and
location of the facilities from which or where the communication is to
be intercepted '267 if specification is impractical.216 The Department of
Justice prevailed on Congress to create this capability for person-
dependent rather than telephone- or place-dependant surveillance in
response to the effective use of evasive techniques by suspicious
targets, such as switching telephones.2 69 Third, CALEA mandated
that providers of telecommunications services make their systems
wiretap-ready for law-enforcement surveillance and set aside $500
million dollars for companies to retrofit their systems for this
purpose.270
v. FBI, 926 F. Supp. 193, 198 (D. D.C. 1996) (discussing exemption 7(c)).
265. See Gellman, supra note 258, at 143 tbl.7.3, 151 (listing or mentioning as
privacy-related legislation the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (the "Buckley Amendment"), the Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988 (the "Bork Bill"), the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Record Confidentiality Laws, the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, and the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994).
266. Since 1968, Congress has slowly permitted lower-level personnel in the
Attorney General's office to apply for wiretaps and has greatly expanded the crimes
for which a wiretap can be authorized. See 18 U.S.C. 2516(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999);
supra note 243 and accompanying text.
267. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1994).
268. See Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 411 n.61 (citing Department of Justice
Memorandum from William Weld, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division to
All United States Attorneys and Strike Force Chiefs, Dec. 15, 1986, at 10-11).
Goldsmith argues that "[i]n many cases, roving surveillance reflects a broadened
application of the particularity requirement rather than an exception thereto." Id. at
411 n.61 (emphasis added).
For interception of oral communications, a roving wiretap can be obtained
without specification of location by convincing a judge that "specification is not
practical." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)(a)(iii). For interception of wire or electronic
communications, a roving wiretap can be obtained without specification of location by
"showing that there is probable cause to believe that the person's actions could have
the effect of thwarting interception from a specified facility." Id. § 2518(11)(b)(ii).
All applications for roving wiretaps must be approved by an official within the
Department of Justice who is an Associate Attorney General or higher. Id. §2518(11)(a)(i), (b)(i).
269. See Goldsmith, supra note 40, at 410.
270. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002-1009, 1021 (Supp. V 1999).
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c. Legislative Proposals After the Terrorist Attack of September 11
Shortly after the hijacking attacks, there was a flurry of legislative
measures aimed at combating terrorism.2 " Alarmed by this haste and
lack of thoughtful deliberation,2n legislators and advocacy groups of
both traditionally liberal and conservative stripes-- challenged the
wisdom, motives, and the constitutionality of certain provisions. - 4
271. On September 13, two days after the attack, the Senate attached an
amendment, entitled the Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, to an appropriations bill
for the Justice Department. See Senate Amendment 1562, 147 Cong. Rec. S9401
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 2001). See generally Alvarez, supra note 7. Several days later,
Attorney General John Ashcroft introduced a more comprehensive legislative agenda
which included nearly identical provisions to Senate Amendment 1562, the
Combating Terrorism Act. See Krim, supra note 7.
272. Apparently, Congress was pressured to act quickly on the bill submitted by
Attorney General Ashcroft. See Krim, supra note 7 ("The White House is pushing for
Capitol Hill to act by the end of the week, according to a congressional source.");
Robert E. Pierre, Wisconsin Senator Emerges as a Maverick, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, at
A8 (reporting that Senator Russell Feingold, Democrat of Wisconsin and the only
senator to vote against the legislation, explained that "the bill's title-the 'USA
Patriot Act'-was part of the 'relentless' pressure to move it swiftly"). For example,
Senate Amendment 1562 was passed hastily and with virtually no debate. See Krim,
supra note 7 (noting that the amendment was passed by a voice vote late at night).
273. See Krim, supra note 7 ("A coalition of public interest groups from across the
political spectrum has formed to try to stop Congress and the Bush administration
from rushing to enact counterterrorism measures before considering their effect on
Americans' privacy and civil rights."); Robin Toner, Bush Law-Enforcement Plan
Troubles Both Right and Left, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2001, at Al. One highly
controversial provision of the proposed legislation, which would have permitted the
attorney general to detain legal immigrants suspected of being involved in terrorism
for indefinite periods without filing charges, was dropped. See id.: Robin Toner &
Neil A. Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill Much Like Senate's, but with 5-Year
Limit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 2001, at B6 [hereinafter Toner & Lewis, House Passes
Terrorism Bill].
274. Several commentators criticized the proposals, suggesting that portions of the
draft legislation had little if anything to do with terrorism and instead were items on
the Department of Justice's "wish list" of new law-enforcement capabilities. See The
Home Front Security and Liberty, supra note 8 ("[Oither proposals from the
attorney general do not seem to provide tools agents really need. In fact, some
amount to a wish list of things that the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation have unsuccessfully lobbied for in the past and that do not make sense
now. Other provisions suffer from a blunderbuss approach."); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Giving Up Our Rights for Little Gain, L.A. Times, Sept. 27, 2001, at 17 ("Atty. Gen.
John Ashcroft's plan for fighting terrorism seems to include all the bad ideas for
greater law enforcement powers that have been rejected over the years.").
These commentators implied that the Department of Justice was exploiting
the present situation to enact measures that it had sought unsuccessfully prior to and
irrespective of the specific occurrence. See Pierre, supra note 272 ("'This is not a bill
that is carefully tailored to the terrorism problem. The whole tenor of the debate was
'Let's grab as much as we can' given the fear of terrorism."' (quoting Senator Russell
Feingold)). An editorial in the New York Times observed that "Congress went down
a similar path after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing." The Home Front. Security
and Liberty, supra note 8. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
"which passed by a wide margin, broadened the government's ability to detain and
deport legal immigrants, even though immigrants had nothing to do with the
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Nevertheless, the Congress enacted and President Bush signed into
law the USA Patriot Act275 in less than two months and with
overwhelming support.276 The bill contained several provisions that
significantly changed the law regarding the government's ability to
conduct surveillance. 77 First, the USA Patriot Act makes terrorism a
predicate act for which a wiretap under Title III can be authorized.2 8
Second, it modified Title III, FISA, and the federal statute related to
pen registers so that there would be explicit legal authorization to
permit surveillance of e-mail and Internet communications-i.e., for
the use of Carnivore. 279 Third, the Act authorizes the use of a "roving
wiretap" under FISA.10 Fourth, the Act lowers the threshold for
which surveillance pursuant to FISA is permitted,281 and expands the
bombing." Id.; cf Greenhouse, supra note 6 (noting that times of crisis most test our
commitment to our ideals but that "times of deep insecurity, grief and anger... in
fact have often evoked the worst of our national instincts"); Harvey A. Silverglate,
Let's Not Trade Freedom for Security, Nat'l L.J., Sept., 24, 2001, at A26 (urging that
the administration, the "police agencies," and Congress not pass "draconian
legislation" which will have "severe limitations on civil liberties [and] no appreciable
increase in security," as occurred when Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, which "has all but eviscerated the ancient writ of habeas
corpus").
275. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
276. Jonathan Krim & Robert O'Harrow Jr., Bush Signs into Law New
Enforcement Era: U.S. Gets Broad Electronic Powers, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 2001, at
A6; see also 147 Cong. Rec. S10990 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Patrick
Leahy) (describing the events surrounding the Act's consideration and passage).
277. Id.
278. USA Patriot Act, § 201 (amending 18 U.S.C. 2516(1)); see Krim & O'Harrow
Jr., supra note 276. The USA Patriot Act also authorized law enforcement to conduct
wiretapping for crimes related to computer fraud and abuse. See USA Patriot Act, §
202.
279. USA Patriot Act, §§ 214,216 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842, 1843 and 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3121, 3123, 3127); see also 147 Cong. Rec. S10999 (statement of Patrick Leahy).
Senator Leahy explained:
I have long supported modernizing the pen register and trap and trace
device laws by modifying the statutory language to cover the use of these
orders on computer transmissions; to remove the jurisdictional limits on
service of these orders; and to update the judicial review procedure, which,
unlike any other area in criminal procedure, bars the exercise of judicial
discretion in reviewing the justification for the order. The USA Act, in
section 216, updates the pen register and trap and trace laws only in two out
of three respects I believe are important, and without allowing meaningful
judicial review.
147 Cong. Rec. S10999 (emphasis added).
280. USA Patriot Act, § 206 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(c)(2)(B)). The "roving
wiretap" can now be obtained upon a showing that "the actions of the target of the
application may have the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified person."
Id.; see also 147 Cong. Rec. S10998 (statement of Patrick Leahy).
281. USA Patriot Act, § 218 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B),
1823(a)(7)(B)). Previously, "the secret procedures and different probable cause
standards under FISA [could] be used only if a high-level executive official certifies
that 'the purpose' is to obtain foreign intelligence formation." See 147 Cong. Rec.
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time-periods for which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
can authorize surveillance in the United States of "an agent of foreign
power." Fifth, the Act allows for so-called "sneak-and-peak
warrants," in which law-enforcement officers are permitted to delay
notifying a target that a search or seizure has been conducted.'
Sixth, the Act also lowers the firewalls that have been erected
between law-enforcement and national-security agencies, by
permitting greater sharing of information gained through
surveillance.2 Finally, the Act subjects several provisions to a four-
year sunset.28
The first part of this Note has described the regime in the United
States for surveillance technologies-i.e., the technologies, the
respective roles of the branches of government, and the rules
S11003 (statement of Patrick Leahy). The new standard adopted in the Act is -a
significant purpose." See USA Patriot Act, § 218, 147 Cong. Rec. S11004.
282. USA Patriot Act, § 207 (amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1824); 147 Cong. Rec.
S11003 (statement of Patrick Leahy). As Senator Leahy explained:
[Tihe bill changes the initial period of the surveillance from 90 to 120 days
and changes the period for extensions from 90 days to one year. The initial
120-day period provides for a review of the results of the surveillance or
search directed at an individual before one-year extensions are requested.
147 Cong. Rec. S11003 (daily ed. Oct. 25,2001).
283. USA Patriot Act, § 213 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3103a); 147 Cong. Rec. S11002
(statement of Patrick Leahy). Senator Leahy explained sneak-and-peak warrants as
follows:
Two circuit courts of appeal, the Second and the Ninth Circuits, have
recognized a limited exception to this requirement [that a person be notified
of a search]. When specifically authorized by the issuing judge or
magistrate, the officers may delay providing notice of the search to avoid
compromising an ongoing investigation or for some other good reason.
However, this authority has been carefully circumscribed.
First, the Second and Ninth Circuit cases have dealt only with situations
where the officers search a premises without seizing any tangible
property....
Second, the cases have required that the officers seeking the warrant must
show good reason for the delay. Finally, while the courts have allowed notice
of the search may be delayed, it must be provided within a reasonable period
thereafter, which should generally be no more than seven days....
.... [Tihe bill prohibits the government from seizing any tangible
property or any wire or electronic communication or stored electronic
information unless it makes a showing of reasonable necessity for the
seizure.... Second, the provision now requires that notice be given within a
reasonable time of the execution of the warrant rather than giving a blanket
authorization for up to a 90-day delay. What constitutes a reasonable time,
of course, will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. But I
would expect courts to be guided by the teachings of the Second and the
Ninth Circuits that, in the ordinary case, a reasonable time is no more than
seven days.
Id. at S11002-03.
284. USA Patriot Act, § 203(b)-(d) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2517): 147 Cong.
Rec. S10998 (statement of Patrick Leahy) (discussing the information-sharing
provisions of the Act).
285. USA Patriot Act, § 224.
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regulating the technologies' use. This part has attempted to convey
both the real-world application of these technologies and the
capabilities for surveillance and monitoring of citizens with these
technologies. Large technological advances-in electronics and in
computer processing and storage, among other fields-have enabled
the development of powerful yet unobtrusive devices. These
sophisticated technologies have greatly increased the government's
ability to eavesdrop on communications, to identify particular
persons, and to monitor the locations, activities, and habits of its
citizens. The next part of the Note identifies and discusses several
significant practical problems with this regime; it also includes a
comparison of the modern jurisprudence of surveillance with the
original understanding of the Constitution generally and the Fourth
Amendment specifically.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THIS REGIME
As the discussion in Part I makes clear, the government and
especially law-enforcement agencies have access to very powerful
technologies for surveillance and monitoring of citizens -and it seems
certain that technological advances will continue to augment these
substantial capabilities. Already, the law is struggling and failing to
keep pace with these developments in surveillance, as many
commentators have noted. 6 Having described the technologies, their
usage, and the various rules regulating them, Part II of the Note
identifies and analyzes practical and theoretical problems with the
current regime in the United States for surveillance technologies. Part
II.A focuses on the shortcomings in the regime's ability to properly
regulate the use of these technologies. Part II.B discusses several key
differences between the original understanding and the current
interpretation of the Constitution generally and the Fourth
Amendment specifically.
286. As Professor Lewis Katz observed in 1990, "the Court has permitted police
surveillance powers to grow almost unchecked to their present epic proportions...
[and that police] may use any number of sophisticated surveillance techniques without
judicial authorization or review." Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment
for the Twenty-first Century, 65 Ind. L.J. 549, 549 (1990). In 1969, Professor Telford
Taylor noted that "old habits and notions of personal privacy... are in grave danger
of burial under an avalanche of new surveillance devices." Taylor, supra note 139, at
19; see also Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1463 ("I will argue that both the state and the
private sector now enjoy unprecedented abilities to collect personal data, and that
technological developments suggest that costs of data collection and surveillance will
decrease, while the quantity and quality of data will increase."); infra note 423 and
accompanying text; cf. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2001) ("It would
be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology."); Rosen,
The Unwanted Gaze, supra note 178, at 58 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court's response to the
growth of new technologies of monitoring and surveillance... has proved to be
distressingly passive at every turn.").
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A. Practical Problems with this Regime
1. Limited and Post-hoc Judicial or Political Evaluation
The first problem with this regime is that not all surveillance
technologies are judicially or politically scrutinized, and those that are
scrutinized are done after the technology has been in use for a while.
In promulgating standards for electronic surveillance, the ABA cited
several reasons that motivated the development of the standards.
First, the ABA noted the prevalence of surveillance and the
likelihood of greater reliance on it.' Second, "traditional legal
doctrine does not necessarily answer many of the novel questions
raised by the use of technologically-assisted physical surveillance,"
such as the accountability of government agencies in using
surveillance technology.' Third, "when the courts have tried to
regulate technologically-assisted physical surveillance by the police,
their efforts have not resulted in a consistent body of case law."'
The significance of this pattern is that it increases substantially the
already broad discretion that law-enforcement officers and agencies
have.290
A technological device known as "Sentor" illustrates how
sophisticated technologies are deployed and exploited without pre-
clearance and often with few rules governing their use. Sentor, which
is currently in use in drug enforcement and border patrols, is a device
which picks up and analyzes the air surrounding a person for traces of
narcotics.291
While the Sentor is frequently used without a warrant, no court has
yet ruled on whether its warrantless use violates the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard. Peter
Bober has asserted, however, that for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis, the courts are likely to examine this new
device by analogy to drug-sniffing canines. Citing Penny-Feeney's
287. See ABA Standards for Electronic Surveillance, supra note 67, at 5.
288. Id. at 6.
289. Id.
290. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.
L. Rev. 349, 415 (1974) (noting the immense discretion of police officers on the street
and how little controls are placed on them); see also infra text accompanying notes
360-61.
291. Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance Tools and the Fourth
Amendment Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Technological Age, 37 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 127, 137-38 (2000).
The "Sentor," a device... which looks like a large flashlight, is pointed at
the suspect and, when switched on, vacuums in large quantities of air (and
dust) from the area surrounding his or her body. It is then inserted into a
larger machine, which heats the samples and through high-speed gas
chromatography separates the chemical compounds contained therein.




interpretation of United States v. Place, Bober concludes that the
Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, is likely to find that
warrantless use of the Sentor does not constitute a search.2g
Thus, a law-enforcement agent's resort to a warrant when employing
this technology at present is optional; further, despite features which
make Sentor potentially more intrusive than drug-sniffing dogs-in
particular, that these specially trained dogs only smell drugs and other
contraband while Sentor detects non-criminal detailsP3-it is likely
that this technology will be judicially approved by favorably
comparing it to similar but less intrusive surveillance methods. This
pattern of analogizing has been used by courts to allow the use of
other surveillance technologies.9
Although the Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of
several technologies, 95 by definition it does so after the fact, and often
many years after the technology has been in use. For example,
although the Supreme Court first ruled on wiretapping in 1928, the
ability to wiretap was discovered and exploited a half century earlier,
shortly after the invention of telegraphy and telephony.296 The
ultimate decision by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of
thermal imaging occurred several years after this technology was
adopted from its military lineage for use in civilian law enforcement. 29,
While the Court's dicta have strongly hinted at the constitutionality
of image-enhancing technologies such as binoculars or night-vision
goggles, the Court has never squarely addressed their
constitutionality.298 In particular, the Court in United States v. Lee299
analogized a searchlight to marine or field glasses and concluded that
neither was a search,3" and reviewed the use of binoculars
approvingly in On Lee v. United States.3"' In recent cases involving
image-enhanced searches, such as Dow Chemical and most recently
Kyllo, the Court has stressed that a key consideration is whether the
292. Id. at 138 (footnotes omitted) (citing Peter Joseph Bober, The "Chemical
Signature" of the Fourth Amendment: Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry and
the War on Drugs, 8 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 75 (1997)).
293. See id. at 135, 138 (discussing analytical differences between drug-sniffing
canines, FLIR, and Sentor).
294. See id. at 135 (discussing how courts have analogized FLIR to drug-sniffing
canines).
295. See generally 2 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, §§ 29:1 to 29:7, at 29-3 to
29-14. Besides wiretapping and thermal imagers, the Court ruled in Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that the use of pen registers is not a search.
296. See Berkel & Rapaport, supra note 30, at 122 (noting that the New York
Police Department was wiretapping telephones by 1895).
297. See supra Part I.A.2.
298. See 2 Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 29:8, at 29-14.
299. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
300. Id. at 563. Justice Brandeis, one of the Court's champions of privacy rights,
wrote the opinion in Lee. See id. at 560.
301. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754 (1952). See generally 2 Fishman &
McKenna, supra note 24, § 29:8, at 29-14.
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technology is in general use by the general public.Y Similarly, as the
technology of wiretapping continues to progress, the constitutionality
of these innovations are not scrutinized anew, but rather assumed to
be legitimate based on analogies to technologies for which there is
precedent. For example, the Congress authorized and the FBI
developed a technology for the interception of electronic
communications-Carnivore-by enfolding it within the rules of Title
III. When the FBI uses its Carnivore software for monitoring the
Internet communications of a target, it hews to the rules of Title III
when searching the full content of the target's communications and
adheres to the statutory requirements for pen-registers when
searching only for information about who and when.Y- Therefore, the
extent, if any, to which these new technologies implicate the Fourth
Amendment in new and unprecedented ways, or which require
different strictures to ensure reasonableness, may never be
considered.
To be sure, this post-hoc and limited scrutiny of surveillance
technology merely reflects the nature of our judiciary, which generally
decides specific controversies between specific parties involving
specific events that have already occurred.-" Nevertheless, there are
aspects of surveillance and technology that makes judicial and
political scrutiny less likely. The very essence of most of these
technologies is to be transparent and unobtrusive; their effectiveness
logically correlates to the inability of the target to detect the
surveillance.305 The inability to notice when a technology is being
used is compounded by the fact that the existence of several of these
technologies is not widely known. For example, several months after
the controversial and highly publicized revelation in 2000 that the FBI
had developed and deployed Carnivore,3  only twenty percent of
302. See Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038.2043,2046 (2001).
303. See Independent Review of Carnivore, supra note 43, at 3-1 to 3-2.
304. Although the judiciary increasingly fashions injunctive, forward-looking
remedies for controversies between less specific parties over events that have not yet
happened, this type of prospective, general rulemaking is typically the province of the
legislature.
305. See supra note 21; see also Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress,
Criminal Justice, New Technologies, and the Constitution 9 (May 1988). This report
explains:
Many new science-based technologies have similar effects which could
degrade constitutional protections:
oThey increase the ability of government to observe, control, or intervene in
the affairs of an individual singly, rather than with large groups or the public
as a whole; this could erode the effectiveness of constitutional restraints
based on common law formulations.
oThey allow investigation or surveillance at a distance, or out of sight of
both the subject and concerned public interest groups: generally raising the
level of surveillance and narrowing the expectation of privacy in society.
Id
306. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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Americans knew what Carnivore was.30 While this transparency
significantly benefits crime-fighting, it also increases the risk of
misuse, since it greatly decreases accountability."°
As the incident at the Super Bowl aptly illustrates,30 9 the full
measure of the impact of these surveillance technologies is their
capability when integrated with other technologies, in particular
computer storage and processing.310  A prime example of the
significant synergy of multiple surveillance technologies is the
"Echelon" worldwide Internet-monitoring system purportedly
operated by the U.S. National Security Agency. As Professor A.
Michael Froomkin described in a recent law-review article, Echelon
consists of technology which recognizes specific pre-determined
voiceprints, "so-called dictionary programs that flag messages with
interesting references or word patterns," and voice-recognition
software to translate spoken words that can be sorted, analyzed, and
retrieved using sophisticated search methods.'
The significance of these synergies is that the government can
monitor its citizens or conduct surveillance more efficiently and more
effectively. Given that costliness has been one important factor
307. After the controversy about Carnivore, a recent survey by the Pew Internet &
American Life Project found that only one in five respondents had heard of
Carnivore. See Kornblum, supra note 44.
308. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 153 ("[T]he very invisibility on which
electronic surveillance depends for its effectiveness makes it evasive of oversight and
readily adaptable to malign uses.").
309. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
310. See Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1468-69 ("Databases multiply the effects of
sensors.... Equally important, databases make it possible to create new information
by combining existing data in new and interesting ways."); see also id. at 1477
("Cameras are also an example of how technologies can interact with each other to
multiply privacy-destroying effects.... In the near future, however, human observers
will become much less important as the task of analyzing still photos and videos will
be mechanized."). As one commentator noted about the phenomenon of these
synergies:
While surveillance and information technologies each create privacy
concerns in their own right, recent technological advances have blurred the
distinction between these two formerly separate categories. Surveillance
technology now can generate personal information, while personal
information can be used for surveillance-like purposes. Merging these two
fields of technology heightens privacy concerns beyond the point that either
category invokes separately.
Thomas B. Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of
Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 975, 995
(1999) (emphasis added).
311. See Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1482-83 ("The NSA recently received a patent
on a computerized procedure that produces a topical summary of a conversation
using a 'tree-word-list' to score the text. The patent describes a 'preprocessing' phase
that removes 'stutter phrases' from a transcript. Then, a computer automatically
assigns a label, or topic description, to the text. The method promises to allow
computerized sorting and retrieval of transcripts and other documents based upon
their meaning, not just keywords." (footnotes omitted)).
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restraining the use of wiretapping, 12 advances in voice-recognition or
text-scanning techniques create the possibility of more affordable
means to monitor a wider selection of people.-"'
Even if so inclined, the courts would be hard-pressed to craft and
recraft rules and regulations that keep up with modem surveillance,
given the fast pace at which existing technologies are improved and
new technologies developed.34 In fact, the courts and the Congress
have substantially contributed to this gap between technology and
regulation.1
Carnivore, the FBI's Internet-sniffing program, illustrates one
aspect of how technology is outstripping the law: Technologies which
have been deemed not to implicate the Fourth Amendment can be
improved or modified so as to enable their use in much more intrusive
ways.31 6 Carnivore operates in one of two modes, either "full," which
312. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 193-94.
313. See id.
314. Cf. People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 734 (N.Y. 1998) (-The technology
moves faster than the law and it is important to law enforcement authorities, but it
cannot be allowed to outpace the array of checks and balances and protections
affecting these privacy intrusions, important to individuals and society at large.").
Despite this observation about technology and the law, the New York Court of
Appeals in Kramer went on to soften a rule the court had devised five years earlier
for ensuring the appropriate legal use of pen-register devices that also could be
modified to intercept telephone conversations. See infra notes 324-327 and
accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 243-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of measures
the Congress has taken to steadily loosen the rules on wiretapping since it first
enacted Title III in 1968. Similarly, the courts have identified several circumstances,
such as the search or random drug-testing of students by school administrators, where
the requirements imposed for conducting a search are less stringent. See Buffaloe,
supra note 142, at 533-42 (discussing cases of administrative or special-needs searches,
where the Supreme Court has dispensed with the requirement that a search be based
on probable cause).
One commentator recently described seven ways that Title Ill and the
ECPA's "balanced legislative scheme have been watered down by Congress itself and
by the judiciary:" 1) the four-fold expansion of crimes for which wiretaps can be used,
2) the steady increase in authorizations and the almost non-existent instance in which
a wiretap request has been denied, 3) the steady increase in the average length of a
wiretap and the number of calls intercepted (both nearly doubling from 1980 to 1996),
4) the erosion of the requirement that other techniques first be exhausted. 5) the lack
of enforcement of the requirement that the surveillance be minimized, 6) the low rate
of acceptance of motions by defendants to suppress, 7) the 100% approval for
wiretaps under FISA and the increasing reliance by law enforcement on FISA for
criminal matters due to its "more flexible" standards. See James X. Dempsey,
Communications Privacy in tire Digital Age: Revitalizing tire Federal Wiretap Laws to
Enhance Privacy, 8 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 65, 75-78 (1997). These trends illustrate
how wiretapping is no longer perceived as an extraordinary technique to be used in
limited situations and under stringent constraints-as it was when Title III was
enacted in 1968. See id.
316. As Justice Scalia noted in Kyllo, the thermal imager at issue in that case was a
relatively rudimentary version of the technology. See supra note 77 and accompanying
text. Had the minority garnered one more vote-i.e., so that the use of a thermal
imager on a house would not have constituted a search-it seems likely that law-
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reveals the entire message, including both content and addressing
information; or "pen," which reveals just the addressing information
in the electronic message.317 These distinctions are significant,318 and,
accordingly, there are different standards that the FBI operator of
Carnivore must meet depending on whether the operator is using the
program in "full" or "pen" mode.319 However, Carnivore contains two
features which together make it impossible for anyone scrutinizing a
Carnivore search to determine which mode the operator was using.
First, the operator can easily switch between "pen" and "full" modes
by merely selecting a radio button on the computer screen;2 0 second,
the program does not keep track of the search.32 In effect, the
operation of Carnivore in conformity with the law is entirely at the
discretion of the operator, since the operator's actions are untraceable
and unaccountable. Thus, the oversight by a judge of the FBI's
surveillance activities, upon which the Independent Technical Review
of the Carnivore System places considerable reliance for ensuring its
proper use,322 can be easily circumvented.3z
Similarly, pen registers can be easily modified to collect not only
addressing information but also the content of telephone
conversations. 24 When initially confronted with this issue, the New
enforcement agents would have interpreted the decision as the green light to use the
more sophisticated version of thermal imagers.
317. Independent Review of Carnivore, supra note 43, at ix.
318. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Smith v. Maryland, a few years after Burger and Katz, that the use of
pen registers does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because a person does not
have a subjective expectation of privacy in the telephone number he or she dials.
319. According to FBI policy, an operator must adhere to the stricter requirements
of Title III of FISA when using "full" mode and must follow the less stringent
procedures of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3124 when using "pen" mode. See Independent
Review of Carnivore, supra note 43, at 3-1 to 3-5.
320. See id. at xi; see also id. at xiv (recommending "separate versions of Carnivore
for pen register and full content collection").
321. See id. at ix ("All users are logged in as 'administrator' and no audit trail of
actions is maintained."); see also id. at xiii ("IITRI did not find adequate provisions
(e.g., audit trails) for establishing individual accountability for actions taken during
use of Carnivore.").
322. See id. at 3-6 ("Judicial involvement is pervasive, and minimizes the risk that
electronic surveillance will be unnecessary, overbroad, or too lengthy."). The report
also cites internal checks developed by the FBI (such as "intensive training for
personnel") and oversight by Congress as additional assurances of proper usage. See
id.
323. Furthermore, the report noted that "the advertised functionality provides
ample capability to perform unauthorized surveillance"-such that the contractor did
not evaluate whether there were any additional capabilities hidden in the source code.
See id. at xi.
324. See People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1998) ("The pen register
devices... had the capacity to intercept and record either digital or aural
transmissions, depending on whether they were set for 'audio off' or 'audio on.' The
switch from one mode to the other could be accomplished by a technician adjusting a
switch .... ); People v. Bialostok, 610 N.E.2d 374, 378 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that it
was improper for the police to install devices that were allegedly used only as pen
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York Court of Appeals devised a per se rule that any pen register that
had the capability of being modified to intercept conversations had to
meet the stricter requirements of wiretaps under New York law.-' In
People v. Bialostok, Acting Chief Judge Simons wrote for an
unanimous court:
This Court has consistently recognized the "insidiousness of
electronic surveillance" .... As we said [in People v. Gallina, 66
N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 1985)], "that no unauthorized eavesdropping may
have occurred is beside the point, because it is the potential for
abuse that is the focus of analysis." In light of... the potential for
abuse embodied in the technology used here, we distinguish this
more sophisticated technology from earlier pen registers. The
traditional pen register [considered in Smith v. Maryland] was, to
large extent, self-regulating. Neither through police misconduct nor
through inadvertence could it reveal to anyone any information in
which the telephone user had a legitimate expectation of privacy.
The same is not true of the device used here. This is a technology
that has the capacity, through willful use or otherwise, to intrude on
legitimately held privacy, and it is the warrant requirement,
interposing the Magistrate's oversight, that provides to citizens
appropriate protection against unlawful intrusion.r 6
However, the Court of Appeals has since replaced Bialostok's per se
rule with a fact-specific, case-by-case approach in which judges weigh
such factors as the ease with which the device can switch between pen
and full modes ("digital to audio capability") and "its susceptibility to
evasion of statutory, precedential, and even constitutional
protections.
327
2. Sanctions Against Misuse Are Weak
It is one thing for the Constitution to proclaim that any
governmental search and seizure must be reasonable; it is another to
ensure compliance. As mentioned above, the principle mechanism for
ensuring compliance with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment is
the exclusionary rule, whereby evidence obtained by improper means
is excluded from a criminal prosecution of the individual subject to an
registers, for which no warrant was required, on the targets' telephones and that were
later converted to "listening devices" with a few simple adjustments).
325. See Bialostok, 610 N.E.2d at 378 (holding that pen registers that could be
modified to monitor telephone conversations required a warrant based on probable
cause under N.Y. law and that evidence gathered with a modifiable pen register
should have been suppressed even when the pen register was not used to intercept
conversations). In its recently promulgated standards on electronic surveillance, the
ABA recommended that "[w]hen a particular surveillance device makes use of more
than one regulated technology and the technologies are governed by differing rules,
the more restrictive rules should apply." ABA Standards for Electronic Surveillance,
supra note 67, Standard 2-9.1(d)(iii).
326. Bialostok, 610 N.E.2d at 377-78 (internal citations and alterations omitted).
327. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d at 737.
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improper search or seizure.328 A second protection is the possibility of
criminal and civil sanctions against government agents who violate a
person's rights. However, both of these mechanisms are extremely
porous, particularly when applied to the use of surveillance
technologies, ultimately making the protections of the Fourth
Amendment quite ephemeral. 9
The first mechanism for preventing abuse of high-tech surveillance,
the exclusionary rule, suffers from several serious shortcomings.
Because courts and law enforcement perceive that the exclusionary
rule often operates to exclude highly relevant and powerful evidence
of guilt,330 they have crafted several ways around the austere rule. For
328. For example, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the law-
enforcement officers' surveillance tapes were excluded as violative of the Fourth
Amendment even though they apparently took all diligent precautions short of
obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 354; see Stephen Saltzburg, National Security and the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in John Norton Moore et al., National Security Law
1001, 1003 (1990) ("Katz... illustrates the preference for a warrant even where
executive officials conducted themselves otherwise reasonably without judicial
supervision.").
A Special Committee of the American Bar Association that assessed the
validity of this perception that the exclusionary rule "seriously handicaps law
enforcement" concluded that:
[Tihe prosecutors and police the Committee interviewed.., do not believe
that the Fourth Amendment rights or their protection via the exclusionary
rule are a significant impediment to crime control. The exclusionary rule is
applied to only a relatively small percentage of arrests and searches made by
the police. A number of observers, including police officials, also report that
the demands of the exclusionary rule and the resulting police training on
Fourth Amendment requirements have promoted professionalism in police
departments across this country. Thus, the exclusionary rule appears to be
providing a significant safeguard of Fourth Amendment protections for
individuals at modest cost in terms of either crime control or effective
prosecution.
Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society, ABA, Criminal Justice in
Crisis 11 (1988).
329. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1257; Joel
Cohen & Claude Szyfer, Private Taping of Conversations: What the Law Says, N.Y.
L.J., May 31, 2001, at 1 ("[P]rosecutions for illegal eavesdropping are extremely rare
nationwide....").
The case of Master v. FBI, 926 F. Supp. 193 (D. D.C. 1996), illustrates the
difficulty of pursuing either criminal or civil sanctions against a law enforcement
agency suspected of illegal wiretapping. The plaintiffs, suspecting that members of
the Cleveland police had conducted illegal wiretaps on them, sought help from the
FBI to investigate. Id. at 194-95. After being told by the FBI on several occasions and
at several levels that the claim was without merit, Master filed a request pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 195. When the FBI withheld from the
plaintiffs certain documents that it indicated were responsive to the request, the
plaintiffs sought an in camera review of these records. Id. The court rejected this
request and dismissed the plaintiffs' case. Id.
330. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1264-65 ("For
as long as we have had the exclusionary rule, critics have attacked it, challenged its
premises, disputed its morality."). As Professor Amar wrote:
The exclusionary rule renders the Fourth Amendment contemptible in the
eyes of judges and citizens. Judges do not like excluding bloody knives, so
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example, courts have created several exceptions to the rule-such as
the good-faith exception,33 the independent-source doctrine,.. and
the plain-view doctrine-whereby evidence obtained without a proper
search warrant and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment is still
admitted into evidence against a suspect. Second, judges are loathe to
exclude highly valuable-usually highly incriminating-evidence
based on a technical violation of a warrant.3 33  Further, the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable in judicial proceedings such as
criminal sentencing, grand jury proceedings, and civil tax proceedings
and thus illegally obtained evidence is admissible for "collateral
uses."
334
In theory, the government must receive authorization from a
neutral judge to conduct an activity that the Court has deemed a
they distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment was not really
violated. In the popular mind, the Amendment has lost its luster and
become associated with grinning criminals getting off on crummy
technicalities.
Amar, supra note 142, at 799.
331. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1267: see, e.g.,
United States v. Hall, No. 99-6056, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 8836 (6th Cir. May 2,
2001). The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule derives from United States V.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984), where the Supreme Court permitted the admission of
evidence obtained by the police "through objective good faith reliance on a facially
valid warrant that is later found to lack probable cause." Carmen R. Parcelli, The
Exclusionary Rule, 88 Geo. L.J. 1043, 1046 (2000). "The Court concluded that a
'good faith' exception to the exclusionary rule was proper because under such
circumstances suppression would not advance the exclusionary rule's goal of deterring
official misconduct." Id
332- See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 278-80 (1961) (holding that
defendant's admission of past bootlegging was admissible when questioner got
information both from illegal wiretap and grand jury transcript); see, e.g., Hoover v.
Leonardo, 91-CV-1211, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22549 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1996). See
generally Parcelli, supra note 331, at 1053 (gathering cases on development of the
independent-source doctrine). In the context of powerful clandestine surveillance,
this exception seems poised to swallow the rule: How can the assertion by a police
officer that an important piece of evidence was discovered independently and
properly rather than from an illegal wiretap ever be tested or contested? See Buffaloe,
supra note 142, at 530-31 ("IThe newly created 'special needs' exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirements... is so broad and far-reaching that it is
poised to turn the warrant preference rule on its head."); cf. Melvyn Zarr, The Bill of
Rights and the Police 33-34 (2d ed. 1980) ("This phenomenon [of police lying] is well
known among members of the Bar and the police. In a ludicrously high number of
cases, the police have overcome a defendant's motion to suppress illegally seized
narcotics by testifying that the defendant, when approached by the police officers,
reached into his pocket, dropped the narcotics on the ground and attempted to
flee."); James Sterngold, Police Corruption Inquir
, 
Erpands in Los Angeles, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 2000, at A16 (revealing that "perhaps 100 cases might have been
tainted by planted evidence, false testimony or other police abuses").
333. See, eg., United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 554-57 (4th Cir. 2000)
(holding that FBI agents remaining in premises overnight for six nights even though
warrant authorized a search from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. did not violate warrant and even if
it did exclusion would be inappropriate).
334. Parcelli, supra note 331, at 1055.
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search or seizure and thus under the Fourth Amendment. -5
However, the exclusionary rule is "only effective if there is a
proceeding in which the government desires to use the evidence. As
long as the evidence is used outside the courtroom, exclusion is not an
available sanction. '336  Thus, the exclusionary rule is meaningless
where the purpose of surveillance is information-gathering-as, for
example, against political dissidents and rivals or to lead law
enforcement to admissible evidence.337 Indeed, Watergate, one of the
most notorious examples of illegal wiretapping in American history,
occurred a mere four years after Congress enacted Title 111.331
The extent to which technologies that are deemed to be a search or
seizure are used for intelligence-gathering purposes, and without a
warrant, is impossible to know; nevertheless, several privacy-rights
advocates have pointed out that although the total number of
authorized wiretaps nationally, both federal and state, in 1999 was
1350,331 the FBI sought, pursuant to CALEA, the capacity to
simultaneously intercept 136,000 conversations, for wiretaps and
dialed-number recorders in the Los Angeles area alone. °
The effeteness of the exclusionary rule is borne out by history,
which is replete with instances of discomforting abuse by law-
enforcement agents, especially in the area of clandestine
surveillance."I As Professor Akhil Reed Amar noted in an influential
335. See supra note 242 (discussing the law-enforcement officer's perspective on
the process and pitfalls of applying for an electronic wiretap). From 1989 through
1999, federal and state law enforcement officials sought authorization for 11,615
wiretaps, of which three were denied. See Wiretap Report 1999, supra note 26, at 32
tbl.7.
336. Saltzburg, supra note 328, at 1028.
337. See Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 157-65; Thomas I. Sheridan III,
Electronic Intelligence Gathering and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 331 (1975) (discussing dichotomy between criminal
evidence and intelligence and applicability of Title III); cf Independent Review of
Carnivore, supra note 43, at 3-7 ("Note, however, that the availability of an
exclusionary rule does not offer direct protection for those not suspected of criminal
or foreign intelligence activity who may be caught within the web of surveillance.").
338. Cf infra note 501.
339. Wiretap Report 1999, supra note 26, at 7.
340. See Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1484. The FBI had originally sought more
capacity (one percent of the total capacity at any given time) but modified its request
after arousing controversy. See id.
341. In 1973, Justice Douglas stated that "we live in a regime where the 'dirty
business' of wiretapping runs rampant" and described the "commonplace" practice of
wiretapping as a "disease." Heutsche v. United States, 414 U.S. 898, 898-99 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); see also Dash et al., supra note 182, at 35-285 (describing electronic-
surveillance practices by municipal police departments in the U.S. through the mid-
1950s); supra notes 135 & 193 and accompanying text.
The history of custodial interrogations is also instructive on this theme:
Evidence over many years that police officers interrogating suspects in their custody
were compelling confessions (often false) eventually led the Court in 1966 to take a
very close look at the constitutionality of these custodial interrogations. In the
landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona, Chief Justice Warren writing for the Court
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law review article on the Fourth Amendment, [t]hreats to the
'security' of Americans come from both government and thugs. -"2
The revelation in the late 1950s and 1960s about rampant surveillance
by police departments was followed by more discoveries by a
congressional committee in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the FBI
also conducted widespread illegal wiretapping against prominent
political figures and dissidents .1 3 According to two commentators,
"[t]he history of the last five decades shows that attacks on privacy are
not an anomaly. When government has the power to invade privacy,
abuses occur. ' 344
In an article on ethics, a lawyer in a U.S. federal intelligence agency
provides insight into the culture of the intelligence community and its
attitude toward civil liberties.- 5 The author describes the "enormous
gap between two almost incompatible ethical (and legal) frameworks:
the due process, human rights-oriented constitutional structure of U.S.
domestic law, and the grey, harsh realities of power politics."' The
author describes the "enormous pent-up hostility in the intelligence
community toward lawyers and legalistic restrictions." - 7 In addition,
carefully described the possibility of abuse of these inherently coercive interrogations.
See 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966). Cases since Miranda underscore the need for
continued vigilance. In Cooper v. Dupnik, an innocent suspect was intentionally
deprived of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent by police officers who,
under pressure to catch a notorious rapist, resorted to terror to elicit a confession. See
963 F.2d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1992). Officers described "creating the illusion of
hopelessness," mocking the suspect's rights, and lying about evidence to -create
stress." Id at 1225. The Ninth Circuit observed, "[this case is an example of officials
who deliberately choose to ignore the law and the Constitution in favor of their own
methods. For victims caught in their snare, the Constitution of the United States
becomes a useless piece of paper." Id. at 1252.
Cooper also illustrates how difficult it is to discipline police officers for
manifestly abusive investigative tactics, given the occasional tendency of courts to
acquiesce in such misconduct. The Ninth Circuit chided the lower court for its
analysis of a suspect's legal rights and its conclusion that the police's behavior did not
shock the conscience. See id.
342. Amar, supra note 142, at 818; see also United States v. Kirschenblatt, l6 F.2d
202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926) (Hand, J.) (quoted in Taylor, supra note 139. at 65): cf 1
Fishman & McKenna, supra note 24, § 1:2. at 1-3 ("To many observers, however.
surreptitious monitoring of private conversations conjures images of Nazi Germany.
the Soviet Union, and fictional equivalents. The Watergate scandal of the 1970s
should suffice to destroy any illusions that the United States is somehow inherently
immune from the misuse of these techniques.").
343. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith). 407 U.S. 297, 299
(1972) ("Successive Presidents for more than one-quarter of a century have
authorized [electronic] surveillance [in internal security matters] in varying degrees,
without guidance from the Congress or a definitive decision of this Court."); supra
note 135 and accompanying text.
344. Diffie & Landau, supra note 20. at 148.
345. Dorian D. Greene, Ethical Dilenunas Confronting Intelligence Agency
Counsel, 2 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 91,91 (1994).
346. Id.
347. Id. at 91-92 (quoting Richard Willard, Attorney General William French
Smith's Counsel for Intelligence Policy).
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the author hints at the possibility and the proclivity of agents to side-
step procedures designed to ensure oversight.3
A second, though infrequently used mechanism by which the
Fourth Amendment is enforced-namely, civil and criminal sanctions
against agents-is similarly fraught with problems? 49 Specifically, it is
extremely difficult to mount a successful lawsuit just to find out about
illegal surveillance, 350 let alone to recover damages for infringement."'
Professor Saltzburg notes several substantial hurdles to pressing a civil
or criminal claim of illegal surveillance. First, it is difficult to learn
about illegal surveillance with sufficient certainty to warrant litigation;
second, FOIA requests are often easily defeated because of executive
privilege; third, the president enjoys absolute immunity against
damages, while other executive officers are also immune "unless it is
absolutely plain that they violated clearly established legal principles;"
and fourth, the case may not be justiciable.52 Unlike private citizens
culpable of illegal surveillance, police officers can claim the common-
law defense of good faith, while "[f]ederal officers are entitled to
qualified immunity based on an objectively reasonable belief that a
warrantless search later determined to violate the Fourth Amendment
was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances.- 353
3. Judicial "Reasonableness" and Lack of Voice of the General Public
In other legal contexts, the question of reasonableness is typically
decided by the jury, as representatives of the general public-such as
the reasonableness in the context of tort claims. 4  In the late
348. Id. at 91 ("Ignoring counsel's advice and thereby, circumventing the entire
Office of General Counsel, is eminently possible in such an organized, tightly
compartmentalized society."); see also Diffie & Landau, supra note 20, at 3 (stating
that police and intelligence agencies that conduct wiretapping "regard their activities
as a natural prerogative of the state, necessary for an orderly society"); Duncan
Campbell, COMINT, privacy and human rights (Paper 3, May 5, 2001)
http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/speciallech/7748/1.html ("Sigint [signals intelligence],
which comprehensively attacks the privacy of such communications, remains- unlike
domestic wiretapping in most countries-unregulated and beyond the reach of most
national jurisdictions.") (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
349. See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 360, 448 n.138 ("The substantive fourth
amendment rules are enforceable, to some extent, by civil and criminal actions against
officers who violate them. But such actions are seldom maintained, nor are they, as a
practical matter, maintainable [due to 'assorted legal difficulties... and a familiar
litany of practical impediments']; and the primary instrument for enforcing the fourth
amendment has long been the exclusionary rule....").
350. See supra note 329 (discussing Master v. FBI, 926 F. Supp. 193 (D. D.C.
1996)): see also Saltzburg, supra note 328, at 1028. Intuitively, it will become
increasingly difficult for citizens to know when, where, and how the government is
tracking their movements and words as the modem means for surveillance become
increasingly smaller and more powerful. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
351. See Saltzburg, supra note 328, at 1029.
352. Id. at 1028-29.
353. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1258.
354. Cf Amar, supra note 142, at 818 ("'Reasonableness' is largely a matter of
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eighteenth century, the question of the reasonableness of a search or
seizure by a governmental agent was decided by juries. 55 However,
since then, the role of juries has been largely read out of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and has been replaced by judges instead,
who predominantly decide the reasonableness of searches and
seizures by authorizing search warrants and decide how broadly the
Constitution sweeps as technological advances create new surveillance
and monitoring capabilities for the government generally and law
enforcement in particular.356 However, the appropriateness of having
the judiciary gauge the general public's perception about what is a
search or seizure and what is a reasonable search or seizure has been
called into question. 7
common sense, and the jury represents the common sense of common people.").
Other commentators have stated:
We believe that the term "reasonable" in the Fourth Amendment is infused
with meaning by a societal convention about the proper scope of the
government's power to conduct searches and seizures, or, turning the
concept around, a convention about the scope of privacy against these
governmental intrusions. We will call this the "Fourth Amendment privacy
convention." To let judges decide what "reasonable" means is implicitly to
conclude that judges are better suited to perceive this convention than juries.
This proposition is not self-evident.
George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal
View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 147, 155 (1993).
355. See Amar, supra note 142, at 771-72. Professor Amar notes that juries
continued to play this role through the nineteenth century as well. See id. at 818 n.228.
356. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. Three rules in particular bear out
that the judiciary has permitted this increase in governmental surveillance power:
First, the courts have weakened the common-law requirement that the subject of a
search be given notice of the search at the time of or shortly afterwards. See 1 Carr,
supra note 25, § 2.5(c)(4), at 2-33 to 2-38 (describing how Congress and the courts
have dulled the notice component of searches and seizures). In its Berger decision,
the Supreme Court "acknowledged the obvious fact that pre-surveillance notice
would eliminate the likelihood of success." Id. § 2.5(c)(4), at 2-33. The wiretap law
Congress enacted shortly after Berger permits the target to be notified within 90 days,
see 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(d) (1994), and "courts have generally treated the ninety-day
maximum as a minimum requirement." 1 Carr, supra note 25, § 25(c)(4)(B), at 2-35.
Further, what the government is required to notify the target of under Title III is
"little more than a notification of the fact that surveillance occurred"-in contrast to
the detailed written inventory of all items seized for non-surveillance searches and
seizures. Id. § 2.5(c)(4)(C), at 2-36 to 2-37. Second, the courts have greatly expanded
the use of warrants-making judge-issued warrants the measure of the reasonableness
of a search or seizure and expanding warrants to allow the gathering of "mere
evidence"-which enables law-enforcement officers to collect more information while
increasing their immunity from civil or criminal sanctions for improper searches and
seizures. See supra notes 350-353 and accompanying text. Third, the exclusionary
rule, which is the primary mechanism for compliance with the Fourth Amendment, is
limited in scope-i.e., its effect exists only when the evidence or information
improperly gathered will be used in court and courts have carved out numerous
exceptions-and it is weakly applied. See supra notes 330-337 and accompanying text.
357. See Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze, supra note 178, at 62-63 ("It's not surprising
that Supreme Court justices, who are secluded in a marble palace and have spent
most of their careers in the cosseted solitude of lower courts and universities, aren't
terribly good at predicting how much privacy ordinary Americans expect in the
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In this high-technology age, linking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is a
prescription for the inexorable and continued erosion of the right
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Professor Amsterdam
articulated this premise in an article in 1974; he noted that a subjective
expectation of privacy could easily be eroded by government
announcing a new surveillance technique on television.358 In Kyllo,
the Court acknowledged the criticism of the reasonable-expectation-
of-privacy test: "The Katz test ... has often been criticized as circular,
and hence subjective and unpredictable."359 Professor Lewis R. Katz
has argued that the Supreme Court has "permitted police surveillance
powers to grow almost unchecked to their present epic
proportions."3  According to Professor Katz, "[a] partial cataloging
of the surveillance techniques declared to fall outside the scope of
fourth amendment protection reads like an arsenal of government
power one might associate with the authority of a police state. 3 61
Given the judiciary's tendency to overestimate the governmental
interest vis-A-vis the citizenry's liberty interest when confronted with
the issue in the context of criminal prosecutions,362 several
workplace.").
358. See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 384. The Court subsequently addressed
Professor Amsterdam's hypothetical in a footnote to Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979). Justice Blackmun explained:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry
would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For
example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide
television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of
privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee
from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously
assumed that police were continuously monitoring his telephone
conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of
his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an
individual's subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences
alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry
would be proper.
Id. at 740 n.5.
359. Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2001); see also Julie, supra note
291, at 132 ("Another common criticism of Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy
test is that it is circular; as the argument goes, the Supreme Court protects only those
expectations that are reasonable, while the only expectations that are reasonable are
those which the Supreme Court is willing to protect.").
360. Katz, supra note 286, at 549.
361. Id. at 551.
362. See Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze, supra note 178, at 34 ("Judges have a natural
tendency to favor the state when balancing the interests of prosecutors against the
interests of criminals, and any society that ties its privacy to the rights of the accused
is a society in which the legal protections for privacy will quickly evaporate.").
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commentators have called for the reinsertion of the perspective of the
general public. As one commentator recently wrote:
In many cases, people have an objectively valid expectation of
privacy that the Court, by judicial fiat, has deemed unjustifiable. We
need more independent mechanisms for protecting privacy-such as
grand juries or other popularly accountable bodies-which can
balance the claims of the police against the privacy of
individuals. .."363
According to other commentators, "only society can resolve the
normative antimony between the Fourth Amendment security against
government action and the security against crime that depends, in
part, on government action. '364
B. Constitutional Problems with the Regime
The Court's jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment, both with
specific respect to modern surveillance technologies and generally, has
been criticized by many commentators 3 -indeed the Supreme Court
recognizes the inconsistency of the jurisprudence in this area?.' As
one prominent constitutional scholar wrote, "[t]he Fourth
Amendment today is an embarrassment.... The result is a vast
jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and
contradictory, but often perverse. Criminals go free, while honest
citizens are intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real
remedy. '367
1. A Government of Limited Powers
The Constitution, the instrument that the early citizens of America
created in 1787 to organize its new government, created a government
363. See id at 63.
364. Thomas & Pollack, supra note 354, at 163; see also id. at 149 ("We also argue
that the best way to determine the nature of the relevant convention is to involve
society in the inquiry.").
365. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 142, at 759 ("Fourth Amendment case law is a
sinking ocean liner-rudderless and badly off course-yet most scholarship contents
itself with rearranging the deck chairs."), 761-800 (stating the substance of the
critique); Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 349 (commenting that "[flor clarity and
consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's most
successful product" and noting similar pronouncements by other commentators);
Katz, supra note 286, at 549 ("[Tlhe Court has permitted police surveillance powers to
grow almost unchecked to their present epic proportions. Today in America, the
police may target any individual for scrutiny -for good reason, for bad reason or for
no reason at all. They may use any number of sophisticated surveillance techniques
without judicial authorization or review."); cf Saltzburg, supra note 328, at 1028-29.
366. See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 349 (discussing Supreme Court's own
criticism of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); see, e.g., Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) ("[lIt would be nonsense to pretend that our
decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony.").
367. Amar, supra note 142, at 757-58.
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of limited powers.368 However, nowhere in the text of the original
Constitution is this axiom explicitly stated.369 Instead, it is largely
supplied by the context in which the United States of America and the
Constitution arose and the writings of its principal authors, and by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.37 °
The U.S. Constitution that we have today is the Founders' second
attempt at a government. Since it was generally clear to all that the
central government created by the first instrument, the Articles of
Confederation, lacked sufficient power in key areas, the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention emerged with a whole new document
rather than amendments to the Articles. 37 1 Though seeking a stronger
central government, they were nevertheless still wary of tyranny.372
Moreover, they recognized the need to structure a government that
would minimize the inevitable vices of faction and of oppression of
the minority at the hands of the majority.373 Accordingly, they devised
368. As stated by Professor Amsterdam, "The Bill of Rights in general and the
fourth amendment in particular are profoundly anti-government documents. They
deny to government.., desired means, efficient means, and means that must
inevitably appear.., to be the absolutely necessary means, for government to obtain
legitimate and laudable objectives." Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 353. According to
another commentator, "The objects sought by the American people in their
aspirations for the preservation of their liberties are well stated in the Preamble to the
Constitution. But while the scope of these objectives recognizes the unlimited power
of the people, the Constitution itself imposes severe limitations upon the
government." Sol Bloom, United States Sesquicentennial Commission, The Story of
the Constitution 33 (1937). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has stated that "[a] basic
principle of American government is that Congress may act only if there is express or
implied authority to act in the Constitution." See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 166 (1997). Professor Chemerinsky then notes that
states, unlike the federal government, have police powers-that is, "state and local
governments [can] adopt any law that is not prohibited by the Constitution." Id.
Professor Katz has argued that the Supreme Court's current approach-namely,
"us[ing] the privacy test in a way that favors the exercise of unreviewable government
power"-"runs counter to the other great theme of the fourth amendment: that ours
is a system of limited government." Katz, supra note 286, at 554 (emphasis added).
369. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368, at 3. Professor
Chemerinsky notes, "The implication [of vesting legislative power in Congress] is that
Congress can act only if there is clear authority, with all other governance left to the
states. But this is not made explicit in the text. Indeed, it was probably this lack of
clarity that inspired the Tenth Amendment .... Id.
370. Cf. Bloom, supra note 368, at 34 ("But as a further precaution the people
reserved to the States and to themselves all powers that were not entrusted to the
national government....").
371. See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368, at 9-10; CRS,
Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at XX ("The convention [in
Philadelphia in 1787] had been called to revise the Articles of Confederation.
Instead, it reported to the Continental Congress a new Constitution.").
372. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, at
559 (1969).
373. See Robert W. Scheef, Note, "Public Citizens" and the Constitution: Bridging
the Gap Between Popular Sovereignty and Original Intent, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2201,
2223 (2001) ("The Constitution controls faction in order to prevent a recurrence of
the majoritarian tyrannies of the Critical Period [i.e., from the late 1770s through the
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a government structure that, though able to effectively govern, would
still "protect individual liberties."374 Further, the Founders relied on
the interplay between the states and the federal government to
protect citizens' liberties.37
Although there was consensus that the federal government required
more power, there was sharp disagreement about how much power to
give and how to demarcate the boundary of this authority."
Specifically, those generally opposed to a strong central government,
the anti-federalists, sought the inclusion of a Bill of Rights "to prevent
the new federal government from taking away individual rights.",
States dominated by anti-federalists signed the Constitution on the
condition of a Bill of Rights.37 The federalists, by contrast, disfavored
a Bill of Rights, claiming in Alexander Hamilton's words that they
"are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would
even be dangerous. '379 To the federalists, individuals' liberties were
sufficiently protected by the Constitution, which was by its very nature
a powers-limiting instrument;3S° the enumeration of rights, however,
was an implicit invitation for government to go where it had not been
explicitly prohibited.381 James Madison eventually prevailed on other
federalists to accept the Bill of Rights and formulated the Ninth' and
Tenth3's Amendments to clarify the significance of the other
amendments in light of the Federalists' prediction that it would invite
the government to intrude on citizens' liberties and rights.'
The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.""- After it was inserted, the
Ninth Amendment sunk into obscurity and for nearly 160 years was
1780s].").
374. See Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368, at 4; see also Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-3, at 1308 (2d ed. 1988) ("Human beings
are of course the intended beneficiaries of our constitutional scheme.").
375. See Tribe, supra note 374, at 18-22.
376. See Wood, supra note 372, at 536-47 (discussing the disagreements between
the federalists and the anti-federalists over the new constitution).
377. See James Herberg, Ninth Amendment, in Constitutional Amendments: 1789
to the Present 205 (Kris E. Palmer ed., 2000).
378. See Sol Wachtler, Judging the Ninth Amendment, 59 Fordham L Rev. 597. 600
(1991).
379. The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). See generally Wachtler, supra
note 378, at 602 ("Like [James] Wilson, Hamilton argued that a bill of rights was not
only unnecessary to secure fundamental rights, but also potentially dangerous.").
380. See Herberg, supra note 377, at 205 ("Since the Constitution gave no authority
to the federal government to take away individual liberties, it stood to reason that the
federal government could do no such thing.").
381. See Ely, supra note 13, at 34-36 (describing James Madison's view of a Bill of
Rights); Herberg, supra note 377, at 205; Wachtler, supra note 379, at 600.
382. See infra note 385.
383. See infra note 395.
384. See Tribe, supra note 374, § 11-3, at 774-75.
385. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
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rarely invoked."6 Although the Ninth Amendment regained some
notoriety in 1965 when Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
invoked it-albeit cautiously-in striking down a Connecticut law that
forbade the use of contraceptives by married couples in Griswold v.
Connecticut,387 more recently it has become mired in controversy over
the proper role of judges in deciding such politically divisive issues as
the rights to abortion and to sexual freedom.31 This debate centers on
whether the Ninth Amendment permits the creation of other rights
that are not included in the Constitution or its first eight amendments
or whether it merely "mak[es] clear that a Bill of Rights might not by
implication be taken to increase the powers of the national
government in areas not enumerated. 3 9 Although arguing that the
language of the Amendment supports the former view, 390 Professor
John Hart Ely states that the latter view is the "received account."3 9
Even as a "rule of construction," the Ninth Amendment states an
important constitutional principle-namely that the powers conferred
on the federal government by the Constitution must accede to certain
liberties of the people3 -which is largely unrealized.
Like the Ninth Amendment and to some extent in conjunction,3 93
the Tenth Amendment also has aspects of a rule of construction3 94-
386. See CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1504; Wachtler,
supra note 378, at 597.
387. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas concluded that
the right to marital privacy could be found in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of
other fundamental rights. Id. at 483-84. Justice Goldberg in concurrence was bolder:
he stated that the right to marital privacy could be located in the Ninth Amendment
alone because the Ninth Amendment protected rights that were not specifically
enumerated. Id. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
388. See CRS Constitution of the United States, supra note 157, at 1504; Wachtler,
supra note 378, at 597; cf Ely, supra note 13, at 2-3 ("There are signs that
interpretivism may be entering a period of comparative popularity. ... [One reason]
is that the controversial abortion decision of 1973, Roe v. Wade, was the clearest
example of noninterpretivist 'reasoning' on the part of the Court in four
decades .... " (endnote omitted).
389. CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra note 147, at 1503-04; see also
Tribe, supra note 374, § 11-3, at 774-75 (The Ninth Amendment "at least states a rule
of construction pointing away from the reverse incorporation view.., and at most
provides a positive source of law for fundamental but unmentioned rights.").
390. See Ely, supra note 13, at 34-38
391. See id. at 34. But see id. at 34-38 for Professor Ely's refutation of this view.
392. See supra notes 368-84 and accompanying text. Indeed, one scholar, in his
discussion of the early amendments to the Constitution, places far more emphasis on
the importance of the Ninth and Tenth Amendment than on the individual liberties
contained in the first eight amendments. See 2 George Ticknor Curtis, Constitutional
History of the United States 153-54, 160-62 (1974).
393. Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1980)
(characterizing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as "complementary" and
explaining that "the ninth deals with rights 'retained by the people,' the tenth with
powers 'reserved' to the states or the people").
394. Cf. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368, at 232 (describing how
"the Court used the Tenth Amendment and federalism considerations as a rule of
construction" in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)).
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i.e., it serves to give meaning to other portions of the text. The Tenth
Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."'" The Tenth
Amendment is also susceptible to two interpretations. According to
Professor Chemerinsky, until the late eighteenth century and again
from 1937 until 1990, the Court "viewed the Tenth Amendment
simply as a reminder that Congress must have authority under the
Constitution in order to legislate, not as a judicially enforceable limit
on the legislative power. '396 Thus, so long as Congress had the power
in a given area, it could essentially do what it wanted, constrained only
by political processes and pressures.391 However, in the last decade
the Supreme Court appears to have revived an interpretation of the
Tenth Amendment that was also prevalent from the late-eighteenth
century until 1937-namely, that "the Tenth Amendment reserves a
zone of activity to the states for their exclusive control."3 3
2. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was added, along with the rest of the Bill
of Rights and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, four years after the
Constitution was enacted. It is generally acknowledged that the
Fourth Amendment reflects the Founders' reaction to certain
practices by the English that the colonists found particularly
reprehensible.39  Specifically, the Fourth Amendment reflects the
colonists' reaction against several laws Parliament enacted that
authorized English agents to enter and search private homes and
offices with few constraints on the officers' discretion.' In addition,
the Secretary of State was authorized to issue general warrants for
search and seizure of contraband and evidence of seditious libel."
Although the longstanding English practice of authorizing general
writs was increasingly disfavored both in America and England, it
continued largely unabated until the famous case of John Wilkes
395. U.S. Const. amend. X.
396. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368. at 226.
397. See icL at 226-27, 231. Professor Chemerinsky quotes Justice Stevens in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authoriy, 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985), as stating
"[tihe political process ensures that the laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated." Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368, at 231.
398. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, supra note 368, at 227.
399. See American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary 26 (Stephen A.
Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra eds., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that the Fourth Amendment is
an expression of a philosophy against intrusions by the British in colonial America).
400. See Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution 37-42 (AMS Press 1986) (1937)
(discussing the Licensing Act, Walpole's Excise Scheme, and the Cider Tax).
Professor Lasson's treatise offers a thorough description of the long history leading
up to the Fourth Amendment.
401. See id. at 42.
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galvanized the consensus against these repressive actions.4°2 In 1792,
Secretary of State Lord Halifax issued a general warrant to search for
the source of a pamphlet harshly critical of the government. 03 Under
this warrant, forty-nine people-publishers, printers, and authors who
might have been responsible-were arrested before Wilkes, a member
of Parliament and the author of the pamphlet, The North Briton,
Number 45, was found.4° Wilkes sued and won £4000, a "princely"
amount of money.4 5
Several scholars have argued that the current interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment differs significantly from the original intent in
several critical respects. Generally, as Professor Amar notes, the
Fourth Amendment was enacted at a time when centralized
government was viewed with considerable skepticism.4°  More
substantively, Professors Amar and Taylor have argued that the
Founders, generally distrusting warrants,4° intended the Warrant and
Reasonableness Clauses of the amendment to be read
disjunctivelyn'-in direct contrast to the modern interpretation, in
402. See id. at 43. As Professor Amar explained:
We need only recall the facts of the 1763 English case, Wilkes v. Wood,
whose plot and cast of characters were familiar to every schoolboy in
America, and whose lessons the Fourth Amendment was undeniably
designed to embody. Wilkes-and not the 1761 Boston writs of assistance
controversy, which went almost unnoticed in debates over the federal
Constitution and Bill of Rights-was the paradigm search and seizure case
for Americans. Indeed, it was probably the most famous case in late
eighteenth-century America, period.
Amar, supra note 142, at 772 (footnotes omitted).
403. See Lasson, supra note 400, at 43.
404. See id. at 43-44.
405. See id. at 45; Amar, supra note 142, at 781.
406. See Amar, supra note 142, at 771-73. According to a recent survey, fifty-four
percent of Americans favor enabling federal law enforcement to monitor email
messages out of concern for Internet-related child pornography, terrorism, fraud,
credit card theft, and hacking into government computers. See Kornblum, supra note
44. However, the survey's respondents also found a concomitant skepticism about
government and a desire for privacy laws to protect against "government snooping."
According to this study, which was conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life
Project, "[t]rust in government to do the right thing most of the time sank to 31%,
from 39% in 1997, 41% in 1988. Of all Americans, 62% want new privacy laws and
protections from government snooping." Id.
407. According to Professor Taylor, several states created their own constitutions
after gaining independence in which "the warrant is treated as an enemy not a
friend." Taylor, supra note 139, at 41; see also Amar, supra note 142, at 774 ("In every
state constitution prior to the federal Bill [of Rights], 'the warrant is treated as an
enemy, not a friend."' (quoting Taylor)).
408. See Taylor, supra note 139, at 23-24 (stating that the widely-held view, in
which "the warrant [is] the touchstone of 'reasonableness"'-i.e., the two clauses of
the Fourth Amendment are read conjunctively-stands "the fourth amendment on its
head"); id. at 38-46 (discussing the original intent of the Fourth Amendment); Amar,
supra note 142, at 762-63 (arguing that the Amendment's first "command"-that
searches and seizures not be unreasonable-does not "require" the second-that
warrants be based on probable cause and narrowly tailored).
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which warrants issued by judges are seen as a hallmark of
reasonableness. 4°9 According to Professor Amar, juries rather than
judges and magistrates were ultimately the main arbiters of the
reasonableness of searches and seizures; government agents
conducted an unreasonable search at peril of a civil suit for damages
and early post-colonial juries were highly suspicious of government
agents.4 10 Because warrants largely (though not entirely) immunized
an agent conducting a search from a subsequent civil suit for damages,
warrants were to be granted in rare instances.41
This part of the Note has attempted to show that as Fourth
Amendment doctrine has evolved the governmental/law enforcement
component has grown steadily more robust and expansive, while the
rights component has remained static or has weakened.
4t 2
409. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
410. See Amar, supra note 142, at 771 ("[J]uries, not judges, are the heroes of the
Founders' Fourth Amendment story. Indeed, at times, the Founders viewed judges
and certain judicial proceedings with suspicion. ). Professor Amar further
explained:
Even when a judge issued a warrant, revolutionary Americans greeted the
event with foreboding. Prior to the Revolution, American judges lacked the
independence from the Crown that their British brothers had won after the
Glorious Revolution. Sitting at the pleasure of the monarch, the King's
judicial magistrates in America were at times hard to distinguish from His
executive magistrates-especially when a single Crown lackey wore several
hats, as often occurred. Nor did the foreboding disappear after the
Revolution, when American judges won a measure of institutional
independence from the executive branch. Even an Article III judge, after
all, had been appointed by the President, looked to the President for
possible promotion to a higher court, and drew his salary from the
government payroll. What's more, such a judge was an official of the central
government-perhaps not so imperial as his Crown-directed colonial
predecessors, but suspicious nonetheless. Would the handful of elite federal
judges truly be able to empathize with the concerns of ordinary folk? And a
single bad apple could spoil the bunch; if even one federal judge was a lord
or a lackey, executive officials shopping for easy warrants would know
where to go. Far more trustworthy were twelve men, good and true, on a
local jury, independent of the government, sympathetic to the legitimate
concerns of fellow citizens, too numerous to be corrupted, and whose
vigilance could not easily be evaded by governmental judge-shopping.
Id. at 773 (footnotes omitted).
411. See id. at 771-72 ("The Framers did not exalt warrants, for a warrant was
issued ex parte by a government official on the imperial payroll and had the purpose
and effect of precluding any common law trespass suit the aggrieved target might try
to bring before a local jury after the search or seizure occurred.").
412. As Justice Brandeis stated in his dissenting opinion in Ohnstead:
We have.., held that general limitations on the powers of Government, like
those embodied in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, do not forbid the United States or the States from meeting
modern conditions by regulations which a century ago, or even half a
century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.
Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of
power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J.. dissenting)
(emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
2001] 1087
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, the following Part recommends a regime where the
government bears more onus for ensuring that all covert, high-
technologically-assisted searches and seizures are reasonable.
III. ARGUMENT AND PROPOSAL
The substance of the Fourth Amendment essentially boils down to
this: Law enforcement has virtually unlimited discretion to peer,
poke, and prod into the lives of U.S. citizens-even those not
suspected of criminal activity-until the public and the courts become
aware of and disquieted by a particular technology-assisted law-
enforcement practice; if the technology or the practice reaches the
Supreme Court and it decrees that technology or practice a search, the
law-enforcement officer must then get a warrant if he intends to use
the information or evidence in court in a prosecution -otherwise the
disincentive for misuse is weak.413 Of course, Congress can and has
constructed protections which the Court has deemed are not required
by the Constitution. Yet, with the costs of the Fourth Amendment in
this technological age falling almost entirely on the shoulders of
citizens,414 and commonly on the criminals and convicts against whom
these technologies are most often and most overtly used, t5 the
413. See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 388 ("[I]f [a police activity] is not labeled a
'search' or 'seizure,' it is subject to no significant restrictions of any kind.... [P]olice
activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the police please to make
them." (endnotes omitted)). Professor Amsterdam further explains:
The question of what constitutes a covered "search" or "seizure" would and
should be viewed with an appreciation that to exclude any particular police
activity from coverage is essentially to exclude it from judicial control and
from the command of reasonableness, whereas to include it is to do no more
than say that it must be conducted in a reasonable manner. With the
question put in this fashion the answer should seldom be delivered against
coverage.
Id. at 393 (endnote omitted).
414. See infra text accompanying note 467; see also McKnight, supra note 83, at
1264 (proposing the Court re-adopt a rule that the use of thermal imagers is
presumptively unreasonable and thereby shift the burden to the government to prove
the reasonableness of its actions). The author reasons that:
The Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and
seizures." Thus, the question to be asked is whether the government
activity-the search or seizure-is reasonable. However, the second prong
of Justice Harlan's test [concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967)] reverses the focus from whether the government's action is
reasonable to whether the citizen's expectation of privacy is reasonable. In
effect, this shifts the burden of proof from the government to the citizen to
prove "reasonableness." Now, instead of the government having to justify
its actions, the citizen is forced to prove that his expectation is one society
recognizes as reasonable.
Id. at 1262. The author proposes that the Court re-adopt a rule whereby the
government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of its actions. Id. at 1262,
1264. He suggests that the court do this by "declar[ing] such warrantless searches
presumptively unreasonable." Id. at 1264.
415. Criticizing the exclusionary rule as the device for deterring the government
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protections of this important piece of the Constitution are extremely
fragile.
During the media's coverage of the controversy over the
clandestine surveillance at the Super Bowl,416 a police spokesman said
that it is not uncommon for police to experiment with new devices
that become available. 17 The officer also noted that people would
appreciate the protection that this surveillance provided."' Even if
this officer's perception accurately reflects the prevailing communal
attitude toward privacy, it begs the question whether local law-
enforcement agents experimenting with technologies and unilaterally
deciding that it does not invade citizens' privacy comports with our
larger notions of liberty and with the Constitution.1 9 Furthermore, in
this high-technology age, linking the protections of the Fourth
Amendment to a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is a
from violating citizens' rights, Professor Amar explained:
The criminal defendant is a kind of private attorney general.
But the worst kind. He is self-selected and self-serving. He is often
unrepresentative of the larger class of law-abiding citizens, and his interests
regularly conflict with theirs. Indeed, he is often despised by the public, the
class he implicitly is supposed to represent. He will litigate on the worst set
of facts, heedless that the result will be a bad precedent for the Fourth
Amendment generally. He cares only about the case at hand-his case-
and has no long view. He is not a sophisticated repeat player. He rarely
hires the best lawyer. He cares only about exclusion-and can get only
exclusion-even if other remedies (damages or injunctions) would better
prevent future violations.... He is, in short, an awkward champion of the
Fourth Amendment.
Amar, supra note 142, at 796; see also CRS, Constitution of the United States, supra
note 147, at 1258 ("[O]n the practical side, persons subjected to illegal arrests and
searches and seizures are often disreputable persons toward whom juries are
unsympathetic...."); Taylor, supra note 139, at 65 ("[Als Learned Hand reminded us
in Prohibition times: '... What seems fair enough against a squalid huckster of bad
liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government determined to
suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition."' (endnote omitted)); Katz,
supra note 286, at 550 ("The court's answer to [the criminal defendant's] plea [for
improperly obtained evidence] will set the level of privacy and freedom for the whole
community. Suppression of illegally obtained evidence protects us all, not just those
suspected of criminal activity.").
416. See supra notes 2 and accompanying text.
417. Jack Carey, ACLU Decries Super Bowl Surveillance: Fans, Workers Secretly
Taped in High-tech Security Effort, USA Today, Feb. 2, 2001, at IC ("'After we saw
[the technology offered as an experiment], we thought it would be an asset,' [Maj.
K.C.] Newcomb said. 'I was fully comfortable that we were not infringing on
anybody's rights."'); cf supra note 290 and accompanying text.
418. Jim Loney, Super Bowl Surveillance Draws Protest from ACLU, The San
Diego Union-Tribune, Feb. 2,2001, at A-15 ("'If this tool could prevent a terrorist act
or something else, I think the tool will be priceless,' Durkin said. 'The vast majority
of visitors to Raymond James (Stadium) would applaud our efforts to keep it safe for
everyone."').
419. Cf Rosen, A Watchful State, supra note 122, at 42 (describing how the head of
company developing face-recognition technology said he would not let the technology
be used improperly and noting "it seems odd to put the liberties of a democracy in the
hands of one unelected scientist").
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prescription for the inexorable and continued erosion of the right
protected by the Fourth Amendment. The government's present
capabilities for monitoring its citizens are very broad; it seems certain
that these capabilities will continue to evolve-so that its surveillance
will become faster, more precise, cheaper, more covert, and more
intrusive.4 0
Recognizing that Americans in later ages and in different
circumstances might prefer a different balance between governmental
power and governmental restraint, the Founders arrived at language
that on its face indicates flexibility: searches and seizures cannot be
unreasonable.4 21  The tension between the two important but
competing interests balanced in the Fourth Amendment-protection
of citizens' liberties and effective governmental authority to maintain
peace-must be continually resolved as society faces new challenges
and threats.4 22 In an age of powerful and fast-evolving science and
420. See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, Clever Wiring Harnesses Tiny Switches, N.Y. Times,
July 17, 2001, at F1 (discussing a patent issued to Hewlett-Packard for a molecule-
based switch for eventual use in memory chips and computer processors); John
Markoff, Researchers Make an Ultra-Tiny Chip, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2001, at 42
(discussing the development of "silicon transistors no more than 70 to 80 atoms wide
and 3 atoms thick... [which] are capable of switching on and off 1.5 trillion times a
second") [hereinafter Markoff, Ultra-Tiny Chip]. According to this news report:
The research will make possible computer processor chips with as many as
one billion transistors and 20 gigahertz speeds. That is more than 23 times
the number of transistors used in Intel's current state-of-the-art Pentium 4
microprocessor, which has 42 million transistors and is capable of executing
1.7 billion instructions a second.
Markoff, Ultra-Tiny Chip, supra. In addition, this new chip will consume significantly
less electricity than current microprocessors. Id. The article also describes Moore's
Law, which states that "the number of transistors that can be etched on a single chip
of silicon doubles on average every 18 months." Id.
421. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L.
Rev. 820, 824 (1994) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment, more than many other parts of the
Constitution, appears to require a fairly high level of abstraction of purpose; its use of
the term 'reasonable' (actually, 'unreasonable') positively invites constructions that
change with changing circumstances.").
422. See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314-15
(1972) ("As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to
examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to
protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable
surveillance to individual privacy and free expression."). Justice Powell further
explains in Keith:
The marked acceleration in technological developments and sophistication
in their use have resulted in new techniques for the planning, commission,
and concealment of criminal activities. It would be contrary to the public
interest for Government to deny to itself the prudent and lawful
employment of those very techniques which are employed against the
Government and its law-abiding citizens....
But a recognition of these elementary truths does not make the
employment by Government of electronic surveillance a welcome
development-even when employed with restraint and under judicial
supervision. There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and
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technology, the challenge of the Fourth Amendment is to derive
maximum benefits from these technologies while keeping their use
properly and fully within our norms of liberty. As one hornbook on
criminal procedure states, "[e]avesdropping techniques, many of
which were probably unforeseen by the framers, raise special
problems [about the meaning of searches and seizures].... Courts
have used the [Fourth] Amendment to limit some new forms of
surveillance, but they have struggled to make the Amendment
meaningful in a technological society." -" To be sure, these
technologies can and should be exploited for many important
governmental functions; however, equally paramount is the need to
properly regulate their use, especially given the sophistication of these
technologies and the inevitability of further technological advances.
The regime proposed here attempts to fully accommodate these two
competing ideals.
The desire to equip local, state, and federal law-enforcement agents
with effective tools to maintain peace and order seems to derive its
sense of urgency from the highly-publicized campaign to battle drug-
trafficking and to rid communities of the social upheaval and violence
attendant on the use of narcotics,4 24 as well as the threat of terrorism
by domestic and international enemies.4,- After the devastating attack
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there were renewed
calls for broader and stronger surveillance capabilities.4"' Further,
apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished
privacy of law-abiding citizens.
Id. at 312.
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001, and the rash of anthrax contaminations which occurred shortly thereafter
appeared to profoundly alter Americans' perceptions about the interplay of civil
rights and security. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. Congress quickly took
steps to significantly increase the authority of law-enforcement agencies such as the
FBI and CIA. See supra notes 271-84 and accompanying text. However, several
commentators urged caution, lest "security measures start to corrode the very society
they are designed to protect." See The National Defense, Editorial, N.Y. Times. Sept.
12, 2001, at A26 ("Americans must rethink how to safeguard the country without
bartering away the rights and privileges of the free society that we are defending....
President Bush and Congress must carefully balance the need for heightened security
with the need to protect the constitutional rights of Americans.").
423. American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary, supra note 399, at 25.
424. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Clinton Administration's Law Enforcement
Strategy: The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act 2-3 (May 1999)
(identifying drugs, gun-violence, and terrorism as several of "the cornerstones of the
Clinton Administration's anti-crime policy").
425. Such extraordinary events as the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, OK, in April 1995, which killed 168 people and injured
more than 700, and of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993 have clearly
had a substantial impact on the nation's sense of its peril and its vulnerability. Several
high-profile airplane disasters seem to further galvanize this perception. Louis J.
Freeh, FBI, Ensuring Public Safety and National Security Under the Rule of Law- A
Report to the American People on the Work of the FBI 1993-1998, at 3-4 (undated).
426. See supra notes 6-7 and 271-84 and accompanying text.
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given the potentially disastrous effects of an attack on portions of the
nation's critical infrastructure, extreme protective measures seem
clearly warranted to protect the nation's power grid, banking system,
and air-traffic control from either physical or electronic sabotage. 7
To be sure, a critical aspect of liberty involves freedom from crime
and personal violence and protection of property, for which effective
and efficient law enforcement is arguably sine qua non.428  It is
important that law enforcement agencies are sufficiently well
equipped to counter the use by criminals of new tools as they are
developed. 429 Accordingly, under the broad powers the Constitution
grants to the states to maintain social order43 and to the federal
427. In 1996, President Clinton signed an Executive Order ("E.O.") creating a
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. See Exec. Order No. 13,010, 61
Fed. Reg. 37,347 (July 17, 1996). Executive Order 13,010 identified as critical
infrastructure the following: "telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and
oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply
systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue)." Id. (The
E.O. also included "continuity of government" as a critical infrastructure. See id.)
The E.O. then delineated two types of threats-"physical threats to tangible
property" and "threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on
the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures
('cyber threats')"-and noted that "many of these critical infrastructures are owned
and operated by the private sector." See id.; see also The Clinton Administration's
Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, at 1
(May 22, 1998).
In 1998, the FBI established a National Infrastructure Protection Center "to
prevent, deter, respond to, and investigate attacks on the nation's critical
infrastructure." Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Terrorism in the United States: 1998, at 9, 17, available at
http://www.fbi.govllibrary/terror/terroris.htm.
428. Sir Robert Peel, who is largely credited with devising the model in 1882 in
London of the modern police force, countered his opponents' suggestions that such an
organized police would infringe people's liberty by "asking if liberty '... consists[sj
[sic] in having your house robbed by organized gangs of thieves?' Christopher
Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation 3 (2d ed. 1998)
(quoting George L. Kirkham & Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Introduction to Law
Enforcement (1980)); see also Saltzburg, supra note 328, at 1001 ("Only in a secure
nation can the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution themselves be
secure."); Chiarella & Newton, supra note 131, at 25-26 ("No governmental interest is
more fundamental than guaranteeing the security of the nation. Only in a secure
nation can the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution be secure. United
States intelligence activities play a vital role in the protection of national
security.... ." (footnotes omitted)).
Similarly, a person wrongfully accused and convicted is most poignantly and
pointedly denied his liberty-so technologies such as DNA analysis, which exculpate
the innocent as much as they inculpate the guilty, have potentially great value in
ensuring our liberty.
429. See supra note 422.
430. See generally Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolitism and
Modern Government: The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 Wash.
L. Rev. 857 (2000). Quoting Madison in Federalist 45 as stating that "[t]he powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State," Judge Talmadge noted that
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government to preserve national security,4-' our country has built law-
enforcement agencies far beyond what was present when the
Constitution was crafted. 32 We also have witnessed the proliferation
of federal crimes.433
There are also reasons outside of law-enforcement for which
increasing control over the populace is sought. The size, diversity, and
mobility of the nation's population require means to count, account
for, differentiate, and keep track of people for the proper delivery of
governmental services with a minimum of waste and fraud.4" Given
these internal and external threats to the nation's security and peace
and given the demand for greater governmental services delivered
more efficiently and accurately, our society and government should
capitalize on these technologies. The regime proposed in this Note
assumes that surveillance technologies can and should effectively be
used to serve these goals.
"[e]ven the advocates of a smaller federal governmental presence, such as Madison,
conceded the need for vigorous exercise of government power by the states." hi. at
867.
431. See id. at 868. Judge Talmadge noted, "Although the U.S. Constitution does
not specifically reference the police power, the Founders envisioned a federal
government actively exercising police powers within the sphere of its enumerated
powers. The Framers considered the police power an essential attribute of
government sovereignty." Id. (footnotes omitted).
432. See Steiker, supra note 421, at 824 (responding to and criticizing Professor
Amar's "intentionalist" reading of the Fourth Amendment). Professor Steiker notes:
"[Alt the time of the drafting and ratifying of the Fourth Amendment, nothing even
remotely resembling modern law enforcement existed. The invention in the
nineteenth century of armed, quasi-military, professional police forces, whose form.
function, and daily presence differ dramatically from that of the colonial
constabulary ... d.
433. Baker, supra note 243, at 678 (discussing how federalization of crime
contradicts constitutional notions of the respective federal and state police powers).
Professor Baker cites "the Supreme Court's statement in United States v.
Lopez that the Commerce Clause power does not include a general police power to
define and punish all crimes," and notes that "Congress and the Justice Department,
however, continue to act as if the federal government has virtually unlimited police
powers." Id at 674 (footnotes omitted). A report from a commission Congress
created in 1997 as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
described the proliferation of federal crimes as "startling." Commission on the
Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement, Law Enforcement in a New Century and
A Changing World: Improving the Administration of Federal Law Enforcement 2
(2000). The report continued:
In 1789, perhaps a dozen crimes were considered sufficiently serious to
warrant Federal attention; today that total exceeds 3,000. Federalizing
common crimes-crimes that historically were the responsibility of State and
local law enforcement agencies-has placed U.S. society in danger of having
Federal law enforcement resources spread much too thinly. If the trend
continues, the United States vill develop the type of national police force
that we have traditionally avoided.
Id.
434. See supra note 126-27 and accompanying text.
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Though broad, government's power under the theory of our
government is also limited. While the Constitution affords the states
and the federal government considerable power, the Constitution was
primarily a powers-limiting document, painting with a broad brush
what and how the federal government was to operate.435 The Bill of
Rights specifically enumerated those fundamental rights that, in
Justice Cardozo's words, are "the very essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty," '436 where the government had to tread lightly, if at all.437 As
Chief Justice Burger remarked in INS v. Chadha,438 "[cjonvenience
and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of
democratic government." '439 While society has a justified need for
effective public safety through vigorous prosecution of criminals,40 it
is critical that those crafting the policy of surveillance bear in mind
Professor Amar's observation that the citizenry's security is
threatened as much by the government as by criminals."
A. Proposal
This Note argues that the current regime for surveillance
technologies should be changed in several fundamental ways in order
to keep the spirit of the Constitution and the Fourth Amendment
meaningful in a technological age. Though substantial, the changes
proposed here need not and should not constrict the lawful use of
these powerful and promising technologies for legitimate
governmental purposes. Unlawful surveillance, on the other hand,
deserves little quarter. If the unreasonable use of the technologies
cannot be adequately prevented or if no reasonable use can be
articulated, necessarily a technology offends the principle contained in
the Fourth Amendment that the right to be secure from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated. The changes advocated
here are aimed primarily at preventing abuse and misuse of the
technologies, by reckoning fully with several problematic
characteristics of modern surveillance technologies in the current
regime: that many of these technologies are unknown to the general
public because they are inherently intended to be used without
435. See Baker, supra note 243, at 674; Talmadge, supra note 430, at 868 ("The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined.") (quoting The Federalist No. 45).
436. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
437. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(describing how the Court strictly scrutinizes legislation regulating speech by
requiring the regulation to be "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling
Government interest").
438. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
439. Id. at 944.
440. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (noting law
enforcement is the other side of "the Miranda equation").
441. See supra note 342.
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detection by citizen-subjects;442 that they are characterized by rapid
development and are growing increasingly sophisticated;" 3 that the
laws in place to regulate the more commonplace forms of
surveillance-such as wiretaps and bugs-fail to reach other
important and powerful ways that government monitors and controls
citizens-such as the many and increasingly interconnected databases
of the federal government;-. and that there is a substantial
opportunity for and long history of misuse of covert surveillance
technologies." 5  Ultimately, this proposal seeks to shift the
jurisprudence of surveillance from a normative orientation to a
process orientation. One set of important aims of the proposal is to
create broader public recognition of the true extent of the
government's surveillance capability, to create mechanisms for more
open and fuller public discourse about central normative issues (such
as what surveillance is reasonable and what is not), and to integrate
the perspectives of the general public into the decisions about these
normative judgments. A second set of aims is to require the
government to take into account the full and future capabilities of the
technologies and to implement realistic and viable measures to
prevent misuse.
1. Legislative or Administrative Rulemaking
At the heart of this proposal is the adoption by the court of a rule
that the use of technology is per se unreasonable unless the executive
agency or the Congress (or both) have clearly and overtly disclosed its
intended usage and established the rules and regulations governing its
use, especially measures to effectively prevent abuse or misuse.
Building on proposals by several academics, such as Professor
Amsterdam, 6 and recently the American Bar Association,"7 the
442. See supra Part L.A & notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
443. See supra Part I.A.
444. See supra notes 287-303 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
446. The centerpiece of Professor Amsterdam's proposal for reform was "that
police discretion to conduct search and seizure activity be tolerably confined by either
legislation or police-made rules and regulations, subject to judicial review for
reasonableness." See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 409. Professor Amsterdam
explained:
I think that the Court should hold that the fourth amendment requires all
police search and seizure activity to be regulated by legal directives that
confine police discretion within reasonable bounds.... Unless a search or
seizure is conducted pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or
police departmental rules and regulations, it is an unreasonable search and
seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment.
Id at 416. Professor Amsterdam indicated a preference for rulemaking, skeptical as
he was about the ability of the legislature to meet this challenge. See id. at 378-79
("The long-time, wholesale 'legislative default' in regulating police practices is no
accident. Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become
sensitive to concerns of protecting persons under investigation by the police.").
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function and purpose of such a rule would be to force the
government- either the executive governmental agencies seeking to
use these technologies or the Congress-to be accountable in their use
of increasingly sophisticated and unobtrusive technologies; the
government would bear the burden in the first instance of defining
their reasonable use and implementing measures to prevent misuse.
The present jurisprudence of electronic searches and seizures places
the burden on the citizen to detect and prove the unreasonableness of
an intrusion.18 As has been discussed, this arrangement renders the
Fourth Amendment almost meaningless in this context, since citizens
are rarely able to detect (let alone prove) the use (reasonable or not)
of a technology whose success by its nature depends on the
unwittingness of its subject.449
The contents of these legislative or administrative rules created for
these covert surveillance technologies should include at least the
following basic elements: First, the rules should clearly and
comprehensively describe the technology so that law-enforcement
agents, citizens, and judges understand what is at issue. Second, the
rules should explain, with meaningful specificity, the reason for the
technology's deployment-the goals that justify its use. Third, the
rules should explain (in general terms but again with meaningful
specificity) how the technology will be used; the rules should not
unduly constrict the discretion necessary for law enforcement to
effectively carry out the difficult job entrusted to it. Fourth, the rules
Similarly, Professor Amar has suggested that a meaningful Fourth
Amendment should be prospectively rather than retroactively regulatory. See Amar,
supra note 142, at 815 ("Early prevention is often better than after-the-fact remedy.").
Further, he has suggested greater input by citizenry, such as through citizen review
panels and "public promulgation of agency guidelines [that] will enable the citizenry
to better assess the things done in their name." See id. at 817. Richard Morgan,
seeking a middle ground, has stated: "What is needed is a flexible combination of
statutory and administrative rules with oversight mechanisms adjusted so that
compliance is strongly encouraged, but without paralyzing law enforcement agencies
when crime is suspected in political contexts." See Morgan supra note 135, at 13.
Professor Gerard Bradley also criticizes the present "'judicialized' regime of search
and seizure" and argues that "the reasonableness clause, properly understood...
exists to affirm legislative supremacy over the law of search and seizure." See Gerard
V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DePaul L. Rev.
817, 817 (1989). He therefore advocates placing (or rather replacing) the power to
"shape our 'living' law of search and seizure" into the hands of legislators rather than
judges, see id. at 856-57, and suggests Title III as paradigmatic: "Having decided that
society deems electronic surveillance to be fourth amendment activity, the Court in
effect said to Congress: put together a regulatory scheme along the lines which we
have sketched here." Id. at 869 (footnote omitted).
447. One of the reasons the American Bar Association promulgated standards
related to electronic surveillance was to "encourage the development-both by
legislatures and administrative bodies-of even more specific written rules governing
technologically-assisted physical surveillance." ABA Standards for Electronic
Surveillance, supra note 67, at 7.




should explain how the technology's use will meet the stated goals.
Finally, the rules should detail how the individual governmental
agents will be accountable to the governmental agency and the
governmental agency to the public in the use of their discretion; the
rules should contain reasonable and realistic mechanisms to ensure
that the governmental agents and agencies conform with parameters
and procedures that are established.
This burden must also be meaningful. The case of Carnivore can be
used to illustrate how such a rule would operate: In the legislation or
administrative rulemaking, the FBI would describe what Carnivore is
(a suite of software which, when attached to the computers of an
Internet service-provider, would permit the FBI to intercept
electronic communications)5 0 and what purpose it serves. The
purpose served seems self-apparent-given the quickly growing use of
this medium for general communication, law enforcement needs the
power to intercept electronic communications in the proper
circumstances, lest the Internet foster rampant criminal activity.
Nevertheless, the description of the purposes should be thorough and
specific. 451
In addition, the FBI would be obliged to show how Carnivore
would work and to clearly demonstrate that there are effective
mechanisms to ensure compliance with proposed norms. If the FBI
sought to stretch Title III to cover the use of Carnivore, the FBI
would have to prove that the interception of electronic
communication is in nature and practice sufficiently identical to
interception of telephonic or wire communication to allow identical
treatment under the law. As discussed above, Carnivore differs
substantially in key ways from traditional telephonic wiretapping-
particularly the ease with which it can be configured to comb very
broadly the traffic search traversing an Internet service-provider's
network.452 More fateful still, Carnivore as configured in late 2000
consisted of technical features that too-easily thwarted oversight;
agents could use it totally unaccountably.45 As long as Carnivore's
configuration lacks reliable and realistic mechanisms for oversight, it
would fail to meet the standards proposed here.
Giving the executive-branch law-enforcement agencies such a
prominent role in promulgating these rules itself creates the potential
for abuse,4 if the rulemaking is not diligent and if mere lip-service is
450. See supra notes 44-46, 316-23 and accompanying text for a description and
discussion of Carnivore.
451. See supra note 274 for a discussion of recent legislation whose measures were
out of proportion, if not entirely unrelated, to the problem purportedly addressed.
452. See Independent Review of Carnivore, supra note 43, at 3-4 to 3-5.
453. See supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
454. See supra note 135 and accompanying text for discussion of abuses by law
enforcement, and supra notes 345-48 and accompanying text for discussion of how
officials in intelligence agencies bristle under the current rules.
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paid to the tall burdens imposed on the government. One important
means of ensuring a level of diligence is the public exposure of these
technologies and their governing rules to public discourse and
scrutiny. This public airing of the proposal would permit lawmakers
and public advocacy groups to test the legitimacy of the proposal and
its underlying elements. The other important lever for ensuring
diligence is the oversight of the judiciary.
2. Judicial Role
In effect, the courts would be a primary bulwark against the foxes
taking over the henhouse. Thus, the role of the courts in this
proposed regime would be critical.455 The judiciary's primary role
would be to require that executive-branch law-enforcement agencies
fully disclose and be accountable for their use of these technologies.
Courts would oversee the development of proper rules and
regulations, viable and effective measures to prevent misuse, and
compliance with these rules and regulations. For example, the courts
could prevent Congress from enacting with little public discourse laws
that made subtle but significant changes in the government's powers
of surveillance, as it has done on several occasions in amending Title
111,456 and as occurred with legislation hastily enacted after the events
of September 11, 2001. 457
The courts' role would entail oversight of both the procedure and
substance of the rulemaking. Procedurally, courts would make sure
that the legislature or the executive-branch agency crafting
administrative rulemaking describe the technology, its use, and its
purpose with sufficient clarity and specificity. The courts must ensure
that penalties effectively deter governmental agents or agencies from
circumventing the rulemaking or legislative sanction recommended
455. See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 429 ("Judicial review both of the substance
of the rules and of police compliance with them in particular cases remains
essential.").
456. See Barr, supra note 109, at 75 (discussing the surreptitious enactment of a
provision broadening the use of "roving wiretaps"). If, as seems likely, neither the
courts nor the populace would permit Congress to quietly and surreptitiously pass a
law affecting a First Amendment right, it seems worth asking why the courts would
treat a law affecting Fourth Amendment rights any differently.
457. See supra note 272 and accompanying text for discussion of pressure exerted
by the Bush administration on Congress to quickly enact wide-reaching legislation.
Although legislation strengthening the government's surveillance powers passed by
overwhelming majorities in the House (337-79) and Senate (96-1), it was enacted with
little debate in the House and Senate. See Toner & Lewis, House Passes Terrorism
Bill, supra note 273; Robin Toner & Neil A. Lewis, Bill Greatly Expanding
Surveillance Power in Terrorism Fight Clears the Senate, N.Y. Times, Oct 12, at B 11.
However, the version of the bill passed by the House was different from the version
negotiated and unanimously adopted by the House Judiciary Committee; the version
passed was one agreed on by "top House Republicans and the Bush administration"
and inserted at the last minute, so that there was little opportunity to read and debate
the bill. See Toner & Lewis, House Passes Terrorism Bill, supra note 273.
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here-creating strong rules on the surface but then permitting
governmental agents or agencies to easily hide dubious practices is no
solution. Further, the courts should ensure that the mechanism
touches the many facets of governmental surveillance, especially those
activities that yield information that will not be exposed in court
(where defendants are motivated to expose and challenge the legality
of the search), such as the creation of powerful but largely invisible
databases. In this sense, the judiciary's role in the regime proposed
here closely resembles the "participation-oriented, representation-
reinforcing approach to judicial review"4 '8 advocated by Professor
Ely.459 As Professor Ely explained:
[U]nlike an approach geared to the judicial imposition of
"fundamental values," the representation-reinforcing orientation ...
is entirely supportive of[] the American system of representative
democracy. It recognizes the unacceptability of the claim that
appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of
conventional values than elected representatives, devoting itself
instead to policing the mechanisms by which the system seeks to
ensure that our elected representatives actually represent.o
Substantively, the courts' first responsibility would be to scrutinize
the agency's articulated purpose and the extent to which the
government's stated purposes dovetail with the stated capabilities of
the technology. In the context of administrative rulemaking, the
ordinarily high level of deference that courts afford executive-branch
agencies would have to be lowered,4 61 since the issues involved here
are potentially, if not actually, of a constitutional dimension. "
Indeed, the standard of judicial review for both legislative and
administrative rulemaking should be consistent with the standard of
review for other constitutional rights; the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause and the First
Amendment, for example, requires the government (usually
Congress) to articulate either an important or compelling
governmental interest and to demonstrate that the measure is either
substantially related or narrowly tailored to meet that interest4h3
458. Ely, supra note 13, at 87.
459. See id. at 73-104.
460. Id. at 101-02.
461. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.. 467 U.S. 837, 842-
44 (1984) (establishing rule that courts should defer to an agency if the agency's
interpretation of a statute is reasonable); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I1), 332
U.S. 194,202-03 (1947) (holding that administrative agencies may flesh out vague and
ambiguous statutes through retroactive adjudication); see e.g., U.S. Telecom Ass'n v.
FCC, 227 F.3d 450,457-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating the Cherron doctrine).
462. Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1986) (stating as a reason for
not deferring to an administrative agency's construction of a statute that "a pure
question of statutory construction [is] for the courts to decide").
463. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (holding that
Virginia failed to show "an exceedingly persuasive justification" for its all-male state-
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A second important substantive oversight responsibility of the
courts would be to scrutinize the mechanisms proposed by the agency
to ensure compliance with the stated standards. Courts would be
tasked with evaluating whether there was adequate accountability of
the agents and the agencies to ensure that the discretion remains
properly moderated. In addition, courts would scrutinize whether the
enforcement mechanisms proposed by the agency or legislature would
sufficiently guard against wayward conduct. However, since the
jurisdiction of federal courts requires that there be a case or
controversy, 4 one important open question would be how to ensure
that a legislative or administrative law could be reviewed by the
courts-in other words, how to ensure that citizens or groups have
standing to challenge a surveillance-sanctioning law or the executive-
branch agency's adherence to such a law even when the citizen or
group is not directly effected.
3. Limiting Governmental Immunity
The present system of law enforcement affords agents with broad
immunity. In large part, this is a function of the heavy reliance on
warrants, which serve to immunize governmental agents.4 65  This
immunity greatly erodes the accountability of governmental agents.
Following a proposal by Professor Amar,4s the regime advocated here
would seek to increase the accountability of governmental agents and
agencies' use of covert surveillance technologies by limiting this
immunity and permitting juries to decide whether conduct is
supported military academy); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) ("[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."); Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding that Oklahoma in enacting a statute that
treated men and women differently failed to show that the gender-based distinction
served an important governmental interest and was substantially related to its
objective); see also supra note 437 and accompanying text.
464. See U.S. Const. art III, § 2.
465. See supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text for discussion of warrants and
immunity. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 also created immunity for non-governmental
agents who assist with a wiretap pursuant to FISA. See Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 225, 115 Stat.
272 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1805). The new law provides:
No cause of action shall lie in any court against any provider of a wire or
electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person
(including any officer, employee, agent, or other specified person thereof)
that furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assistance in
accordance with a court order or request for emergency assistance under this
Act.
50 U.S.C. § 1805(h).
466. See Amar, supra note 142, passim.
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reasonable, and, if not, the appropriate measure of punishment.
Professor Amar has recommended strict governmental liability for
unreasonable searches and seizures:
In our century, however, judges for the first time have created wide
zones of individual officer immunity for constitutional torts. Within
these zones, the innocent citizen victim is in effect "held liable" and
left to pay for the government's constitutional wrong.... The best
way to close this shocking remedial gap today would be to recognize
direct liability of the government entity.... If the search or seizure
is ultimately deemed unreasonable, the government entity should
pay. And the damages assessed will be a visible sign to legislators
and the general public of the true costs of unreasonable government
conduct.
467
Thus, under Professor Amar's rubric, not only should this compel
proper exercise of discretion, but the costs of unreasonable searches
or seizures are borne by the tortfeasor-the government.
4. Citizen Involvement
These normative decisions about reasonableness of searches and
seizures and about the government's power versus citizens' rights
would be returned to the citizens. Rather than having law-
enforcement officers and agencies unilaterally deciding and judges
periodically decreeing what intrusions are reasonable and what
privacy is appropriate, citizens should have meaningful input on these
important normative decisions. Citizens should be far more involved
than they presently are in making normative decisions about the
relevance and substance of their own privacy interest and their own
tolerance for governmental intrusions in the name of maintaining
public order.
Ensuring or increasing citizens' involvement can take several forms.
First, this proposed regime envisions greater use of the various
political measures available, especially through legislative or
administrative deliberation, discourse, and debate.', In addition,
increased citizen involvement can take the form of public hearings or
citizens' advisory committees, where law enforcement would present a
technology and its intended use to the public. Citizens would provide
feedback and guidance about how they value their liberties vis-a-vis
security and what they deem unreasonable;4 9 to be meaningful, the
government's disclosures about the technology and the intended uses
should be thorough and comprehensive, and citizens' input should be
able to influence outcomes.
467. Id. at 812-13.
468. See supra notes 446-54 and accompanying text.




The second mechanism for increasing citizens' involvement in
defining Fourth Amendment reasonableness is through the jury
system. Following a proposal by Professor Amar, this regime would
seek to reintroduce civil and criminal penalties against governmental
agents conducting unreasonable searches and seizures as a key means
for policing the police's conduct.47° As Professor Amar noted, such a
system, which comports with the practice in the late eighteenth
century, would be a very effective method for preserving the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.471 However, this development would
require a fundamental rethinking of warrants, which are currently the
centerpiece of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.472
B. Advantages
As mentioned above, the regime proposed here is principally
concerned with redressing several problematic characteristics of
modern surveillance technologies. 473 The first section of Part III has
sketched the operation of this proposed regime and has attempted to
show how the proposal accomplishes its intended goals. This section
suggests several additional operational and doctrinal advantages that
are gained by making legislative or administrative pre-clearance bear
the brunt of the regulation of surveillance technologies.
First, although courts possess considerable institutional
competencies and resources, the executive-branch law-enforcement
agencies that seek to deploy the technology will know more about the
technology and the purposes for which it is being developed. In
addition, since courts decide specific cases and controversies, they
may not be presented the full scope of a technology when deciding its
constitutionality, as Kyllo illustrates.474 Thus, by placing this onus of
declaring an intended use and proposing the parameters for such use,
this regime has the advantage of drawing on the expertise of those
who will actually use the technologies.
Second, given their greater technological expertise, these agencies,
can, with appropriate oversight, develop parameters and rules that are
customized to the technology. As the ABA has suggested, what is
reasonable will vary depending on the particular technology and the
particular usage. 47  Further, a single technology may have multiple
applications, with each application creating different benefits and
posing different risks and thus requiring different constraints and
protections.476 However, the Supreme Court's conjunctive reading of
470. See Amar, supra note 142, passim.
471. See supra notes 407-11 and accompanying text.
472. See supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text.
473. See supra Part II and text accompanying notes 44245.
474. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
476. For example, rudimentary thermal imagers can be used to monitor unusual
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the Fourth Amendment has yielded a simple binary jurisprudence-
conduct that is a search or seizure requires a warrant, which serves to
assure reasonableness, while conduct that is not requires nothing"-
which fails to adequately address the many possible gradations of the
invasiveness of a particular technology or application and the
importance and value of the information gleaned. Further, since
warrants require a showing of probable cause and particularity of
description, the Court currently seems disinclined to find that
technologies which intrude relatively minimally on each person's
privacy but which improve safety and security are searches or
seizures.47 And just as there are technological applications where a
warrant is overly burdensome, there may also be technologies and
applications where a warrant is not sufficiently rigorous and more
precautions are required.479 In short, the present regime lacks the
suppleness necessary to properly regulate the many surveillance
technologies in use and in development.
A third operational advantage is that this regime would eliminate
the interval during which a highly intrusive technology is being used
without public or judicial scrutiny. For example, the FBI first
implemented its Carnivore system secretly; though the FBI apparently
hews closely to Title III for the use of Carnivore, there may yet be
different or additional risks posed by this new technology that require
different treatment. Under the current regime, the constitutionality of
a particular technology's usage percolates slowly to the Supreme
Court, during which time there may be no constraints on its usage and
thus no ability to attempt to ensure its use is reasonable.' Some
technologies, such as large-scale federal databases, are never judicially
scrutinized at all. The regime proposed here would attempt to close
this gap by placing the evaluation of the technology upfront.
Fourth, Professor Amsterdam delineated several ways that his
regime would improve the performance of the police in upholding the
Fourth Amendment. First, requiring the police to make prior rules
heat patterns emanating from houses, while more sophisticated versions can detect
weapons, drugs, and other contraband on people. See supra notes 77-83 and
accompanying text.
477. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
478. Since it would be impractical to require law enforcement to secure warrants
for broad but minimally invasive surveillance such as face-recognition cameras or
airport metal detectors, the Court has crafted an administrative or special-needs
exception to the warrant requirement. See Buffaloe, supra note 142, at 533-42.
However, once a technology has been deemed not to implicate the Fourth
Amendment, there are effectively no other controls over its use.
479. The prime example of this is surveillance orders for wiretaps. See Taylor,
supra note 139, at 79-85 (discussing differences between search warrants and
surveillance orders). Though often treated as synonymous with regular search
warrants, surveillance orders were designed initially to be more cumbersome. See
supra note 23742 and accompanying text.
480. See supra Part 11.A.1.
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about certain practices would improve "the quality of police
decisions" by 1) making police aware that there are policies to be
made-rather than making decisions haphazardly, 2) by forcing
"someone with responsibility and proven judgment" to make these
decisions, and 3) by increasing the awareness of the seriousness of
their practices.48' Second, such rulemaking would ensure fairness and
consistency in the treatment of citizens. 41 Third, in contrast to the
current practice which "remains necessarily unresponsive and
irresponsible," his proposal would "increase[] the visibility of police
policy decisions. "483 Such a system would force the police to confront
its own practices and to make them known to other government
agencies and to the general public.' In Professor Amsterdam's view,
"[r]ulemaking offers the best hope we have for getting policemen
consistently to obey and enforce constitutional norms that guarantee
the liberty of the citizen. '
The increasing reliance by the police and federal law enforcement
on surveillance also represents a decision on how to allocate financial
and personnel resources.486 Although there was a rush to change
wiretap laws after September 11, 48 1 there was also considerable
evidence that the failure was not due to lack of technology or to
481. Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 423-24; supra Part II.A.1.
482. Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 425.
483. Id. at 426.
484. Id. at 426-27.
485. Id. at 428 (emphasis in original omitted).
486. The financial costs of surveillance are substantial. In 1999, courts authorized
federal and state law-enforcement to conduct 1350 wiretaps. See Wiretap Report
1999, supra note 26, at 7. The total cost of these wiretaps was in excess of $70 million,
and the average wiretap cost $57,511, of which the cost in manpower constitutes the
vast majority of this expense. See Wiretap Report 1999, supra note 26, at 10.
Dwarfing this sum, however, is the $500 million that taxpayers will pay to retrofit
existing telecommunications facilities so that law enforcement has a guaranteed right
of access to any and all electronic communications, pursuant to CALEA. See OTA,
Surveillance in a Digital Age, supra note 21, at 6. One recent estimate placed the cost
of electronic surveillance and spy satellites at $10 billion a year. See Tim Weiner, To
Fight in the Shadows, Get Better Eyes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2001, § 4 (Week in
Review), at 1.
There is also reason to question the value of these large investments.
Recently, the government disclosed that a U.S. federal agent spying for the Soviet and
Russian governments compromised a surveillance operation under the Russian
Embassy in Washington, D.C. costing "several hundred million dollars." James Risen
& Lowell Bergman, U.S. Thinks Agent Revealed Tunnel at Soviet Embassy: Costly
Effort to Spy in Washington Was Ruined, Officials Say, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2001, at 1.
The journalists also note that this was not atypical. Id. ("The tunnel operation against
the Soviet complex.. . is just one of many similar clandestine technical operations run
by the United States intelligence community .... And, like the embassy operation,
many of those other operations were eventually compromised by spies.").
Critics also question whether the track record of databases are any better. For
example, in his evaluation of the Treasury Department's FinCEN, Steven Bercu
asserts that the benefits of FinCEN have never been adequately shown. See Bercu,
supra note 96, at 447-48.
487. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
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overly restrictive laws.' Instead, there were other indications that
the "failure" to prevent the attack on the Pentagon and the World
Trade Center-to the extent that the attacks actually could have been
interdicted-was a failure in other aspects of the United States' law
enforcement and intelligence. Indeed, it may be the case that our
security lies in devoting fewer resources to high-technology
clandestine surveillance and more resources on time-tested
488. See infra note 489.
489. The hijackings exposed how the security measures in place at American
airports are poorly enforced. See Kate Zernike, Change Ahead for Troubled Boston
Airport Agency, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2001, at A14 (describing Logan Airport's
history of security lapses and how sinecure is rife at the authority that runs the
airport); see also Carey Goldberg, Boston's Airport Security Is Described as Standard,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2001, at A16 (stating that the type and frequency of security
lapses at Logan was comparable to other U.S. airports). A second frequently-cited
reason for the "failure" was problems within and among the law-enforcement and
intelligence communities, such as internecine battles within the agencies and turf wars
without, incompetence, and lack of agents able to translate intercepts of Arabic and
Farsi communications. See Seymour M. Hersh, W1'hat Went Wrong: The C.LA. and the
Failure of American Intelligence, The New Yorker, Oct. 8, 2001, at 34 (describing
problems within the C.I.A., particularly the small and decreasing number of
intelligence operatives in the field, that prevented it from detecting and preventing
the attacks of September 11); Walter Pincus, Committee: Terrorism Threat Is Long-
Term; Agencies Advised To Collaborate More, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 2001. at A33
(noting the "concern" in Washington, D.C., that "neither the FBI nor CIA has
enough Arabic and Farsi translators for the enormous amounts of intelligence
intercepts occurring around the world"); Peter Slevin, FBI Courts Arab, Muslim
Communities: Agency Seeks Information, Easing of Old Tensions, Wash. Post. Sept.
19, 2001, at A14 (discussing the FBI's difficulty in gaining contacts within the Muslim
and Arab-American communities and stating that "the infiltration of terror networks
has proven far more difficult than even the puncturing of Soviet intelligence or Mafia
families, particularly given a shortage of Arab American agents"); Tim Weiner &
David Cay Johnston, Roadblocks Cited in Efforts to Trace Bin Laden's Money, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 2001, at Al (citing as one reason the U.S. government failed to track
and stop the flow of money between the terrorists was that the people within the U.S.
intelligence agencies assigned the task were "generally incompetent" to handle it).
In addition, there are commentators who credit the perpetrators as much as
criticize U.S. intelligence and law enforcement. See Hersh, supra: see also Stephen J.
Hedges et al., FBI Probes 5th Flight for Hijackers: Plane Grounded on Day of Attack,
Chi. Trib., Sept. 18, 2001, at 1 (describing evidence that the hijackers used computers
at public libraries to avoid detection while communicating); Weiner, supra note 486
("[American surveillance's] targets are hard men hiding in shadows and speaking in
codes, against whom spy satellites, surveillance systems and smart bombs count for
little.").
Amid the news about the government's attempt to expand its wiretapping
capabilities was the not-very-prominent disclosure of a highly classified internal
investigation into alleged improprieties by the FBI in the investigations of the
bombings of two United States' embassies in Tanzania and Saudi Arabia in 1998. See
David Johnston & James Risen, Officials Say 2 More Jets May Have Been in the Plot,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 2001, at B1. According to a report appearing in the New York
Times, the investigation was instigated by the chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (the court that administers warrants for surveillance orders under
FISA), "apparently related to whether the [FBI] was seeking wiretaps under the
[Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] on individuals without informing the court of
a subject's status pending criminal investigations." Id.
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intelligence-gathering and crime-fighting methods49°- for example, by
deploying more officers on the street and focusing on improving the
techniques and technologies currently in place.
Finally, Professor Amsterdam identified four doctrinal advantages
of shifting a substantial part of the responsibility for making Fourth
Amendment law from the judiciary to administrative bodies or to the
legislature 9.4 1  First, "it provides a pervasive safeguard against
arbitrary searches and seizures that runs the length and breadth of the
amendment and does not require the creation of any new
categories .... ,49 Second, the rules would be clear, flexible, and
intelligible (without being "amorphous") to law-enforcement agents,
since law-enforcement agents who are presumptively more
knowledgeable than the courts about the technologies and the
purposes (legitimate and otherwise) for deploying the technologies,
would have created the rules.493 Third, forcing the police to secure
authorization for certain practices through administrative rulemaking
"would operate to tame the wild proliferation of police practices that
has presented one of the Supreme Court's greatest problems in
developing a coherent body of fourth amendment law." '494 Finally,
rulemaking "would permit the Court to extend the coverage of the
fourth amendment over police activities that demand some control
against abuse but do not appear to lend themselves to regulation by
warrants or the probable cause standard of justification. '" 495
490. See Weiner, supra note 486 (citing an intelligence expert as recently saying
that "'American intelligence was in disarray, drowning under a tidal wave of
technology, harried by short-term military tasks, [and] short on brain power").
491. Professor Amsterdam placed greater faith in administrative rulemaking to
correct the ills of the Fourth Amendment practice than in legislation by the Congress.
See Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 378-79. As Professor Amsterdam stated,
Nor do I ignore the possibility of controlling that ["enormous range of
police"] power [that "stands unrestrained"] and restraining its abuses by
subconstitutional law. I only wish that the possibility might become a
reality. But our fondest hopes must be tempered by a little common sense.
The long-time, wholesale "legislative default" in regulating police practices
is no accident. Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to
become sensitive to the concern of protecting persons under investigation by
the police.
Id.
492. Id. at 418.
493. Id. at 418-19.
494. Id. at 419. See supra notes 481-85 and accompanying text for discussion of
how rulemaking would improve police practices.
495. Amsterdam, supra note 290, at 422. As discussed above, the Supreme Court's
reliance on the warrant's probable-cause requirement to ensure the reasonableness of
a search or seizure has led the Court to contort its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and allow practices which are clearly searches or seizures, but which would never




There are numerous examples of misuse of surveillance
technologies,4 96 confirming the Founders' suspicions about the often
irresistible allure of power.4 97 Justice Scalia recently observed that
"[o]nly someone who has worked in the field of law enforcement can
fully appreciate the vast power and the immense discretion that are
placed in the hands of a prosecutor with respect to the objects of his
investigation."4 98 Americans take great pride and comfort in the belief
that our democratic institutions499 largely serve to prevent abuses of
496. See supra notes 135, 341-44 and accompanying text.
497. As Senator Sam Ervin, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, stated in 1974:
The Founding Fathers knew well that with power comes the ability to do
harm. The fundamentals of our constitutional system require us always to
ensure that governmental power is sufficiently constrained by law so that as
much as is humanly possible the power of government is used for good
alone, and that our nation continues to have a government subject to the
people, and not the reverse. We have slowly come to the realization that
this is true no less for information practices as it is for other of
Government's activities.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Preface to 1 Federal Data Banks and Constitutional Rights, supra
note 23, at III.
498. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
499. The robust existence of the "administrative state," in which difficult or
complex issues are delegated to expert and insulated agencies, raises concerns about
the efficacy of political practice as an adequate assurance that law enforcement
conduct clandestine surveillance within the confines of constitutional strictures. See
Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983)
("Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process, but unless we make
the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, erpertise, the
strength of modern government, can become a monster which rules with no practical
limits on its discretion." (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc., v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962))), E. Donald Elliot, INS v.
Chadha The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legislative Veto,
1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 169-75 (describing how the rise of the administrative state has
transformed the three-branch constitutional system originally established). As
Professor Elliot states:
The United States has at least one other "constitution (with a lower-case
'c')," which we might call the "constitution of the administrative state." Its
functions are to provide structure and control over the enormous array of
federal departments, independent commissions, agencies, government
corporations, banks, boards, committees, and quasi-official agencies and
authorities that now exercise power to make law in various forms....
Together the constitution of the administrative state creates a system of law
by which government instrumentalities are supposedly controlled and
managed.
Id. at 169-70.
Another commentator, discussing the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
("FinCEN"), observed: "What dangers arise when an entrenched bureaucratic
agency controls powerful, largely invisible technologies? The chief concern, perhaps,
is that bureaucracies have little incentive to regulate themselves.... FinCEN is
largely cabined off from the political process." See Bercu, supra note 96, at 403.
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power.- ° However, even Louis Freeh, the former Director of the FBI,
acknowledges the very fine line between protection and repression:
Compliance with the highest ethical standards is essential for all law
enforcement officers because one of history's darkest lessons
teaches us what happens when the law is subject to the most
horrifying misuse by police. The place was Nazi Germany and the
time was the 1930s.... Hitler persuaded the German president to
invoke a section of the German constitution that in effect suspended
all civil liberties, thus permitting warrantless searches and seizure of
property without due process.5 0
Thus, the need for some form of careful and thorough oversight and
accountability is especially heightened in the area of clandestine
surveillance because the political controls that may be useful in other
areas are much less availing.
This Note argues that the powers of law enforcement-both legally
and technologically-are already extremely broad. In essence, the
modern Fourth Amendment permits governmental officials extremely
broad discretion to peer into the lives of U.S. citizens-partly because
the Court has ruled that several of these technologies are outside the
Fourth Amendment and partly because the measures that have been
established to ensure that the meaning of it is honored are notably
unavailing in the context of modern surveillance. Further, the current
regime for modern surveillance technologies contains several serious
flaws and these flaws will only worsen as technologies continue to
advance. Given the prospect of a protracted battle against terrorism
following the calamitous hijackings and attacks of September 11, 2001,
new law-enforcement techniques may be appropriate.
However, since the liberties that are central to American ideals are
at issue, there needs to be extremely close analysis of the question
whether the events of September 11 resulted from failures of
500. Cf. Talmadge, supra note 430. Judge Talmadge notes that "[t]he self-
corrective feature of democratic government is a significant check on governmental
abuse, and is often overlooked by advocates of greater constitutional limits on the
police power." Id. at 907. While Judge Talmadge's notion has appeal in the context of
the infringement of property rights by abuses of police powers, it is less clear that
reliance on this "self-corrective feature of democratic government" is a sufficient
safeguard against sophisticated modern electronic surveillance techniques and
technologies, which by their very essence are hidden from view and therefore beyond
the range of the public and therefore democratic self-correction. See supra note 499.
501. See Freeh, supra note 425, at 14; see also 1 Fishman & McKenna, supra note
24, § 1:1, at 1-3 (referencing Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and noting that
"[t]he Watergate scandal... should suffice to destroy any illusions that the United
States is somehow inherently immune from the misuse of these techniques"); Diffie &
Landau, supra note 20, at 4 ("Totalitarian regimes have given us abundant evidence
that the use of wiretaps and even the fear of their use can stifle free speech. Nor is
the political use of electronic surveillance a particularly remote problem-the
Watergate scandal is only the most recent example in contemporary American history
for its use by the party in power in its attempts to stay in power.").
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technology or overly restrictive laws. If not-if the failures resulted
from institutional problems of the intelligence and law-enforcement
agencies-then it seems entirely appropriate to demand that the
agencies correct these malfunctions before the rights of citizens are
further encroached and the agencies given even more power and
discretion.
This Note has attempted to articulate how our fundamental liberty
values can be revived and reconciled with equally important
government interests to permit these technologies to be properly
exploited. It has asserted these technologies be exploited to the
extent of the citizenry's appetite for them and to the extent that their
use can be duly confined within the bounds of the ideals of our
society.
Notes & Observations
